


# The Princeton Theological Review



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# The Princeton Theological Review

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BY

OSWALD T. ALLIS

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# The Princeton Theological Review

JANUARY, 1925

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## SOME RELIGIOUS IMPLICATIONS OF CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY

In 1864 Dr. James McCosh published a brief essay on "The Philosophic Principles involved in the Puritan Theology."<sup>1</sup> Our present world shows no marked interest either in Puritan theology or in its underlying philosophy, while Dr. McCosh himself is remembered more by the walk and the building called by his name in the University over which he once presided than by that philosophy of common sense he so firmly believed and so earnestly advocated. Nevertheless common sense has a curious way of mixing the obvious and the striking, and in the essay referred to there will be found a statement and an exhortation worthy of remembrance—Philosophy is of great importance to theology, but Biblical theologians as such should always avoid identifying their systems with any peculiar metaphysical system.

The statement is obvious; the exhortation is more often honored in the breach than the observance; and sixty years have brought some striking changes. The term theology is for many obsolescent and is being replaced by the term religion; again *Biblical* Theologians are notably few, and systematizers of religion are very many. Religion has no need of philosophy, argue some; philosophy must produce a new substitute for decaying Christianity, assert others. In this essay we shall attempt to give some account of the latter effort, but let us remember our text: Philosophy is of use to

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<sup>1</sup> This was part of the Introduction to the Complete Works of Stephen Charnock, B.D., pp. vi-xlviii of *The Works of Stephen Charnock* (Nicol's Series of Standard Divines. Puritan Period). Edinburgh, 1864.

Christianity, and yet Christianity as such is not identical with any peculiar metaphysical system.

In our country today there are just two living tendencies in philosophy: Speculative Idealism and Neo-Realism. We omit Pragmatism because as the years slip by it is revealing itself more and more as a deliberate refusal to adopt any philosophy as such, but merely so far as is necessary for action, and this without scruple or conviction as to the source whence derived. The case is different with the two first mentioned. Each is a living system striving for survival. Each awaits the master mind that will make of it a synthesis of our complex modern life.

Now if, as Bosanquet remarked, "experience in the broad sense is all we have," experience must be the starting point for all systems of philosophy. This granted, then the two systems mentioned may be explained as the attempted answers to two questions: "What is its value?" asks the idealist, "I wish to appreciate it." "What is its structure?" asks the neo-realist, "I wish to understand it." We must consider the answers in some detail.

## I

In a paper read in 1917 before the Philosophical Club of Yale University,<sup>2</sup> the late Professor J. E. Creighton pointed out that there were two sorts of idealism. One is represented by the "mentalism" begun by Bishop Berkeley and continued with important modifications by Josiah Royce and Miss Calkins,<sup>3</sup> and in addition the "panpsychism" advocated by James Ward<sup>4</sup> and C. A. Strong.<sup>5</sup> The other is represented by "speculative" idealism, by which is meant the philosophy of Bernard Bosanquet.<sup>6</sup> If Professor Creighton had lived to

<sup>2</sup> Afterwards published in *The Philosophical Review*, September, 1917, "Two Types of Idealism."

<sup>3</sup> Leighton, *Field of Philosophy*, 1923, p. 300, "Mentalism means . . . that nothing really exists but minds; that the so-called physical world of common sense is but the appearance of minds to other minds."

<sup>4</sup> See his *Psychological Principles*, 1918, p. 329.

<sup>5</sup> *The Origin of Consciousness*, 1918, and *Theory of Knowledge*, 1924.

<sup>6</sup> Professor Bosanquet died February 9, 1923.

write his article today, he might have recognized as a third type of contemporary idealism that of the Italians, Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile, who have developed the Hegelian dictum, "Philosophy is history," and for whom "mind, active, self-creative and self-creating mind, is literally the only thing in the world, and besides mind there is nothing, not even an all generative Absolute at the beginning or an all merging Absolute in the end."<sup>7</sup> But since Royce's influence is apparently on the decline, and Bosanquet's influence is still on the increase in our country, largely through the efforts of Professor Creighton and his pupils in the Sage School of Philosophy in Cornell University,<sup>8</sup> and since the "neo-idealism" of Croce and Gentile is as yet for most of us an imported novelty with strong Italian flavor, we shall fix our attention upon speculative idealism in order to ascertain its interpretation of experience and the solution it offers for the problems of religion.

In this endeavor we are helped by Mr. Bosanquet's own statement of the genesis and meaning of his philosophy. Mr. J. H. Muirhead noticed that Dr. Raymond Schmidt published with great success *Die Deutsche Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen*. The motif of this book was taken from Fichte's saying, "The kind of philosophy that a man chooses depends upon the kind of man that he is," and the result was a most interesting, journalesque sketch of contemporary German thinkers. What Schmidt did for the Germans, Muirhead has done for the British in his *Contemporary British Philosophy, Personal Statements, First Series*, published in 1924. The volume is vastly more entertaining and illuminating than the labored pages of ponderous dialectic written elsewhere by the several authors in exposition of their views. Mr. Bosanquet's contribution, although not actually the last words he wrote for publication,

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<sup>7</sup> Quoted from C. E. M. Joad, *Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy*, 1924, p. 42.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. A. K. Rogers, *English and American Philosophy since 1800. A Critical Survey*, 1922, p. 298.



is yet, to quote Mr. Muirhead, "of peculiar interest as containing a personal note not elsewhere to be found in his published writings. In this respect, as well as in the general declaration of his philosophical faith which it contains, it may be regarded as his last will and testament to his generation."

This bequest is in the form of an explanation how Bosanquet came to adopt as his own that aspect of Hegelianism which holds that behind our immediate and individual experience, beyond it and yet in it, there is a total concrete universal by which alone it becomes intelligible, and through fellowship in which it is real.<sup>9</sup> Childhood days on a Northumbrian farm aroused in him a "feeling of the coöperative will," and the dim gropings of the dawning years led him to the thought that in some as yet unseen way the collective will is needed by the individual will. Later came one of those events that like the rod thrust into a chemical solution causes experience to crystallize. He heard Dr. Morehouse, later Bishop of Manchester, exclaim with deep emotion after discussing some current criticisms of the New Testament, "But what are all these reasonings to me? I know that these things are true!" Here was an experience that, as the youthful philosopher noted, brought its possessor strength and inspiration, but which could not be interpreted as guaranteeing the historicity of the events to which it was referred. There were evidently values in life—but they could be looked for in the wrong place. How discover the right place? Ah! there was the problem.

Afterwards there came deepening reflection and study. In Plato he found a passion for the unity of things, and from him he learned the great law of value, "that which is filled with the more real, is more really filled"; and also that in human society there is a spirit through which that better and higher "other world" is in principle reconciled with this. From Hegel (probably through F. H. Bradley) he gained the insight that the object-matter of philosophy was never

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<sup>9</sup> Joad, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

something abstract, but always something concrete and present. This explained how the other world could be other and yet in Paul's language "not another," but the actual *feeling* of the fact was not yet his. It soon came, nevertheless, in the aesthetic experience that takes us into a new world that is the old at its best; or, in other words, poetry and art, paradoxical though it be, rise above the actual and yet remain within the sensuous. In the crowning felicity of this aesthetic experience Bosanquet's mind found a rest which was deepened by his acquaintance with F. H. Bradley's *Ethical Studies*, published in 1876. In this volume the notion of "law universal" was developed into a "concrete system," that is to say, the universe of ethics was appreciated as an actual whole of existing institutions which furnish a content for the living and growing universal end.

Thus from childhood's surroundings, from preacher and sage and teacher, and youthful joy in the beauty that expresses the world's characteristic, came to Bosanquet the conviction that the concrete-universal of experience is the typical reality of life. But how demonstrate it? He believed he had found the way in considering thought as the determination of reality and logic as the theory of thought. He was too wise, however, to attempt as Hegel had done, the reduction of thought to a bare formula. For how could this be possible, if thought is the control exercised over our mental powers by a reality as rich as is the concrete universal, and if "logic is the clear perception of the way in which, through their connection and coöperation, the natures that compose the universe frame and mould the assertions that constitute our thought"? If this view be adopted, all the old terms get new meanings. Contradiction arises when different elements of experience attempt to occupy the same place in the same system, and thus come into collision. The universal is not a general predicate, but "the plastic unity of an inclusive reality." The syllogism is the new springing from the old—a process that Ruskin thought he saw symbolized in the leafy spray drawn by some early painter on the wall of

the Spanish Chapel at Santa Maria Novella in Florence—"the leaping and vital flame by which a whole system exhibits its concentrated life within a single focus, creating a something which is at once the old in the new, and the new in the old." In a word Logic aims to bring out the process implied in all the modes of experience in which and by which the spirit of the concrete universal or of individuality is the central essence.

Bosanquet's philosophy is thus the theoretical fabric to the construction of which his experience drove him. This experience was so wide and sympathetic that to quote Professor Hoernle's words:<sup>10</sup> "Few modern philosophers draw the data for their philosophizing from so wide a range, or represent, in the multitude of their contacts, so nearly a microcosm of contemporary civilization." He was convinced that he had found the truth. New ideas must of necessity appear as the whole reveals more of itself, but he was sure that the new would in the main never be irreconcilable with the old.

## II

What now are the religious implications of this system? The answer is given in two of Bosanquet's own works, *What Religion Is* and *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*. In addition we have the sympathetic interpretations of Professor E. L. Schaub<sup>11</sup> and of C. C. J. Webb.<sup>12</sup> In Webb's opinion Bosanquet remained "true to his evangelical traditions," but the unbiased student will note that while, like all the philosophic sons of Hegel, the old terminology is for the most part retained, it is so drastically refilled with new content, that the names alone remain as reminders of whence the user of the names has come. In proof of this let us notice the following distinctions.

<sup>10</sup> *Philosophical Review*, 1923. "On Bosanquet's Idealism," p. 588.

<sup>11</sup> *Philosophical Review*, November, 1923, "Bosanquet's Interpretation of Religious Experience."

<sup>12</sup> *Hibbert Journal*, October, 1923, "Bernard Bosanquet's Philosophy of Religion."



Religion is in general for Bosanquet what it was for Hegel, "the knowledge possessed by the finite mind of its nature as absolute mind,"<sup>13</sup> and yet, with deeper insight, Bosanquet does not interpret this with too intellectualistic an emphasis, for in the sketch already referred to he wrote, "Religion is essentially a union by faith and will with a real supreme perfection in which finite imperfection, though actual, is felt to be transcended and abolished." Religion is thus "just the weld of finite and infinite."<sup>14</sup> We "are spirits, and our life is one with that of the Spirit which is the whole and the good."<sup>15</sup>

What now is God? Naturally we would suppose that the Absolute would be the supreme deity of the system, but the problem of evil and the concrete fact of the religious consciousness compelled Bosanquet to distinguish between the Absolute and the God of religious experience. The latter being definitely against evil is wholly good, and is therefore not that inclusive Being in which all contradictions are transformed and unified. Therefore for our religious consciousness God is "the world consciousness, to which all consciousnesses are contributory, in respect only of a certain *nisus* or characteristic, viz., its attitude to or in the genesis and absorption of evil. And it is for this reason that he is always represented by religion in imaginative forms, which could not be applied to the totality of things as a totality." It will be quite evident that this view precludes the existence of God as a separate being after the pattern of man. God is not "any external or isolable fact or existence," but is merely a name for that character of the world of spiritual membership wherein evil is overcome by good.

Evil is also a name—a name that denotes the finitude of man. We as bits of nature become alive and conscious are, each one of us and all together, constituents of the "Absolute

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<sup>13</sup> "Religionsphilosophie," *Werke*, XI, p. 3.

<sup>14</sup> *What Religion Is*, p. 62.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25.

energy,"<sup>16</sup> and each in striving to take possession of his loftier self, becomes aware of a nature that lies beyond—the good—and of evil, the discordant ideas and attitudes, the obstructed efforts, the conflicting systems and contradictions that belong to his incompleteness. Pain and accident and death are all necessarily involved in this ceaseless striving of the finite self to achieve an infinitude it can never *ex hypothese* attain.

The meaning of evil fixes the meaning of salvation as deliverance from that isolation from the whole which is the source of all sin and suffering. Consequently salvation occurs when we throw ourselves into the nearest "universal," giving ourselves to something, some great social cause or act which we cannot help holding supreme. To do this is to be saved from the conflicts, uncertainties, and sufferings of a life merely self-conscious, but "universally" conscious. "Faith" denotes the attitude of mind in which we thus give up our finite selves, and to be "justified" means to achieve a "whole" self in this manner.

If the meaning of the preceding paragraph is apprehended, it will be seen that while salvation can indefinitely transcend each previous stage, it can never be complete. Religion cannot make us perfect, although being our identification with the good and the true, it "is the only thing that makes life worth living at all."<sup>17</sup>

Equally evident is it that Bosanquet's system offers little information on the subject of immortality—that is to say *individual* immortality, which is the only kind worth having. True, our finite self, being an element in the Absolute is subject to transformation, but there is no rational way of ascertaining of what kind and degree this transformation is.

### III

As already indicated Neo-Realism endeavors to understand the structure of experience. It says that it is weary of the lyric music of the speculative idealists, and reiterates

<sup>16</sup> *Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 335.

<sup>17</sup> *What Religion Is*, p. vii.

scornfully that in nearly a century of trial they have produced no other fruit than "a morbid concern for their own processes and an antiquarian curiosity in their own past."<sup>18</sup> The remedy is to return to the former healthy interest of philosophy in cosmology, which in turn means of course to unite it with present day science. It is high time that this alliance be consummated, for, to quote Professor Montague again, "At a time like the present, when the science of physics in its theories of Relativity and of *Quanta* is approaching what may be a great climax in the intellectual life of the race, it is indescribably humiliating that we who claim to represent the tradition of Plato and Democritus, of Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant, should have allowed ourselves to become so indifferent to the physical world and so ignorant of the new discoveries concerning it that we are unable even to appreciate the situation with which science is confronted."

What then is this Neo-Realism? *Quot homines, tot opinioniones* seems to be the case, and it would merely intensify the confusion to cite the eager testimony of the many thinkers who are ranging themselves under the new banner. Let us select a few and hear what they have to say. And first, Professor W. T. Marvin who some ten years ago told us that all Cartesian dualists may be divided into three classes. First those who believe that science can infer the nature of the physical or non-mental world. In this group belong most of our scientists. Second, those who believe that science can tell us nothing about the world beyond what our senses perceive. In this group are many notable men. Third, those who assert that there is no world transcending our experience. This group includes of course the idealists. But, says Marvin, the first and the second views lead to the absurdity of agnosticism or parallelism, and the third view has been tried for a hundred years and been found wanting. What is in order is a new departure, and this has been made by the Neo-Realists,

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<sup>18</sup> Quoted in part from Professor W. P. Montague's Presidential Address before the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association at Brown University, December 28, 1923.

who for the old notion of cause would substitute that of function, and for the *veraltet* notion of substance that of system with functional relations. This advance, however, consists rather in the change of names than in the change of concepts. In 1918 Professor R. B. Perry<sup>19</sup> summed up Neo-Realism under the following four heads: the common sense belief in the independence of the fact; Plato's teaching as to the objective existence of mathematical and logical truth; the "externality" of relations, or the doctrine that the diverse facts composing the universe are not so bound up with one another that they cannot be transferred without being destroyed; and the "immanence" of consciousness, or that consciousness is homogeneous with its environment and interactive with it. More recently Professor Montague<sup>20</sup> explains Neo-Realism as first, ordinary realism;<sup>21</sup> second, Plato's theory of the independent objectivity of the abstract;<sup>22</sup> and Reid's substitution of a common sense *presentative* theory of knowledge for the *representative* theory of Descartes and Locke.

A critical consideration of the content of the preceding paragraph should indicate to us that Neo-Realism has many *nuances*. Is it a single tendency in philosophy or more? We hazard the surmise that in the next few years the divergences will become increasingly evident. But however this may be, let us complete our account by examining what Bertrand Russell has to say.<sup>23</sup> The new philosophy—Mr. Russell is unwilling to call it Neo-Realism—is derived from many sources, but is always characterized by pluralism as a meta-

<sup>19</sup> *Present Conflict of Ideals*, 1918, pp. 364-380.

<sup>20</sup> *Journal of Philosophy*, October 9, 1924, "Things Perceived and Things Perceiving."

<sup>21</sup> Ordinary Realism is the doctrine of the existence of realities of some description independent of minds and other than minds.

<sup>22</sup> This as already noted under Professor Perry's explanation of Neo-Realism, does not mean that Plato's doctrine of Ideas is adopted in its entirety, but merely that part that asserts the independent objectivity of mathematical and logical truth.

<sup>23</sup> *The Dial*, October, 1924, "Philosophy in the Twentieth Century," pp. 271 seq.

physic and analysis as a method. It tends more and more to adopt Professor James' view that the primary substance of the world is neither mental nor material, but a something more fundamental out of which both mind and matter are constructed. The prime characteristic of this new philosophy, however, is that it regards itself as essentially one with science, differing from the special sciences merely by the generality of its problems and its willingness to form hypotheses when empirical evidence is still lacking. Its method is the method of science. It makes no statements about the universe as a whole, nor does it aim to construct a comprehensive system.<sup>24</sup> It does not regard the world as "organic" in that from a part the whole could be inferred, nor does it attempt like orthodox idealism to deduce from the nature of knowledge the nature of the world.

There are three main sources of this new philosophy—theory of knowledge, logic, and the principles of mathematics. Knowledge makes no difference to what is known,<sup>25</sup> consequently the theory of knowledge ceases to be a clue to the mysteries of the universe, and we are driven back to "the plodding investigation of science." The "new" logic is atomistic; that is to say, it does not believe that a "thorough knowledge of one thing will involve a thorough knowledge of the whole universe." Here again progress can only come through a patient working out of the relations one by one as the mind can apprehend them.

The principles of mathematics used by the new philosophy are the Non-Euclidean Geometry invented by Lobatchevsky which undermined the mathematical argument of Kant's transcendental aesthetic; Weierstrass's proof that continuity does not involve infinitesimals; Cantor's theory of continuity and infinity which abolished many of the old standard para-

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<sup>24</sup> This is not true of all who call themselves Neo-Realists, if we may judge from their published work.

<sup>25</sup> This is an illustration of the externality of relations.



doxes of philosophy; and Frege's demonstration in opposition to Kant's view that arithmetic depends on logic.

With this impressive equipment the new philosophy is able to list the entities to be assumed in any given body of scientific doctrine as well as the relations between them, and then by manipulation of symbols to forecast the outcome of that body of doctrine for philosophy. By the help of this method the claim is confidently made that Physics is achieving an advance that will within a few years revolutionize our thinking.

The advance culminates in the theory of relativity which holds that while the events that happen to a given piece of matter have a definite time order for an observer who shares its motion, events which happen to pieces of matter in different places have not always a definite time order. This may not seem very momentous, but, as Russell remarks, if we consider the part that time plays in our common notions, our outlook will be profoundly modified the moment our imagination realizes what the physicists have done. Let the reader attempt to define "progress" in the new terms, or the notion of "distance in space," and he will become aware that profound changes will be necessary. "A body at a given time" becomes an event, and a piece of matter becomes a series of events obeying certain laws. Substance, both material or spiritual, is now a series of events possessing certain interesting relations to one another. Force in the old sense disappears; the great principle of modern physics is the "principle of least action" or, as Mr. Russell quaintly terms it, "the law of universal laziness"; and there is no such thing as one body "controlling" the movements of another.

#### IV

In spite of Mr. Russell's assertion that while it has been generally regarded as the business of philosophy to prove the great truths of religion, the new philosophy does not profess to be able to prove or even disprove them, a few of the Neo-Realists have hastened to develop the religious implications

of the system. These thinkers belong not to the "Cosmological" realists, but to the "moral" realists, a distinction drawn by Professor Hoernle in an interesting article published six years ago,<sup>26</sup> in which he seems to have chiefly in mind Professor R. B. Perry, who has been at most pains to elaborate a definite "philosophy of life" in strict adherence to the principles of Neo-Realism. It is we recall true that Professor E. G. Spaulding defines God as "the totality of values"; as justice and truth and beauty; as transcendent above the world and immanent in it; "a Power for good that works not only side by side with man, but also in him and through him, flowering in that freedom which is given to his reason to get at truth, to his emotions to love the beautiful, the good, and the true, and detest the ugly, the evil, and the false, and to his will and manhood to engage in the struggle,"<sup>27</sup> but such a notion of God is considered by other Neo-Realists incompatible with the new system. It is also true that Professor Sellars calls himself a "representative" realist in that he has made an attempt to continue the tradition of Locke, and has written a book called *The Next Step in Religion*. But the book is atheistic, and, since religion disappears when God is denied, it is therefore not a treatise on religion at all, but a discourse on social ethics. Mr. Russell himself has also uttered some religious [or irreligious] sentiments,<sup>28</sup> but these are merely a celebration of the anticipated victory of all conquering death, which upon examination are seen to be no logical outcome of his philosophy, but the elegiac expression of a moment of despondency. Therefore Professor Perry remains as the only Neo-Realist who has attempted the task of unfolding the religious implications of the new philosophy.

Professor Perry's interest is not so much in the analysis of

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<sup>26</sup> *Harvard Theological Review*, April, 1918, "Neo-Realism and Religion."

<sup>27</sup> Cf. *The New Rationalism*, p. 517.

<sup>28</sup> In *Mysticism and Logic*, Chap. III. "The Free Man's Worship"; and in *Philosophical Essays*. Chap. II.

the Cosmos as in the search for a knowledge that will "illuminate things in order that action may be invented which shall make them good."<sup>29</sup> In a later book<sup>30</sup> Professor Perry says "the moral and religious consequences of realism . . . do not differ materially from the moral and religious consequences of pluralism." The latter are<sup>31</sup> first, the preciousness of the individual. This is evidently an analogical consequence of the metaphysics of Neo-Realism as already explained, only as he reminds us the individualism he has in view is not self-assertion, but one that uses the pronouns we and thou and you rather than the pronoun I. It is therefore a basis for tolerance, social, religious, and political, and it is exceedingly interested in the detail of human life. Second, Freedom as an expression for desire and hope. The meaning of this rather obscure statement is that the man of action is at the same time a man of faith that through his own and other like efforts the world may become a better world. This again is a supposed consequence of the metaphysics of Neo-Realism, since a pluralistic universe is, we are assured, a universe unlike that of the idealists in that it has a fighting chance to become altogether good. Third, a Finite God. This also is implied by Neo-realistic metaphysics, for God must be but one, we are told, of the many semi-independent forces among which the world is divided. It is not easy to see how this God can satisfy the religious consciousness of the plain man. John Stuart Mill attempted to erect such a God, but the idea cannot be said to have met a widespread need nor to have been hailed with even a minimal outburst of popular cheering. The novelist H. G. Wells has employed a facile pen in recommendation of the concept and Perry attempts so to depict him [or it?] as to make him attractive to all truly democratic members of our own or of any genuine republic. Here is a God who condemns and fights against evils pre-

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<sup>29</sup> *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, Chap. XIV, "A Realistic Philosophy of Life."

<sup>30</sup> *The Present Conflict of Ideals*, 1918, p. 379.

<sup>31</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 316 seq.

cisely as we (good) men do. To quote:<sup>32</sup> "This is not a religion for the helpless who wish to recline upon the bosom of an Almighty and leave it all to his higher and inscrutable wisdom. It is a religion for those in whom the fighting spirit is alive, and who are stout-hearted enough to respond to the challenge of evil as to an enemy to be attacked and overcome. It is a religion for those who are "willing to take the universe to be really dangerous and adventurous, without therefore backing out and crying 'no play'."

Our exposition indicates that the thinkers mentioned are, with perhaps a few exceptions, like William James, unable for various reasons "to accept either popular Christianity or scholastic theism."<sup>33</sup> This inability is, they imagine, the necessary result of their system of thought, but it requires no prolonged dialectic to prove that any system involving logically the finiteness of God is incompatible with Scripture and contrary to Christianity. The doctrine of God is crucial for any system. Therefore, no matter what else a philosophy may imply religiously, if its doctrine of God contradicts Scripture, it is hopelessly non-Christian.

But let us for a moment follow the example of Bishop Butler<sup>34</sup> and "argue upon the principles of others," not with the desire of proving anything *from* those principles, but *notwithstanding* them. It will be recalled that Bosanquet announced as a fundamental of his system, "experience is all we have," and that his philosophy is a search for the concrete-universal that makes experience in the broad sense both possible and intelligible. But is it really the logical outcome of this dictum and method that the impressive and historically vindicated portion of experience coincident with the Christian consciousness, should be either finally ignored or interpreted in such a way as to falsify it? In saying this we are not unmindful of the admirable struggle of English and Ameri-

<sup>32</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 327.

<sup>33</sup> See *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 521, where he defines his belief.

<sup>34</sup> See the *Analogy*, Part II, Chap. VIII, near the end.

can idealism during the past hundred years, first, against materialism, and later against the evolutionists who think that the only way to describe and explain the high and holy is to degrade both to the imperfection whence they are supposed to have emerged, but where they are not yet visible. Much less would we detract from Bosanquet's service in exhibiting the fact that "religion has a genuinely metaphysical aspect and a cosmic orientation."<sup>35</sup> Any help is to be welcomed against the appalling present effort to dethrone God and educate him to democracy, since man has now attained to a development in which he properly insists on a voice in the cosmic councils and a responsible share in the upholding and perfection of the universe; to *use* God [as do the Pragmatists], rather than to know him and enjoy him; to make religion [as do the Neo-Realists], an appreciation of the highest social values, or an effort to promote the well-being of the group or of mankind; to look on social training as the one and sufficient road to religious maturity.<sup>36</sup> But if Bosanquet's God is a "little lower than the Absolute," how can the religious implications of speculative idealism be of avail against the "appalling views" just mentioned? In place of successful refutation of their opponents the idealists are in danger of seeing their own house collapse.

Similarly the Neo-Realistic attempt to make their pluralistic metaphysics normative for religion is fore-doomed to fail because it is not the logical implication of their thought. In this philosophy there is much concerning the sphere of nature and the kingdom of man that while novel need cause us no misgiving, for all Christianity asks of any system of cosmology is truth, since it knows well that whatever is true has never hindered the kingdom of God, nor conflicted with that "deposit" made once for all to the saints. But we ven-

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<sup>35</sup> Quoted from E. L. Schaub, *Philosophical Review*, November, 1923, p. 667.

<sup>36</sup> The thought is in the main Professor Schaub's (*op. cit.*), but we have changed the words and added to them in order to bring out our meaning.



ture to prophesy that it will appear increasingly impossible to apply plural metaphysics to the concept of God in order to rob him of infinity. Already history demonstrates that the notion of a finite God lacks "survival value," and what good reason can there be for supposing that an idea repeatedly weighed and found wanting in ability to satisfy religious needs can suddenly acquire what it has always lacked? Again in saying this we are not unsympathetic with Profesesor Perry's enthusiastic emphasis on the preciousness of the individual and the reality of the struggle against every form of evil. We are not unwilling to favor a plural universe over against a "block" universe, if good reasons compel our assent, but in order to make the concept valid, the logical necessity of the system demands what Professor Spaulding asserts, somewhat faint-heartedly and uncertainly we fear, and what Cardinal Mercier and the Neo-scholastics urge with persuasive enthusiasm—a God who is over all infinite and eternally glorious, the creator and upholder of the plural cosmos.

To recall the thought with which we began. "Scholastic theism" uses philosophy, but "popular Christianity" is not philosophy. These are facts of which Dr. McCosh reminds us, and in which—especially the latter—there is immense advantage. Our theism and our Christianity are each of them not derivatives of philosophy, but, founded as they are on the deeds and words of God, are rather starting points for philosophy. Our problem therefore is one of instruction, but in solving it we often fail to develop efficiently our inherited doctrine of the Word as means of revelation and means of grace. With the former we have nothing to do except to accept it and understand it. With the latter we have, under Christ, everything to do. We must bring the Truth of the Gospel home to our generation, an art that demands that we keep faith with the letter even when rising into the spirit. Redemption, companionship, and the actual making of a new moral reality are ultimate tests of religious truth<sup>37</sup> where

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<sup>37</sup> Cf. Professor Tufts' remarks in *American Journal of Theology*, 1910, pp. 18 *seq.*

human needs are concerned. The religious implications of the philosophies described in this essay fail to meet these tests. Our inherited Protestantism can meet them provided we follow the Spirit's leading in the enlarged use of the Word as means of grace. Our duty is clear, our responsibility is heavy, and—the world is waiting for the dawn.

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## MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS OF SPACE IN RELATION TO OMNIPRESENCE\*

The Kantian arguments in favor of the pure subjectivity of the notion of space are in general endorsed by the late Professor Borden P. Bowne of Boston University. But in so far as his general epistemology is different from, and more constructive than that of Kant, Bowne's argumentation for the Kantian position assumes a different form. This form of argumentation is a consequence particularly of his belief in the external existence of a spiritual Being who is both infinite, personal, and a unity in his nature. This conception is an advance upon Kant's agnosticism, and is attained through the use of the causal principle applied to the data of subjective experience. What then are Bowne's contentions in view of his personal, pluralistic idealism?

1. By means of the method of elimination of all other possibilities by reducing them to absurdity Bowne establishes his own view: "It is held," he argues first, "that space is not a nothing, but a peculiar kind of existence which can be described only in terms of itself. The common-sense view is that there is something and its opposite nothing; but then there is a third conception, space which cannot be defined in terms of the other two. But the attempt to make space real and yet distinct both from things and from nothing is a failure. Either we must make it a pure nothing in reality, or we must make it a thing in interaction with itself and with other things. Both these views are untenable, and the former is absurd."<sup>1</sup>

There appears to be much force in these alternative ways of putting the matter. But it is to be remarked (a) that Bowne has not adequately faced the first alternative he names, that is, that space is "a peculiar kind of existence which can

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<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysics, A Study in First Principles*, p. 185.

be described only in terms of itself." It is philosophically worthy of recognition that space may be entirely *sui generis*, to the same degree that he ascribes to motion,<sup>2</sup> "It is indefinable, except in terms of itself." Bowne himself adopts the identical mode of explaining other mysteries in his own system, e.g., that of action.<sup>3</sup> He says of action, "that it must be recognized but cannot be understood. How a thing can act, how we ourselves can act,—all these are insoluble questions." Conscience or "oughtness" is also quite unanalyzable, yet its existence is an indubitable fact. Why then discard the reality of space on such slight consideration?

(b.) The unanalyzability or indefinability of space does not lead to contradictions, nor does it involve the unreality of space, as Bowne holds. So far from being "absurd" or inconceivable, its objectivity as thus defined forces itself on all minds. We can not think real space away. Bowne himself admits that the notion in general is a conviction of spontaneous thought. The very language used to explain away its objectivity in particular betrays belief in it. The belief is universal. The alleged contradictions and absurdities only arise when some unpalatable attempt to define the indefinable is made.

(c.) If this notion of space as real but indefinable does not lead to contradictions when accepted as it is, then there can be no logical force or expediency in the resort of declaring space subjective to obviate supposed contradictions. Concerning various definitions of space as nothing, as an entity, as a quality of, or a relation between things, it might be agreed that none of them appeal to us as consistent. Yet the exclusion of them does not *ipso facto* shut us up to subjectivism as the final and inevitable refuge.

(d.) Professor Mead shows how Bowne himself vacillates in his description of the phenomenon of change between making it a thing ("something becomes something else," p. 92) and not a thing, i.e., he makes it practically a *tertium*

<sup>2</sup> Vide *op. cit.*, p. 242.

<sup>3</sup> Vide *op. cit.*, p. 108.

*quid* between them. This, in his treatment of space, is precisely what Bowne charges those who hold the objectivist view with doing.<sup>4</sup>

2. Bowne's second argument, a theological one, is that "the doctrine which regards space as real, apart from things, leads to a hopeless dualism of first principles."<sup>5</sup> "If space be a reality apart from things, it is something uncreated and eternal. No one would be hardy enough to maintain a proper creation of space conceived of as an infinite void: indeed, the idea negatives creation." "The common notion of an independent space is repugnant to creation, for the necessity would ever pursue us of positing a previous space for the reception of the created one." "Accordingly, spontaneous thought has always regarded space as one of the eternal and self-existent necessities which even God himself cannot escape. But this view is contradicted by the necessary unity of basal reality. English and American thinkers have paid very little attention to the problem of knowledge—and hence they have had little hesitation in allowing any number of independent principles." ". . . but all principles and all manifestation alike must flow from the Infinite."

Two criticisms are apropos here: (a) To put it into syllogistic form the author's reasoning is as follows: "If space be a reality . . . it is something uncreated and eternal." God is uncreated and eternal. Therefore God and space eternally co-exist independent of each other, in a basal dualism. The difficulty inheres in the major premise. Is space, if real, *necessarily* uncreated and eternal? May it not be finite and created? Modern physics asserts that it is. If "spontaneous thought has always regarded space as one of the eternal and self-existent necessities which even God himself can not escape," there is also another postulate of spontaneous thought, that is, the notion of a perfect being, a pure theism which brooks no limitation by independent, self-existent realities. And when two such postulates as these conflict the

<sup>4</sup> Vide *Bibliotheca Sacra*, 1890, p. 430 ff.

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 186.



higher must be established as the true one; in this case the absoluteness of deity. Real space then, contrary to what Bowne calls "spontaneous thought," must be regarded as finite *if* its infinity begets anti-theistic deductions. This is rather reinforced by the second consideration that there is no proof of its infinity. The term infinite is, after all, but a synonym for the "indefinite," or our intellectual impotency to "take in" the vast beyond of space whither only our imagination can lead us. The statement then is not axiomatically true that "if space be real it *must* be infinite."<sup>6</sup> Hence all the more untrue is the conclusion that space is both uncreated and eternal.

(b.) But granting that space is not real and infinite, and does not constitute another, that is a second "principle" (the term is vaguely applied), it is an arbitrary piece of philosophic legislation to limit the number of "principles" qualified to exist in the outer universe to one, or possibly two. It is agreed by us that the "basal reality" certainly is "the determining principle of all secondary existence" as well as the "source of all laws, principles, and realities."<sup>7</sup> We agree also in asserting that there may be other and secondary principles beside that of deity. But the denial that the principles of matter, space and time and others may objectively coexist with the primary principle is overworking the law of parsimony. The causality principle is admitted by Bowne to be real, i.e., objective. Why, then, place the limitation here and exclude matter, space, time and the rest? The legitimate number of such principles must be determined by the impartial envisaging of the spheres of mind and nature, hardly by anything less candid and direct.

3. Bowne then presents his final objection to the reality of space. This objection "is based on the unity of being."

If space be a real objective existence, then the infinite, or rather God, is *in* space, and possesses bulk and diameter. For whatever exists in space must exist either as a point or as volume; and as no one would

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 186.

<sup>7</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 144.

think of ascribing a punctual existence to God there is nothing to do but to ascribe volume. But... nothing possessing volume in space can be a unit. Points and component volumes can always be distinguished in the volume of such a thing and thus the thing appears as made up of parts. But such a conception applied to the infinite cancels both its unity and its omnipresence. That which is omnipresent in space cannot be extended in space, for such extension would imply merely the presence of the being part for part or volume for volume in the occupied space. Philosophy can not reconcile the necessary unity of the infinite with existence in space, and *theology* can not reconcile its conception of the non-spatial mode of the divine existence with existence in space. But if space be real it must be infinite, and God must exist in space, and the indicated conclusions must follow.<sup>8</sup>

On first sight the representation seems insuperable. But closer scrutiny discloses inaccurate or erroneous definitions for premises.

(a.) If true theism is an intuition of spontaneous thought and is our first interest, then space *can* not be defined in any way such as to possibly limit deity except it be a self-imposed limitation, of which there are of course many, viz. the existence of matter, of spiritual beings, of laws, and forces outside of deity. Only in case space is defined as an infinite attribute of the infinite divine essence, inhering inseparably in the divine nature and constitution, conditioning it from within, can space be regarded as constituting a necessary limitation. Only in such a case can it be alleged that "God is in space, and possesses bulk and diameter," or that God is "part for part, or volume for volume, *in* the occupied space." Samuel Clarke, Isaac Newton, and Girardeau held this view, and it is only against this view,—to which Bowne gives only one reference—that these objections may be said to have force.

(b.) Many metaphysicians distinguish between extension and space, extension being that quality predicated of objects in space, and space being that receptivity which contains objects. But Bowne identifies the two quite plainly.<sup>9</sup> He consequently predicates extension—that which is predicated of bodies—of God. But if space is *not* extension, then extension,

<sup>8</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 189.

<sup>9</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 184. "If space be real and extended."

"bulk and diameter," can not be predicated of God.

(c.) It is from the *infinity* of space that the author's deductions are made. "If space be real it must be infinite, and God must exist in space, and the indicated conclusions must follow." But if the infinity of space be denied, then the conclusions do not follow. We have seen above that, despite Kant, its infinity is at best an intellectual abstraction, and can not be *proved*. Space *may* be finite.

(d.) Even if space be real and infinite, the extension and divisibility of God need not be concluded. There are other possible explanations. For if space is real, it may either be a void (mere receptivity), or a thing. If it is a void, the divisibility of deity obviously does not follow. If it is a thing of some kind, there are possible ways of conceiving the metaphysical impenetration of this space by pure spirit other than by this spirit being subject to it, i.e., being divided and measured by it. If electricity can penetrate and pervade steel without becoming steel, it is conceivable that in some way such a disparate reality as spirit might penetrate and fill all space without becoming subject to space, without being included or bounded or divided by it.

(e.) On the supposition that space is neither necessarily a thing or *no* thing, but essentially indefinable, it is *a fortiori* evident that such contradictions can not be predicated of space and deity. Where space is unanalyzable and inscrutable in its ultimate nature, space can not confidently, if at all, be said to create difficulties when we attempt to fill it with the divine presence. But as Bowne has eliminated this alternative in his definition of the nature of space, the force of this consideration remains unappreciated by him.

The conclusion from these remarks is that the three difficulties formally raised against the reality of space are submerged by the brood of difficulties which they in turn bring upon themselves. The reasoning in all cases is sun-clear. But because it is from false premises, it is of no avail.

The significance of these philosophical reasonings for the doctrine of the divine omnipresence—which is our prime in-

terest—is seen from the author's conclusion, which was indeed quite to be anticipated, namely, the untenability of the doctrine of omnipresence. The infinite, he says, "acts directly upon all reality and hence is everywhere. By omnipresence, we can mean nothing more than this immediate action upon all reality."<sup>10</sup> But only with rare confusion of thought can omnipresence be thus supplanted by omni-action. The hands are the hands of Esau, but the voice is the voice of a Jacob.

Before passing from Bowne we must note a more general assumption throughout the writer's treatment, namely that there is analogy between our sense-impressions and our space intuition. The former, and especially clearly the "secondary" qualities are subjective, we are told: therefore, reasoning by analogy, it is not unreasonable, and on the contrary very likely, that our space intuition is purely subjective.

It is to be remarked here, *first*, that there is a difference between empirical data and regulative principles of consciousness. The objectivity of the secondary qualities in particular is less obvious than the primary to the trained psychologist. And while in everyday experience, secondary qualities plainly originate from external causation, we are not under a strict *a priori* necessity of referring them to an outside world exterior to the sense-organs. But when we think of space, if we have had any experience with the external world at all, we are obliged by an *a priori* necessity to regard it as objective. To do otherwise would be to violate what Professor Samuel Harris would call our "rational intuitions." Fundamentally, however, the author is right in drawing the analogy between sense and intuition. And to defeat his logic it is only necessary to repostulate the common-sense conviction of the external reality of the world of phenomena.

The *second* criticism is *ad hominem*. If the author thus repudiates the validity of the space-notion why does he not repudiate the notion of causality which appears to be the only intuitional brand that he has snatched from the burning. On the sole, highly privileged notion of causality as external

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<sup>10</sup> P. 208.

to the sense-organ, Bowne constructs his transsubjective metaphysics and theology. If he sent it the same way that he sent the space-notion, there would be no theology—only a solipsism remaining. What reason has he for *not* so sending it? This would afford a leading question.

The *third* criticism takes its force from a palpable case of reasoning in a circle, or *petitio principii*. Sense-impressions are not copies of things, we are told; they are only subjective appearances. But how do we know this? Science has revealed that outside of and preceding audition are certain sound waves vibrating in the ether. And these are not themselves sound. Only their effect on the sense-organ is to be regarded as sound. So far so good. *But*, to prove this subjectivity the author must presuppose real space and the undulatory motion of ether in space. He, in proving the pure subjectivity of sensation, must assume at least for a moment, the objectivity of space and motion. But the objectivity of space and motion are the very realities which Bowne is trying to prove to be subjective. It is logical opportunism to prove the subjectivity of sensation by use of objective space and motion, and then turn immediately around and establish the subjectivity of space and motion by appeal to the fact of the subjectivity of sensation. Bowne, believing in the subjectivity of both sensation, and space and motion, by some adroit and subtle metaphysics spirits himself out of the prison-wall of subjectivity just long enough to get evidence from the view-point of objectivity *that* everything is safely immured within the walls of pure subjectivity. Spiriting himself surreptitiously back into subjectivity again he declares everything to be subjective except that space and motion in that moment in which he did his scouting upon his unsuspecting *ego*. It is like the more gruesome case of a person having a dream in which he perceives that he is dead, and attaining this consciousness by looking upon his own lifeless corpse in the casket. As everything King Midas touched became gold, so, all that Bowne experiences in such excursions must suffer the fatal instantaneous translation



into subjectivity. It is unfair metaphysical sportsmanship to break the rules of logical consistency just long enough to verify the truth for which he is contending, namely that everything is subjective. If Bowne begins with the belief in the subjectivity of phenomena, he must end in it. He cannot escape the Berkeleian "ego-centric predicament," even just enough to *prove* that he cannot escape it.

It is evident that where we found a *tendency* to subjective idealism and skepticism in Kant, we find it developed and almost completed in Bowne. He only arrests his theory from gravitation into the final resting-place of Humian skepticism by laying down the Ariadne thread of the causal notion which leads outward from sense-experience to a being who must be postulated as its cause. Bowne anticipates this charge that the subjectivity of the space principle "destroys all confidence in the mind," and attempts to parry the criticism. He does this, *first*, by alleging that the charge "fails to discriminate between the relative authority of the different forms of mental action," i.e., intuitions. This is the author's categorical reply: ours apparently "is not to reason why." The author means to confer more distinctive authority on the cause-notion, we take it. But we might justly doubt his sovereign philosophic authority to distribute authority to the various "forms of mental action" in this fashion, to dignify the cause-notion with validity, i.e., objective validity, and to withhold it from others. Appeal to universal experience, to common-sense and to impartial introspective analysis must govern this distribution of honors.

Bowne's *second* reply to the charge that his view "destroys all confidence in the mind" is that the charge confounds reality in mind with delusion."<sup>11</sup> "When we call space a mode of appearance," he says, "we do not mean that it is a delusion, but the form in which being appears in intuition. Those appearances are delusions which intuition itself contradicts."<sup>12</sup> He then attempts to show how the secondary qualities, and

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<sup>11</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 197.

<sup>12</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 198.

how justice and righteousness are just as real and universal even if they *be* subjective. We remark, *first*, that the proof of the reality of the subjective space by the analogy of experiences which he antecedently believes and determines are equally *unreal* is without weight. The adducing of subjective, i.e., unreal qualities is no compulsion for believing in the reality of another subjective notion, i.e., space. To prove that the space notion is *not* a delusion Bowne must perforce compare it with actual *objective* space demonstrating that objective space is unreal and a delusion, and that subjective space is the true and ultimate reality. But Bowne who lives self-confined in the charmed circle of subjective phenomena (to us, unreality) can never *ex hypothesi* extradite himself sufficiently into the objective world (to us, reality) to demonstrate to us that his own world of subjectivity is not to us a delusion.

We remark, *secondly*, that Bowne's defence is a begging of the question. Our view is misunderstood "by confounding reality *in mind* with delusion," he says. Before he ever begins to discuss, he denominates phenomena "*reality in mind*," then. But its realness as opposed to delusion, is the very thing to be proved. The author fails to properly define "reality." He very indirectly leads us to infer that "reality" is that which is given by intuition, and "delusion that which intuition contradicts."<sup>13</sup> But this is only pushing the matter around the vicious circle, for he defines intuitions in such a way that they can not give us anything but reality. We are back just where we began.

A third group of philosophers following Kant and Bowne, above discussed, also deny the reality of space. They resemble Bowne in that they are avowed idealists, but like Kant and unlike Bowne they base the subjectivity of space upon certain paradoxes of thought. These are not for F. H. Bradley the Kantian antinomies precisely. They are the paradoxes involved in "term" and "relation." Any two or more given terms which are related, must be related to the relation re-

<sup>13</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 198, the last sentence in the paragraph.

lating them. These intermediary relations must in turn, be related, and so on till we have an infinite regressus. This paradox or difficulty of thought points to the fact, the English idealist asserts, that space is only appearance; "a relational mode of thought—any one that moves by the machinery of terms and relations—must give appearance, and not truth." As this discredits the reality of space and time without even further consideration of the other difficulties intrinsic to space and time, the author concludes that true reality is found in a relation-transcending mode of experience of some kind.

A. E. Taylor, a disciple of Bradley, revives practically the Kantian dilemma regarding the infinity and finiteness of space,<sup>14</sup> and like Bradley concludes that "space and time being constructions of our own, are really neither finite nor infinite series, but are the one or the other according to the purpose for which we use our construction."<sup>15</sup> "With the recognition that space and time are phenomenal . . . the difficulty disappears." And space and time ultimately are "taken up, rearranged, and transcended" in "the absolute experience." But "precisely how this is effected, we, from our finite standpoint, cannot presume to say."

The only remark upon these two views is that, as the view of the subjectivity of space is made a resort to overcome the difficulties inhering in the assumption that it exists, the method is comparable to the man who ends the problems connected with his existence by committing suicide: or to the emu which escapes its dangerous enemies by hiding its face in the sand. The existence of paradoxes and of difficulties in any metaphysical matter are only natural, and a sign more of reality than unreality, unless all mystery and all finiteness of understanding, and all faith have been transcended by an age

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<sup>14</sup> He states it as follows: "We must either arbitrarily refuse to continue the indefinite regress beyond the point at which its difficulties become apparent, as is done by the assertion that space and time have finite bounds or indivisible parts, or we must hold that the absolute experience actually achieves the summation of an unending series."

<sup>15</sup> *Elements of Metaphysics*, p. 147.

of reason. Further, this is an old and time-worn form of philosophic—if not indeed, sophic—exercise, first propounded by Zeno of Elea. Such an extreme philosophic disposal as this need not be resorted to, even granting the insolubility of the dilemma. Even fellow-idealists, e.g., J. Royce, soundly and roundly refute Bradley's reasoning here.<sup>16</sup>

The same general criticisms that applied to Kant's antinomies apply here, *mutatis mutandis*.

Bergson denies space on grounds that are quite distinctive. Space is an order of reality, but not an original order, he says. Time is the original order, and space originates from it when it checks or reverses itself. But, he does not explain why time should thus become irregular. Space he defines as "an ideal end in the direction of which material objects develop themselves, but where they are not developed."<sup>17</sup> Space is only a scientific and intellectual perversion of the temporal flux. This view while entertaining, is too individualistic to criticize seriously.

There are three generic views as to the reality of space, the objective view, the subjective view, and the subjective-objective. The subjective view of space as an *ens rationale* has just been found inadequate. The objective view is empirical in tendency. The subjective-objective view remains as the most self-commending. This has been championed by such worthy metaphysicians as Sir William Hamilton, James McCosh and Trendelenburg, among others. It rests upon the common-sense view of the Scottish school, that the objectivity of fundamental intuitive truths is an inescapable, inevitable, practical, empirical, and spontaneous datum of self-consciousness, which can not be violated without doing injustice to our rational natures. The necessity, the self-evidence of it, and the universality of the belief, are the three criteria of ultimate intuitions, such as that of space. The same tests might be applied to the question of the *objectivity*

<sup>16</sup> *The World and The Individual*, Vol. I, Supplementary Essay.

<sup>17</sup> Un terme idéal dans la direction duquel les choses matérielles se développent, mais où elles ne sont pas développées."

as well as to the *fact* of the space notion. And though this notion may be held by some to be naïve, uncritical and contrary to scientific analysis, it is nevertheless substantiated by irresistible native beliefs. And as to science, only a science concealing some *a priori* philosophical or psychological standpoint can consistently analyze away space as a reality discovered and not created by the mind.

The reality of space being established, the next question, in order of importance is, if space be real, "is it infinite or finite?" The necessity of this discussion is seen from Bowne's employment of the teaching of the infinity of space for skeptical ends.

The question, to begin with, can not be clearly answered until it is defined what view of the nature of space we are assuming. If, e.g., space is defined as simply the sum total of the relations of body or bodies, then it is clear that the question is answered automatically by determining whether the universe of material bodies is infinite or not. Or, if space is defined as an attribute of the divine essence, it is, conversely, infinite by self-evident necessity. We shall therefore assume the most conservative and general definition possible. Such a definition will be the most convenient for the present purpose. This definition is the above-mentioned one wherein space is defined as objectively real, as distinct from extension (predicated of material bodies), and as a receptivity containing material bodies, yet as indefinable and unanalyzable in its ultimate nature.

The first form of statement of the question will be as follows: Do the antinomies of Zeno, Aristotle, Kant, Hamilton, and Taylor throw insuperable difficulties into the way of the acceptance of space as infinite? We take the liberty here of referring the reader to our earlier discussion of Kant's antinomies. To supplement this it might be here added that these alleged antinomies find their fulcrum in the assumption that space has parts and divisions such as extended bodies have. Hamilton says that "we can not conceive an absolute



maximum of space, for the instant that the absolute limit is reached, the mind will overstep this and go beyond into further enlargements of the conceived spaces until completely baffled." The fallacy apparent here is that space is assumed to be something extended, and therefore picturable or imaginable by the mind in such concrete form as perceivable surfaces of space-filling objects. While it is true that extension of physical bodies is directly related to space (and time) yet extension is different from space. Space has no tangible extension, and can not be immediately intuited as it is in itself. The above difficulty of conceiving infinite space then falls away, and with it, fall the antinomies.

Another and similar solution of this element in the antinomies is that given by Shadworth Hodgson.<sup>18</sup> Space, he thinks, is only finite when it becomes an object of voluntary cognition, or is made an object of conscious attention. It is here limited, but limited only by our inability to conceive or mentally grasp it. But in our involuntary consciousness, where space is not definitely fixated it is vaguely assumed as boundless. It has not been made an object of analysis and division. Hence, we may suppose that the contradictions would never have arisen had the mind not given too serious attention to the conceiving of space.

The contradictories being thus removed from the concept of the infinity of space, the next question is, Does spatial infinity imply that space is infinite in time, or that it is eternal and uncreated? and hence that it is independent of God, thus limiting Him?

Regarding this question Martineau presents the affirmative. For, according to him, space, unlike matter, can not be conceived of as non-existent. It is an intuitive and absolutely necessary postulate of thought that space therefore is uncaused, original and self-existent. Further, there must be something "in which" God exists and acts. Without some objective medium "in which" God acts, it is impossible to

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<sup>18</sup> *Space and Time*, p. 148, *passim*.

think of even the creation. God can not "supply himself with objectivity" as certain philosophy asserts.

It is evident that if space and God are both uncaused, self-existent and eternal, there are two eternal self-existences perpetually limiting each other, just as Uranos and Kronos were regarded as the original deities by ancient Greece. Of course, this negates pure theism. Either a fundamental limitation to the omnipotence and infinite existence of God must be accepted, or the eternal self-existence of space must be denied. We may apply to Martineau's doctrine of eternal space a consideration which H. Spencer forcefully urges: "If we admit that there can be something uncaused, there is no reason to assume a cause for anything."<sup>19</sup> There is no reason, if space exists uncaused, to deny that matter, force, and natural laws are eternal, as the materialists assert.

In circumventing these difficulties attending the doctrine of the infinity of space, the following seven alternatives are logically possible:

The first is that propounded by Plato, Philo, Augustine,<sup>20</sup> Newton,<sup>21</sup> S. Clarke, and Girardeau, which represents space as an attribute of the divine essence, analogous to other attributes such as omniscience and goodness. Being within the divine nature and not objective to it, space is conceived of as dependent on God, and therefore, as not anti-theistic; though it is eternal and uncreated. This solution neatly removes the objections to Martineau's position. This solution, however, obviates one difficulty only to fall subject to another. First, it must be conceded that this view is self-evidently speculative, and secondly, that it is pantheistic in tendency. The conception of τὸ πᾶν as including matter and mind, includes space and time as also the modes of the existence and manifestation of deity. We find this classically expressed in Spinoza.

<sup>19</sup> *First Principles*, p. 37; vide Cocker's *Theistic Conception of the World*, p. 67.

<sup>20</sup> Girardeau claims Augustine for this position.

<sup>21</sup> "*Deus durat semper et adest ubique, et existendo semper et ubique durationem et spatium, aeternitatem et infinitatem constituit.*" From the *Principia*.

The second possible alternative is to assert the infinity of space and the infinity of God, but to affirm that there is no necessary impingement of the one upon the other because the inter-relationship of the two is inscrutable—belonging to the category of mystery. This is the view of James McCosh:

There may for aught we know be nothing inconsistent in supposing that space and time on the one hand, and God on the other, may have infinite attributes. They could be held as contradictory only on the supposition that the existence of unbounded space and unending time were, *in the nature of things* inconsistent with the existence of an infinite God; which, it may safely be said, can never be proven. As to *how* they subsist together is a question we are not obliged to answer, for we must believe many separate truths, each on its evidence without being able to trace a connection, or being able so much as to say that there is a *how* between them. . . . But I plant myself on far firmer ground when I maintain, secondly, that, while I believe that space and time are infinite, and that God is infinite, I am not necessarily obliged to hold that the infinity of space (and time) is independent of the infinity of God. . . . Who will venture to affirm that space and time, being dependent on God, may not stand in a relation to God which is altogether indefinable and utterly inconceivable by us. True, we are constrained to believe that space and time have an existence independent of *us*, but we are not compelled to believe that they have an existence independent of everything else, and least of all, independent of God. In such a subject where we have no light from intuition or experience to guide us, true wisdom shows itself in refusing to assert, or dogmatize, or speculate.<sup>22</sup>

Similarly teaches Noah Porter,<sup>23</sup> "We know too little of space (and time) to assert that . . . they are independent of God." It is the "means of measuring His acts, of regulating the mightiest agents which he creates, and of manifesting many of his most comprehensive designs." "We may certainly know that whatever space is, it does *not* share in that independent self-existence which we ascribe to Him alone who is the living and true God."<sup>24</sup>

The third possible alternative is that of admitting and asserting the infinity and independence of space as eternally self-existent, but interpreting the fact that it limits deity by

<sup>22</sup> *Intuitions of the Human Mind*, p. 213.

<sup>23</sup> *The Human Intellect*, p. 662, note.

<sup>24</sup> Schleiermacher and Nietzsche also teach that God is the almighty cause of space (Nietzsche, *System of Christian Doctrine*, p. 156-7).

the suggestion that the limitation is one eternally self-imposed or voluntarily assumed by deity. But just how this is possible is something which defies human understanding: the logical possibility is a rather abstract one therefore.

A fourth alternative is to explain the problem by defining space as so disparate from spirit in nature that even if it is infinite and eternal in existence, it cannot possibly limit spiritual being, just as an infinite line can coexist with infinite spirit without necessarily limiting it: or just as one infinite line may coexist with another and parallel infinite line without interference.

The fifth solution of the matter is to categorically declare space finite and created, a view held by some theologians, e.g., Herman Bavinck. This is done naturally in the interests of preserving a pure Biblical theism. This view dispels the problem quickly and eliminates the mental strain of speculation. But it does not commend itself to the reasoning imagination of many thinkers as apodictically certain. Kant, Martineau and McCosh assert that its infinity is a necessary datum of our intuitive reason. The finiteness of space is easy to conceive, and can almost be represented; but this is not a philosophic test of truth. The strength of the view is its freedom from anti-theistic implications.

The sixth possible reconciliation is proffered of course by those who deny our above definition of space, and make it, as Fullerton, a system or "plan" of relations. They particularly oppose the thing-ness or real existence of space in the sense of material objects or forces. Infinite space, then, is merely said to be "not affirming an existence but recognizing a possibility," i.e., "that there is no theoretical limit to our freedom of imagining extensions to a supposed limited universe."<sup>25</sup> If it be true that space is merely the "plan" or system of relations then the solution may be spontaneously accepted. But otherwise not.

A seventh alternative way of viewing the matter is presented by A. E. Taylor, who regards space as neither neces-

<sup>25</sup> Fullerton, *System of Metaphysics*, p. 222.

sarily infinite, nor necessarily finite, but as infinite or finite according to our way of viewing space and our purpose in so doing.<sup>26</sup> Of this it may be remarked that it rests upon the idealistic world view wherein space is merely a mental construct. The problem of infinity has no labyrinths for such a *Weltanschauung* quite naturally, if space does not externally exist. Further, this note sounds an antiphonal to the familiar "instrumental logic" of Professor Dewey and pragmatism in general. The representation that the whole problem turns upon our volition is too capricious to possess philosophic value.

Equally obvious is it that the modern views<sup>27</sup> which identify space with time find a plausible escape from the dilemma. The choice in the foregoing five alternatives however, seems to lie between the second and the fifth view, the view of James McCosh and of the finitists respectively.

If space be assumed as infinite, the further question arises, is this purely a negative idea, or is it a positive one? Again we have division of good authorities, e.g., James McCosh and Noah Porter. McCosh declares that this is

. . . not merely a negative proposition, as some have declared it to be; it is a positive affirmation that to whatever point we go, in reality or in imagination there must be a space and time beyond. Nor is it an impotency of the mind. It is not a mere incapacity to conceive that when we go a certain length backward or forward in time or out into space, there time and space should cease. It is a conviction of a positive kind that beyond these points, or beyond any other space conceivable, there must still be time and space. This is a truth self-evident, necessary, universal. If we were carried out to the utmost point to which the furthest-seeing telescope can reach, or beyond this as far as imagination can range, we should confidently stretch forth our hand into outer region, believing that there must be space into which it might enter.<sup>28</sup>

Conversely, Noah Porter affirms that it is "purely and simply negative." It is rather "indefinite" than "infinite." The latter view is a humbler and less presuming view than that of Mc-

<sup>26</sup> "Space and time are neither finite nor infinite series, but are the one or the other according to the purpose for which we use our construction." (R. B. Perry, *Present Tendencies in Philosophy*, p. 102.)

<sup>27</sup> Vide the *Monist* for 1920.

<sup>28</sup> *Intuitions of the Human Mind*.



Cosh, and is more commonly accepted. To be so apodictically evident the positive nature of spatial infinity must be an intuition. This McCosh constitutes it accordingly to be. But it is extremely difficult to admit this into the class of intuitions, as he defines them. His various tests of intuitions can not be very satisfactorily applied to the idea of infinite space.

The later physical theory of Einstein concerning a curved space meeting itself so as to be globular, deserves passing mention. In this view space is infinite in that it is endless, yet finite in its boundedness. But the view is generally recognized as speculative. Further, even were it not so, the conception would have no necessary anti-theistic bearings. It is interesting to note in this connection that Einstein is an orthodox Jew.

It is now assumed that space is real and is infinite. We are next concerned then with the question of its *nature*. Its infinity is more generally recognized by both mathematicians and metaphysicians, than any one view as to its specific nature. The mode of formulation of the doctrine of divine omnipresence will be determined by our findings.

1. The first view is that space is a relation.

The relational view was first formed by Leibnitz.<sup>29</sup> Calderwood defines it as "a certain correlation of coexistences." Hamilton's view, from which however Calderwood distinguishes his, is that of "the *image* or *concept* of a certain correlation of coexistences." Professor Mead<sup>30</sup> defines space as the "sum or system of relations between things in space." But Canon Birke<sup>31</sup> perhaps expresses it most comprehensively: "We do not conceive of mere space as an actual being, like objects contained in it, nor as an attribute nor inherent power or quality of those objects, but as a definite relation between them, or parts of them. This relation has definite

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<sup>29</sup> He describes it as follows, "Je tenais l'espace pour quelque chose de purement relatif, comme le temps; pour un ordre des coexistences comme le temps est un ordre des successions."

<sup>30</sup> *Bibliotheca Sacra*, 1890.

<sup>31</sup> In *The Scripture Doctrine of Creation*, p. 133.

characters, which the mind can no more reverse than it can disbelieve the objective relatives themselves; and is conceived to be independent of those details of place, character and form, whereby the material objects are differenced from each other. Space, then, is the summation of all those relations of distance, forward or backward, sideways, up or down, in which bodies are either known to be placed, or conceived to be placeable, one towards another." As Cocker<sup>32</sup> puts it, "of 'pure space' apart from the relations of bodies we have no conception, can have no conception, place is a relation belonging to extension: and extension is a property of matter only."

*First:* The first remark on this view is that common sense judgment decrees against it: we can not conceive of any two objects in the created universe which when put together in any possible relationship can produce what corresponds to our notion of space. If we annihilate these objects and their relations, there would still be something left, something *in* which these objects rested. The notion of space would not be exhausted by them. Such at least is the common judgment of "all the people all the time." If such a judgment is an illusion it is an universal illusion, and the macrocosm itself is "of such stuff as dreams are made of."

*Secondly:* The view confuses extension and space. Extension pertains to matter and body and has parts and divisions and relations. Space is that *in* which bodies and therefore extension—the attribute of bodies—exists.

*Thirdly:* If space is infinite as many thinkers have assumed then its nature can not be relational. For all the existences related are finite: hence the relationships are finite, and there can be no infinite relation. But if space is infinite as assumed, there *must* be an infinite relation. But space can not be both an infinite relation and the sum of finite ones, at the same time. No summation of finite relations can produce an infinite one.

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<sup>32</sup> *Theistic Conception of the World*, p. 71.

2. A second view of the nature of space is that it is a *plenum* or a thing of some kind, having ontological existence.<sup>33</sup> This view is held by certain modern physicists<sup>34</sup> who, perplexed by the problem of space, resort to constituting it as something semimaterial in order to explain phenomena of light and gravitation.

There are some also who would identify space with ether, because space, even in clearest atmosphere, can be perceived and distance in it measured—which would not be the case were it a void. For physics ether, or something like it, is thought to be a necessary postulate for explaining various phenomena.

The criticism of these particular views is that it would be necessary to endow space with motility in each case. For heat and light require a movable medium. But Newton said, and common intuition requires, that space is, and should be immovable.<sup>35</sup>

Further, if space is infinite we would then have an infinite substance. But an infinite substance is a contradiction in terms and like speaking of an infinite finite. Further, were there an infinite substance, either material or immaterial, it would result in there existing two infinite beings mutually limiting each other. Such a dualism is impossible to pure theism. The *plenum* view is not widely held. It was approximated by Plato and the early philosophers. It must be assumed that space may actually be seen, and felt by the senses if it be a substance in the true sense of the term. It must have the attribute of any material substance.

3. If not a *plenum* or thing, is space "powerless emptiness" or nothing, a void or vacuum? If space is not a thing the only alternative appears to be that it is a *no-thing*.

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<sup>33</sup> Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*, I. 138, ". . . Descartes held that there is no such thing as empty space. Nothing can not possibly have extension. Wherever extension is there must be *something* extended. Hence the doctrine of a *plenum*."

<sup>34</sup> Vide Aloys Müller, in *Das Problem des absoluten Raumes*.

<sup>35</sup> Vide the *Monist*, 1920, p. 49.

And Bowne presses home to its full limit the dilemma here: "Either we must make space a pure nothing in reality, or we must make it a thing in interaction with itself." A writer in the *North American Review* describes space as a "triple synthesis of three negative notions—receptivity, unity, and infinity; the first is the negation of matter, the second is the negation of divisibility, the third is the negation of limitation." Again Dieserud<sup>36</sup> says: "Empty or pure space is then, if it exists anywhere, the vacuum, the sheer emptiness, the pure expansion, the non-being, the nothing (=no-thing) which is left when existing active things are withdrawn, and which offers no obstruction to new extended bodies, but stands everywhere ready to receive something." Such, in general, is the position of Fullerton also.

Having just eliminated space as a *thing* this present view seems forthwith to obtain. And it has distinct advantages. It is free from many of the contradictions to which the other two views are subject, e.g., the theistic postulate is not endangered,<sup>37</sup> the old problem of infinite divisibility does not exist, and all the problems and paradoxes incident to the ascription of existential reality to space, disappear.

But even this view does not completely satisfy the intellect. In the first place, a pure void or vacuum is something in the nature of the case that is beyond experience: we have and never can sense, i.e., see and touch, a vacuum. We have therefore a natural reserve in declaring space to be an infinite "somewhat" which we have never experienced. We are in the odd position of not being able to deny on good empirical or logical grounds that it is a void, yet on the other hand not being able confidently to assert it on empirical grounds. If, as Dr. McCosh asserts, space *can* be perceived, then this is proof positive that space is not a void or vacuum. If space can not be perceived, this may or may not prove that it is

<sup>36</sup> In the *Monist*, 1920, p. 45.

<sup>37</sup> For example, the argument of D. Stewart: "Divine omnipotence can not annihilate space, therefore it must be independent reality," is made invalid.

vacuum. If its unperceivability were taken seriously as a proof, it would only be a negative one. For space may indeed be some supersensible reality which is not a vacuum.

Secondly: Science is adverse to the view that space is an infinite vacuum. "Nature abhors a vacuum" it is said: and a pure or perfect vacuum has never been produced by apparatus.

Thirdly: If there is no real space externally existent there remains little reason for not accepting the force of Bowne's dilemma and adopting the idealistic solution. The "middle wall of partition" between realism and idealism has been broken down.

4. The fourth possible view, a sort of *tertium quid* between the last two views of *plenum* and *vacuum*, is as has been aptly expressed, that space is "a quasi-thing, a thing yet not a thing, a thing too real to be banished and yet not real enough to be capable of standing alone, an insistent but feeble-kneed spectre."<sup>38</sup> This view is a sort of palladium for all those metaphysicians in whom the trying paradoxes and perplexities of all the other views have produced mental disturbances. The characteristic position of those who belong in this class is that space is real, but indefinable, indescribable and unanalyzable something existing in a class by itself. Noah Porter, McCosh and Fullerton and others belong here. We "can not explain it except by referring it to our original perception," says McCosh. "Space and time are not to be arranged with such cognitions as substances, modes, or relations. They seem indeed to be put in a class by themselves, and resemble modes, relations and substances only in that they are existences, entities, realities." Though he seems to assert here some existence, yet elsewhere he denies that space can have parts—which is, if anything a characteristic of all existence except the spiritual type. Similarly equivocal is the view of Fullerton, that space is a void yet a "*plan*" of all things. "Empty space is not synonymous with 'nothing at

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<sup>38</sup> Fullerton, *op. cit.*, p. 223.



all,' it is empty space and is quite distinguishable from empty time. The conception 'thing,' and the conception 'nothing at all' do not exhaust the possibilities between them. By distance between two things we do not mean a third thing, but neither do we mean nothing at all." Shadworth Hodgson similarly defines space as an "abstract capacity" for things.

While this all may seem verbal jugglery to those who, like Bowne, hold opposing views, and enforce with vigorous logic the dilemma with its excluded middle, that space must be either a thing or nothing, yet it best befits all the facts to be included. This view possesses the modesty of self-confessed ultimate ignorance which is in the end not only more ingenuous, but more truth-approximating. Hamilton puts it: *Qui non scit ignorare, ignorat scire*. And Augustine well might say of space what he says of time: "What is time? If not asked, I know, but attempting to explain, I know not." This view eludes all the errors and contradictions of the vacuum view above.

Envisaging the problem now from the theological angle, namely, the relation of God to space—whatever space may be—it is to be noted that the problem turns almost entirely upon which of the numerous views of space above is adopted. It remains then but to summarize them in their theistic bearing.

But first, what, in general, are the proper relations of deity to space? The primary proposition is that deity must be transcendent above all space (and time). He must not be included or captivated by it but entirely free from its limitations. This is the characteristic Biblical representation.<sup>39</sup> But this relationship is merely negative in essence: it could easily lead to the conclusion of a finite God. For such a deity may conceivably be excluded from space and yet in some sense superior to it.

The second proposition, put negatively, is that this is

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<sup>39</sup> Ps. cxxxix. 7-12, 1 Kings viii. 27, Deut. x. 14, Is. lxvi. 1, Acts vii. 49, 17, 24.

not explained by defining the relationship as God's *encompassing*, περιέχων, space, like a shell encloses a pomegranate.<sup>40</sup> For to enclose space, deity must be spatial in nature, just as a mathematical point can only be mathematically enclosed by a mathematical circle. And further, in this case deity need only to be a finite spatial being as he would enclose only a finite space-world.

The third element in the problem is, how we shall introduce a spiritual being into space while he is at the same time to be conceived of as out of, and free from it. How can he be conceived as within it yet not included or bounded by it. How escape the difficulty (above) propounded by Bowne: "If space be a real objective existence, then the Infinite, i.e., God, is in space and possesses bulk and diameter. For whatever is in space must exist either as a point or as a volume; and as no one could think of ascribing a punctual existence to God, there is nothing to do but to ascribe volume. . . . But such a conception applied to deity cancels both its unity and its omnipresence. That which is omnipresent in space can not be extended in space, for such extension would imply merely the presence of the being part for part, or volume for volume in the occupied space. Philosophy can not reconcile the necessary unity of the Infinite with existence in space, and Theology can not reconcile its conception of the non-spatial mode of the divine existence with existence in space."<sup>41</sup>

How preserve, then, the unity, the personality, and the definiteness of God—for Dorner also suggests that omnipresence in an infinite space would mean that God were confined in, and absorbed into, the infinite spatial expansion. If the "*adessentia*" or "*omnipresentia essentialis*" of the Fathers be maintained, he asks, how can we say that all things fill space, while at the same time God fills all things?

Many a thoughtful but lion-hearted knight-errant has entered the metaphysical lists and jousted with this formid-

<sup>40</sup> This is the view of Theophilus, *Ad Antol.* i.5.

<sup>41</sup> Vide his *Metaphysics*, p. 189.

able problem. Each has borne a banner with different device.

1. The first banner carries the idealistic device. Idealism, however, rather dissolves than solves the problem by denying the reality of space, making it merely a form of subjective sensation or experience to which nothing corresponds without. This quiet removal of real space naturally removes the above problems connected with it. It leaves in their place however the question of how, and with what defence such an act of metaphysical leger de main may be committed. Material substance and the outer world are similarly spirited away into the interior of what Carlyle dubs the "nasty nominative." Only divine being remains without, according to Bowne. And his omnipresence after the completion of this act is defined as follows: "God acts directly upon all reality and hence is everywhere. For by omnipresence we can mean nothing more than this immediate action on all reality."<sup>42</sup> Omnipresence, then, is God's immediate action on all human minds and their contents (for this is the only reality remaining and therefore the "all reality" referred to.) This is a good definition of divine immanence in human spirits, but not a definition either of immensity or omnipresence. Further, the mere "immediate action" without a clear assertion of the presence of the essence is inadequate. There must be the "*omnipraesentia essentialis*" in addition to the presence of action.

2. If the first view removed space from God, the second one removes God from space. Socinians attempt the solution by confining the essence of God to Heaven, and making him present everywhere else by his efficiency. But their very definitions are their own criticisms, e.g. the *essentialis finitudo dei*, and "*vera quaedam magnitudo et quantitas dei*. Their attempt was to make him definite, for which end they conceived it necessary to constitute him finite. The view is also deistic in removing deity essentially from his creation.

3. The third is the pantheistic solution. Here matter, force,

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<sup>42</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 208.

mind, space and time are included in the substance of the τὸ πᾶν its modes of manifestation. Pantheism ensures the substantial omnipresence of deity, but at the expense of the distinct reality and independence of the world and man. It is therein antipodal to the Socinian view. It also makes the divine omnipresence a necessity of nature, not a free choice.

4. The view of Samuel Clarke, Sir Isaac Newton, and Girardeau and others approximates the pantheistic view by making space an attribute of the divine substance. Space is hence but a manifestation of the divine nature and essence. Augustine uses terminology suggesting this position. God is not in space, he says, and does not embrace things, such as space. Rather is everything in Him.<sup>43</sup>

The solution of the question of how God can be omnipresent in space by reposing space in God is a worthy philosophic solution if it were true. It would effectually dissipate the dilemma of Bowne presented above. Girardeau regards the position as a distinct "coign of vantage" in its freedom from the commonly known philosophic difficulties. But is the position authoritative and compelling to reason?

5. Dorner verges toward Schleiermacher in finding the solution in the divine omnipotence as it is exercised in causality.<sup>44</sup> "If the pantheistic theory is to be avoided, . . . and also if the personality of God is not to be initially excluded, without falling into the deistic conception, that can only be done *by advancing from the category of substantiality to causality*. For by that means God may hold an intimate relation to the world without being necessarily identical with it or its essence. . . . Everything is (enclosed) in Him and He is in everything. By causality it remains *thinkable* that God has an immanence in the world which exists by his power, and yet has a transcendence opposed to the world."<sup>45</sup>

<sup>43</sup> *De divers.*, Quaest. XX.

<sup>44</sup> "As Bretschneider rightly sees, omnipresence is scarcely to be distinguished any longer from omnipotence" (*System of Christian Doctrine*, Vol. I, p. 243, note 2).

<sup>45</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 242.

But this view, while clear and commendable, still overlooks the fact that the "category of substantiality" is necessary to that of causality; and that the two can not be separated without tending toward deism and Socinianism. Omnipotence can not be exercised where there is no omnipotent essence. It would be more accurate to reverse Dorner's statement (see footnote 44) and say that omnipotence is scarcely to be distinguished any longer from omnipresence. If the two doctrines are held as equally and distinctly valid however, it is true that the causal idea is of much value in clearing up the question of the independency of space while it is at the same time being occupied by the cause.

Schleiermacher carries the causal idea further. God for him is pure abstract "Causality," and his attributes merely the notions in us which that Causality evokes when it operates on the mind. Hence space is defined as "the absolutely spaceless Causality which conditions space together with all that is extended."<sup>46</sup>

Other theologians, as Michaelis,<sup>47</sup> Reinhard, Wegscheider, and Steudel, have carried the matter still further and expressly separated the *omnipraesentia operativa* from the *omnipraesentia essentialis*, or the *adessentia* of the Fathers, being motivated by a fear of pantheism. God everywhere efficiently acts on the world and space from without it. The Scriptural idea of an ἀδιάρραστος in Acts XVII, 24-28 and Jer. XXIII, 24 eliminates the tenability of this distant-residence view. Further the notion of deity operating from a distance (*actio in distans*) is contrary to thought. A being can not act where it is not. Hence these views proceed *ex errore per veritatem ad errorem*. They escape one error (the pantheistic) but in their anxiety fall subject to another. In placing God "essentially" at a distance (or tending to this) they make him related to space and limited by it. Indeed they imply that God himself must be spatial if he can have such a relation to it.

<sup>46</sup> *Christliche Glaube*, I. s. 53. (v. Dorner, p. 242).

<sup>47</sup> *Dogmatik*, second edition, p. 173.



6. The next view identifies the omnipresence of God not thus with the attribute of omnipotence, but with that of omniscience. Endemann<sup>48</sup> had already identified it with both omnipotence and omniscience. W. Powell<sup>49</sup> and others regard the attribute of omniscience alone as both a sufficient and superior explanation of the omnipresence, for the same reason that others thought omnipotence to be.

Powell apparently deduces his view from the etymology of the word. Presence comes from *prae-esse*, or *praesens*, to be before, i.e. consciously before some one. Hence, "omnipresence is consciousness of all material facts and processes. God sees fully from the points of view of all parts of space. For Him consequently there is no 'here' nor 'there.' . . . Omnipresence is an infinite attribute meaning . . . that there is no limit to the fulness of His knowledge of all real material facts. . . . The idea of presence relates strictly to material reality and only figuratively to conscious reality."<sup>50</sup>

Words are some times *vox et nihil praeterea*. Our comment is that it is not only unphilosophic to deduce a metaphysical view of omnipresence from a latin word, but it is untheological and illogical to mistake omniscience for substantial omnipresence. It is like mistaking a corollary for the proposition. The view is a hysteron proteron in logic: for, given the ontological presence of a spirit everywhere knowledge of everything in which it follows as a necessary deduction: but knowledge of everything can not follow where there is no ontological presence in everything. Omniscience here is placed before that which makes it possible. It is most true that omnipresence and omniscience are very closely interrelated and implicated. They are such for the Psalmist (Psalm 139). The writers in question have, conscious of this fact, mistakenly identified the two, and that not in the most natural way, of merging omniscience into omnipresence, but of merging omnipresence into omniscience.

<sup>48</sup> 1777, *Inst. Dog. Theol.*

<sup>49</sup> Vide *The Infinite Attributes of God*, 1920.

<sup>50</sup> P. 142, *idem*.

Further, if the notion of the mode of divine presence is deduced from *prae + ens*, be before, and omnipresence means merely "consciousness of," all this insinuates the implication that God's essence is where his consciousness is not. If this is not the implication, why then is the peculiar distinction of "consciousness of" and "ontological presence in" made? And if his consciousness is where his essence is not, then we have a reversion to the Socinian view, at least in tendency. As spiritual essence is just as non-spatial as mere consciousness, there are just as many possibilities of metaphysically reconciling it with space as there are for reconciling consciousness with the same. The presence through consciousness has no more advantage metaphysically then, than the presence conjointly through consciousness and substantial existence.

7. The problem of omnipresence may be solved, it is further suggested, by viewing space as merely our finite way of looking at things, while to the Infinite One there is no such thing. It is not experienced by Him. Certain idealists uphold this point of view. But this not so much explaining the problem as explaining it away by the categorical statement that what most people regard as reality is merely fiction or phantasy.

8. The three remaining views, which have already been presented in other connections, make it more possible to harmonize the doctrine of the universal divine presence with world space: (a.) The relational view permits, and presents no barrier to, the ontological presence of deity in the manifold of relations, being of such nature as they are. (b.) The vacuum or void view likewise presents no tangible difficulty. (c.) The view of Porter and McCosh that space is real but something undefineable by nature likewise obviates any difficulty. As it appeared, all things considered, to be the most plausible view of space, it may now be assumed as the worthiest definition in our framing a final notion of omnipresence and immensity.

The relation of God to space may then be defined in a

two-fold way; first, negatively, in accordance with the first point in the problem stated above, God is transcendent above, or free from, the limitations of space in any form. This may be termed "immensity" i. e. "immeasurability." This implies (a.) that God is without extension by nature; (b.) that consequently the whole (and not a part) of the divine being is in every place. God does not possess an "ubi" or "locus," or have "whereness." He is not divided, measured or multiplied. He is not a whole having parts. He does not, in Bowne's words, possess bulk and diameter, or have punctual existence. Quenstedt<sup>51</sup> aptly puts it in the familiar phraseology of scholasticism: *ubique illocaliter, impartibiliter, non definitiva ut spiritus, non circumscriptiva ut corpora, sed repletive.*

Secondly, the positive side of this statement is that God is ontologically or essentially present in the unitary wholeness of His being in all space and all reality. "Everything is filled by Him," John of Damascus puts it. This positive penetration or pervasion (to use misleading spatial terms) of space and reality is termed *omnipresence* by some to distinguish it from *immensity*.<sup>52</sup> This implies (a.) that God is the cause of space (as Dorner); (b.) that he pervades it without diffusion;<sup>53</sup> (c.) that he pervades it freely as opposed to pantheism; (d.) that his presence in space is not to be equated with the presence of space and the world in God, as Augustine, Anselm<sup>54</sup> and Zahn<sup>55</sup>—though these expressions are well-meant they are pantheizing in tendency or suggestiveness; (e.) that God is not merely potentially in space,

<sup>51</sup> Vide his *Theologia*, I, 288.

<sup>52</sup> These terms have had different but not greatly consequentially different meanings placed on them. For MacPherson, immensity is transcendence, and omnipresence is the immanence of God. For Dr. Charles Hodge, immensity is the divine presence in relation to space, and omnipresence is the same in relation to all His creatures. For Strong, immensity is non-extension or non-limitation: omnipresence is the active penetration of everything by deity.

<sup>53</sup> Augustine: *non quasi mole ubique diffusa.*

<sup>54</sup> "Nothing contains Thee; Thou containest all things."

<sup>55</sup> *Bib. Dogm.*, p. 149, "The immanence of the world in God, not the immanence of God in the world is taught by the Scripture."

as opposed to the Socinians; (f.) that God is not in space by mere causality,<sup>56</sup> or by operation upon it,<sup>57</sup> or by mere consciousness of it.<sup>58</sup> Thomas Aquinas, in his definition, seems to summarize all of these elements at once in the positive statement: He is *per potentiam*, *per praesentiam* (all things are open and naked before Him.) and *per essentiam*, in all space.

*Princeton.*

F. D. JENKINS.

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<sup>56</sup> Schleiermacher and Dorner.

<sup>57</sup> Bowne.

<sup>58</sup> Powell.

## MODERN BOTANY AND THE THEORY OF ORGANIC EVOLUTION

During the long distracting years that followed his notable discoveries, Gregor Mendel (1822-1884) used to say, "Meine Zeit wird schon kommen." But he had been dead sixteen years before the world awoke to the importance of his experiments. However in our day the great truth that the characters of organisms are *transmitted separately* in heredity has become the great predominating influence in experimental biology. As Edwin Grant Conklin expresses it, "At present it is practically certain that there is no other kind of inheritance than Mendelian."<sup>1</sup>

This principle of the *separateness* of the various characters of size, color, shape, etc., of the various organs and tissues of plants and animals, and their segregation and separate transmission in heredity, has proved a very enlightening idea when we attempt to understand the origin of the great diversities among plants and animals. And although Bateson has had to remind us that, "we cannot see how the differentiation into species came about; variation of many kinds, often considerable, we daily witness, but no origin of species";<sup>2</sup> yet it has always seemed reasonable that this principle of Mendelian segregation has been one of the important factors in the multiplying of various types. The one essential point which we have not been able to explain, as Bateson has pointed out, is how the barriers of cross-sterility have been erected between these various *mutants*, or Mendelian segregates, which we can so easily imagine must have originated in the long ago from the ancestral types.

But it is as clear as sunlight that we must have these original types, these primal stocks, to start with. Mendelism gives us a very vivid picture of the shuffling of the cards, of the recombination of the separate characters in an almost in-

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<sup>1</sup> *Heredity and Environment* (1920), p. 99.

<sup>2</sup> *Science*, Jan. 20, 1922.



numerable variety of ways; but we must have these cards, or there could be no shuffling. The chemist can separate or combine the elements of his various compounds; but he never expects to get out of his mixtures anything that he did not put into them.

This fact has been a great stumblingblock to many ardent students of organic evolution. They openly confess that they are becoming disappointed; for Mendelism is not getting them anywhere. In a recent address Bateson speaks of these dissatisfied ones:

I notice that certain writers who conceive themselves to be doing a service to Darwinism, take thereupon occasion to say that they expected as much, and that from the first they had disliked the whole thing. I would remind them that the class of evidence to which we were appealing was precisely that to which Darwin and every other previous evolutionist had appealed.<sup>3</sup>

As an example of what is being said against Mendelism, we may take the following from E. W. MacBride:

I well remember the enthusiasm with which the Mendelian theory was received, when it was introduced to the scientific world in the early years of this century. We thought that at last the key to evolution had been discovered. As a leading Mendelian put it, whilst the rest of us had been held up by an apparently impenetrable hedge, viz., the difficulty of explaining the origin of variation, Mendel had unnoticed cut a way through. But, as our knowledge of the facts grew, the difficulty of using Mendelian phenomena to explain evolution became apparent, and this early hope sickened and died. The way which Mendel cut was seen to lead into a *cul-de-sac*.<sup>4</sup>

The article from which this is taken had been written by Professor MacBride in criticism of some other papers by Julian Huxley in the same journal. More recently Mr. Huxley has replied to MacBride in the following manner:

It is a matter of constant surprise why many who profess themselves Darwinian of the Darwinians should not only not avail themselves of the new tool [Mendelian breeding experiments], but also evince positive hostility to it. The new principles are, indeed, the only tool we at present possess which is capable of putting evolutionary theories to experimental test. Yet, with a few honorable exceptions, most taxonomists and 'evolu-

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<sup>3</sup> *Nature*, May 10, 1924.

<sup>4</sup> *Science Progress*, Jan. 1922, pp. 455 f.

tionists' prefer to stick to speculative methods—speculative because incapable of being tested either by experiment or by calculation—and make no attempt to use the new principles in experimental attack—or, for that matter, even in interpretation.<sup>5</sup>

A very interesting situation, indeed! On the one side we have the more ardent evolutionists who “prefer to stick to speculative methods,” blaming Mendelism for leading them into a *cul-de-sac*, a blind alley; on the other side we have the experimental biologists who remind their opponents and critics that this new tool of experimental breeding by Mendelian methods is “the only tool we at present possess which is capable of putting evolutionary theories to experimental tests.” How much organic evolution can we get out of a situation like that?

But now comes J. P. Lotsy, the Holland botanist, and says that the only possible way to get new types is through hybridization—of course, with Mendelian segregation. The crossing of two distinct types will give us a new kind; there is no other way. As for the supposed evidence of geology or paleontology in support of organic evolutionary pedigrees, he has completely lost faith in it, and repudiates this method entirely. On this latter point he says: “Phylogeny, *i.e.*, reconstruction of what has happened in the past, is no science, but a product of fantastic speculations.”<sup>6</sup>

I agree with Lotsy most fully in this statement, which should undoubtedly be brought to the attention of the Curator of the American Museum of Natural History, New York City, and his staff of assistants. They might find occasion to change the labels over two or three of their wonderful exhibits, and there would be at least one department which would need to be entitled: “Hall of Fantastic Speculations.” Indeed, as I remember, this label might be placed over several of the departments there.

But as if to offset any objection to his statement, Lotsy

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<sup>5</sup> *Nature*, April 12, 1924, p. 520.

<sup>6</sup> *Evolution by Means of Hybridization*, 1916, p. 140.

goes on to say in the sentence immediately following the passage just quoted: "Those who know that I have spent a considerable part of my life in efforts to trace the phylogeny of the vegetable kingdom, will know that this is not written down lightly; nobody cares to destroy his own efforts."

But this new *Aufklärung* regarding the futility of all attempts to trace out imaginary lines of descent by means of the fossils, seems to have dawned also on the minds of some of the English botanists. For A. G. Tansley, in his Presidential address before the Botanical Section of the British Association, at the Liverpool Meeting (1923), did not hesitate to say that he regarded recent developments in botany as making the search for common ancestors among the plants "literally a hopeless quest, the genealogical tree an illusory vision."<sup>7</sup>

Prof. A. C. Seward, of Cambridge University, informs us that "The present tendency is to discard the old-fashioned genealogical tree with its wonderful diversity of branches," as being in any respects a true method of representing the course of evolution. Because, as he goes on to say, "a student who takes an impartial retrospect soon discovers that the fossil record raises more problems than it solves."<sup>8</sup>

Professor F. O. Bower, of Glasgow University, in commenting on these recent developments in botany says that: "At the present moment we seem to have reached a phase of negation in respect of the achievements of phyletic morphology, and in conclusions as to descent. . . . I believe that a similar negative attitude is also to be found among those who pursue zoological science."<sup>9</sup>

Readers of this REVIEW may remember an article of mine in a previous issue,<sup>10</sup> entitled: "The Fossils as Age-Markers in Geology." The conclusion there reached was that the exact chronological distinctions between the various geological systems or formations, are not logically and scientifically

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<sup>7</sup> *Nature*, March 8, 1924.

<sup>8</sup> *Nature*, April 26, 1924.

<sup>9</sup> *Nature*, March 8, 1924.

<sup>10</sup> October, 1922.

established; and that the fantastic blunders upon which these alleged chronological distinctions have been founded, make but a poor foundation on which to build evolutionary theories of organic development. It is interesting to note that these English and Dutch botanists are approaching this latter conclusion, though by another road.

Dr. D. H. Scott has issued a very notable book this year (1924) entitled: *Extinct Plants and Problems of Evolution*, which gives us a good picture of the present situation among the students of plants, and helps us to see why the foregoing statements are not to be regarded as mere sporadic exclamations of revolt and dissatisfaction on the part of a few people. In passing it may be remarked that Dr. Scott reverses the order of discussion ordinarily followed, in that he begins with the *present* flora and *works backward into the past*, instead of beginning at an imaginary point in the past, which I have compared to the vanishing point of the vistas of a past eternity, and working up to the present. In this I am sure that Dr. Scott is following correct principles. As I have pointed out in my *Fundamentals of Geology*, and more recently in my *New Geology*, this is the only method deserving to be called truly scientific.

Scott quotes liberally and with approval from Bateson, and adds his own *dictum* that, "It must be admitted that our present knowledge of variation is not such as to throw any clear light on the origin of species."<sup>11</sup> and he goes on to say: "At present all speculation on the nature of past changes is in the air; for variation itself is only an hypothesis, and we have to decide, quite arbitrarily, what kind of variations we think may probably have occurred in the course of descent."<sup>12</sup>

After quoting the forceful statement of Lotsy, that phylogeny, that is, the "reconstruction of what has happened in the past, is no science, but a product of fantastic speculations," Scott proceeds to say, "Like Dr. Lotsy, I have be-

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<sup>11</sup> P. 16.

<sup>12</sup> P. 17.

come skeptical of late as to most phylogenetic reconstructions";<sup>13</sup> though he does not wish to go quite so far. He thinks that we can still catch glimpses of a development process, "in dim outline," and, as it were, by "an act of faith."

As for the reasons for this skepticism on his part, Scott gives us the following: "The record [geological] shows no time limit between Monocotyledons and Dicotyledons, and throws no light on the possible derivation of the one class from the other. Both extend far back into the Cretaceous, and throughout the whole time the Dicotyledons appear more numerous than the Monocotyledons, as they are at the present day."<sup>14</sup>

All this would be readily understood if, as I have contended, the fossils merely represent an older state of our present world, the buried floras and faunas being known as "formations," but not in any sense whatever representing a true chronology, all of these floras and faunas having doubtless lived contemporaneously. If the geological "formations" merely represent contemporaneous floras and faunas, what would be more natural and indeed inevitable than the facts as given above by Professor Scott?

Scott sees no way of connecting one of the great groups of plants with another. "On the whole, one is impressed with the independence of the various phyla of vascular plants, all through the geological record."<sup>15</sup> "On a review of the whole evidence, the former belief in the origin of the Pteridosperms (and through them of the seed-plants generally) from Ferns must be given up. We have no reason to believe that Ferns, as botanists understand the name, are any older than the Pteridosperms themselves; the points in common between the two groups now appear to be homoplastic,<sup>16</sup> and not indicative of the descent of the one from the other. Thus

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<sup>13</sup> P. 18.

<sup>14</sup> P. 43.

<sup>15</sup> P. 202.

<sup>16</sup> *i.e.* having a similarity of form unaccompanied by a community of pedigree.



the origin of the seed-plants is still an unsolved problem.<sup>17</sup>

He quotes with approval the following novel theory of Prof. A. C. Seward, of Cambridge University:

It may be that we shall never piece together the links in the chain of life, not because the missing parts elude our search, but because the unfolding of terrestrial life in all its phases cannot be compared to a single chain. Continuity in some degree there must have been, but it is conceivable that plant-life viewed as a whole may best be represented by separate and independent lines of evolution, or disconnected chains which were never united, each being initiated by some revolution in the organic world.<sup>18</sup>

What are we coming to in these modern days? "Disconnected chains which were never united"! I could believe him, if he would only make these "disconnected chains" sufficiently numerous, and start them with a real Creation, instead of with "some revolution in the organic world." And, as I have come to think the matter over, would it not be a good plan to have them all start together, instead of having them start independently, in a sort of handicap race, a few at a time?

Scott says that this "bold suggestion" of Professor Seward is "to be welcomed;" because "the evolution of plants, so far as the record shows, does not present a uniform progression, but rather a series of diverse periods of vegetation, each with a character of its own."<sup>19</sup>

I fully agree with this statement. But I am prepared to maintain that the reason why the fossil plants do "not present a uniform progression, but rather a series of diverse periods of vegetation, each with a character of its own," is because he and the other paleobotanists have always had to take the geological "formations" as the zoologists have wanted to arrange them. The latter have had things too much their own way.

As I have repeatedly pointed out, in my *New Geology* and elsewhere, the whole arrangement of the "formations" into an orderly series is a purely artificial scheme, made up from

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<sup>17</sup> Pp. 207-8.

<sup>18</sup> Pp. 214-215.

<sup>19</sup> P. 215.

scattered localities all over the globe, there being no place on earth where more than two or three of them are ever found together in any one vertical section. The geological series is like the card-catalogue of a library; and although its main outlines have long been fixed, its details are even yet constantly manipulated and revised, so as to make them conform more nearly to the evolutionary theory. But this rechecking and rearrangement has been almost entirely in the hands of the paleozoologists; with the very natural result that their pets, the fossil animals, seem to "present a uniform progression," all right enough, but the plants have been almost completely disregarded. Hence Dr. Scott and his companion paleobotanists are having a hard time of it, a very hard time, and are quite discouraged in trying to work out any real scheme of evolution from the fossil plants.

If I were in the place of these paleobotanists, I should insist on having a fair show. Of course, the "geological series" is pretty well fixed up and stereotyped by this time, and it might be quite difficult now to get any proper adjustments made. If they could only have gotten in on the ground floor, in the days of Cuvier, Murchison, and Sedgwick, or even in the days of Hall, Agassiz, and Dana, they would not now have occasion to complain that they cannot get their fossil plants to "present a uniform progression."

Some unfortunate discoveries have lately tended to make matters even worse. For instance, in 1921 Professor Seward himself collected in Greenland and brought with him back to England a slab of Cretaceous rock, "showing on one side of the slab a Dicotyledonous leaf, like that of a Plane, and on the other the leaf of one of the old Cycads."<sup>20</sup> This was too bad; for the paleobotanists are just naïve enough to infer from this that this "old Cycad" and this modern plane tree must have actually lived contemporaneously. They should have taken a cue from the paleozoologists. Plenty of instances of "discordant" fossil animals have been found in similarly close contact, without the zoologists feeling at all

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<sup>20</sup> Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

obliged to draw the inconvenient conclusion that these "incongruous" animals had actually lived contemporaneously. Various devices have been worked out. A new generic name might be given to the one or the other, or to both; which would get rid of the difficulty quite well. Or an imaginary line of stratification could be drawn between the two fossils, one of them being in one "age" and the other in another. If when discovered the fossils had happened to be in the "wrong" order, the "older" being on top and the "younger" being below, a "thrust fault" would need to be worked out, to have the "older" pushed over on top of the "younger." Several other devices might have suggested themselves to the ingenious paleozoologist without his being driven to the crude, inept conclusion that the two fossils had actually lived in the same world together. Really, such unskilful handling of the situation by these fossil-botanists has made it doubly difficult for them to make their plants "present a uniform progression."

Still more recently Dr. A. C. Noé, Paleobotanist of the University of Chicago, has published an article entitled, "A Paleozoic Angiosperm,"<sup>21</sup> describing the discovery of a true angiosperm stem in a coal ball from a coal seam near Harrisburg, Illinois. Not only is the fossil stem here discovered an undoubted Angiosperm, but the coal seam from which it was taken just as undoubtedly belongs to the "Pennsylvanian" subdivision of the Carboniferous System of geology. Furthermore, other fossil plant remains, which have been identified as *Lepidodendroids* belonging to the Carboniferous, were found in the same coal ball. This discovery was made after the make-up of the manuscript of Professor Scott's book, which may be given as the reason why no mention of it is found there.

This is a very astonishing discovery. Hitherto it has been supposed that Angiosperms are not found in any geological formations "lower" in the series than the Comanchean or Lower Cretaceous. But this discovery at one jump takes us

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<sup>21</sup> *Journal of Geology*, May-June, 1923.

back through the Jurassic, the Triassic, and the Permian, into the Carboniferous. Truly, it is a very astonishing discovery, from the point of view of evolutionary geology.

In reality, there is nothing at all surprising about it. Why may not the Cretaceous Angiosperms have been living contemporaneously with the Coal plants of the Carboniferous? Nobody has ever given us a glimmer of a scientific reason why they did not live contemporaneously, though in separated localities, in the ancient world, except the negative reason, that we had never found them actually together in the same deposit. Now we have actually found them together. What prevents us from saying that the Carboniferous and the Cretaceous coal beds merely represent contemporary floras, from separated localities? There is absolutely nothing but an evolutionary theory, already hoary with age, but nevertheless a pure assumption, a mere theory, to forbid us saying that these two formations (widely separated in the classification) were actually living contemporary with each other.

But it is very inconvenient, sometimes dangerous to one's geological reputation, to find a well-recognized fossil in the wrong place. This is illustrated by the case of Mr. John T. Reid, a mining engineer of Lovelock, Nevada. This gentleman had the misfortune to run across a big fossilized horse's foot, taken from a Cretaceous (Laramie formation) coal mine in Utah. Now as a mining engineer of long experience and acquaintance with geological theory, it was decidedly unethical for him to find this well-carbonized one-toed horse's foot in a Cretaceous bed, and a big foot at that, as large as that of a draft horse of today. Of course, ever since the time of T. H. Huxley, when he first put his fossil horses on parade, geologists have been looking for something which they could call a "horse" in Eocene or possibly Cretaceous strata; but what they wanted was a little, wee animal, not bigger than a rabbit. If Mr. Reid was going to find a horse of any kind in a Cretaceous coal bed, it should by all means have been a small one, and it ought to have had five or six

toes at least. Why, to find a genuine large horse in a Cretaceous stratum would imply that the actual ancestors of the modern horse (*Equus caballus*) may have been contemporary with the big dinosaurs; and this would never do.

In addition Mr. Reid committed the further indiscretion of taking his specimen to New York and showing it to Dr. W. D. Matthew and others of the staff of the American Museum of Natural History. Of all the scientific institutions in the world this is the one that has specialized in working up a pedigree for the horse, by illustrating with casts and fossils plausibly arranged just how our modern horse has evolved from a little four-toed creature, called a "horse" by courtesy, which is about the size of a fox. And this latter specimen was found in Eocene (Wasatch) beds. Some of us would hardly dare to be caught within three or four blocks of West Central Park, New York City, with a large, carbonized, one-toed, Cretaceous horse's foot in our possession. Is it any wonder that when Mr. Reid had the temerity to present such a specimen in person to the members of the Museum staff, with some of whom he was already acquainted, he was almost threatened with excommunication from the scientific synagogue?

Similarly, I should think it must have been a very dangerous thing for Dr. A. C. Noé to find a real Angiosperm in Carboniferous strata. But he must have felt that he had the paleobotanists with him, for the methods which they have developed of making very thin sections of their fossils and then examining these sections under the microscope, brings out beautifully the most minute tissues and makes it very easy to identify the kind of plant under examination. In this respect the paleobotanists are ahead of the paleozoologists, for the latter have only the hard parts of their specimens to examine, such as the shells or bones; whereas the former have the most minute tissues of stems or fruits (in the botanic sense) spread out before them with all the perfection of recent specimens. Whether or not Dr. Noé had any compunctions of conscience at finding an Angiosperm in a Carboniferous bed, I do not know. At any rate, the thing was



done, and the results have been published in an "orthodox" scientific journal. But this makes it an even more difficult task for the botanists to arrange their specimens so as to "present a uniform progression."

In view of all this, we may well ask ourselves, "Ubinam gentium sumus?" Where in the world are we? What have these recent contributions to botany accomplished with respect to the ever-present problem of the origin of our plants and animals? What light do these recent advances throw upon the problem of organic evolution?

For one thing, these discoveries are helping more and more to show the absurdities of the current chronological distinctions between the various kinds of fossils. On account of these and other discoveries, the evolutionary type of geology is apparently *in extremis*. It seems quite unlikely that it can survive much longer. With its biological form of the "onion-coat theory," its "thrust faults" and its "deceptive conformities," it was fast becoming subject to the scoffs of the Philistine Fundamentalists; but now the orthodox paleobotanists have themselves entered the lists against the long-treasured traditions, and are making things very uncomfortable for the modern students of botany to continue believing the creed upon which all scientists have been nourished for the past two generations. For when the evolutionary form of geology breaks down, the whole theory of organic evolution tumbles with it; the biological phase of the theory collapsed long ago under the assaults of Mendel and his followers.

In the second place, these modern discoveries are helping to dissipate the age-old fable about "extinct species." This theory that all the fossil plants and animals belong to extinct types, and are only in a very remote and shadowy way connected with the living things of our modern world, has come down to us from the days of Buffon, "Strata" Smith, and Baron Cuvier. It has been hard to dispel this superstition, because it has been such a useful ally of Lyell's uniformitarianism and the organic evolution of Darwin, and because it has so long delayed the coming of the New Catastrophism

in geology, by keeping the world in ignorance of the thousands of fossil plants and animals which are essentially duplicates of those alive today. But the modern discoveries, especially in botany, are helping us to see that, if we will only make a reasonable allowance for the changed environment of climate which prevails in our modern world, great multitudes of the fossil forms are undoubtedly the real ancestors of species alive today on all of the five continents and in all of the seven seas. And with the establishment of this great basic truth, the ultimate triumph of the New Catastrophism becomes as certain as tomorrow's sunrise.

In the third place, these discoveries seem to be bringing us already within measurable distance of the scientific establishment of a real Creation, as the origin of our more familiar forms of plant life. This development in the situation ought to be as pleasing to the old-time friends of the Bible as it undoubtedly is annoying and perplexing to the standpat evolutionists.

Dr. H. B. Guppy, a prominent English botanist, in 1906, put forth the theory that, in considering the total life-existence of the great families (such as the families of the Angiosperms), we must speak of two quite distinct periods, the first period in which they originated, and the second (the present) in which they became differentiated or split up into their present diversity. D. H. Scott quotes Guppy as saying: "The age that witnessed the rise of the great families and the age that witnessed their subsequent differentiation are things apart, and cannot be dealt with by the same method."<sup>22</sup>

To this limited extent, this sounds so much like the Bible doctrine of a real Creation in the long ago, a *completed Creation*, utterly different from the present reign of "natural law," that I could not help exclaiming, "Eppur si muove!" on reading Guppy's theory for the first time.

In 1922, Dr. J. C. Willis issued a remarkable book entitled, *Age and Area*, to which Dr. Guppy contributes a chapter. This book is published by the Cambridge University Press,

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<sup>22</sup> *Linnean Society's Journal*, 1919, p. 457; Scott, p. 29.

and in it Willis says that he had adopted Guppy's theory regarding the origin of the great plant families the year after it was first enunciated, or in 1907. Among the other contributors to Willis' book is Hugo de Vries, of "Mutation" fame. Dr. Scott does not wholly endorse this theory, but he always speaks of Willis and Guppy with the most profound respect; while in telling the implications of the theory he admits that we cannot refute it, for he says: "We know nothing whatever of the origin of the Angiospermous families, so the field is open to speculation."<sup>23</sup>

No, not "open to speculation"; rather let us say, open to a belief in a real Creation as the only possible origin of these types of life. This is what Guppy's theory really means, as it seems to me. A dangerous admission for a modern scientist to make! Yes; but these men feel themselves driven to it by the cogency of their evidence.

Willis explains the theory further as follows, for he says that the development of plants "did not proceed from individual to variety, from variety to species, from species to genus, and from genus to family, but inversely, the great families and genera appearing at a very early period, and subsequently breaking up into other genera and species."<sup>24</sup>

In the light of what Mendelism has shown us, this seems to me to be a very reasonable view of the situation regarding origins. Obviously great multitudes of what we term "species," both the Jordanian species and the groups called "Linnaean species," corresponding more to what are commonly called genera, have come about by Mendelian or other methods of segregation from the great primal stocks, which Guppy calls the great family groups. But back of all this, as Guppy and Willis declare, there must have been a sudden origin of these great groups by some method not now in evidence around us under this reign of what we are pleased to term "natural law."

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<sup>23</sup> "Extinct Plants and Problems of Evolution," p. 217; 1924.

<sup>24</sup> "Age and Area," p. 221; 1922.

As I have shown at length elsewhere,<sup>25</sup> the prime idea of the evolution doctrine is *uniformity*, that the present is the measure of the past and the measure of all the past. The origin of plants and animals has not been different in any way from processes now going on around us; but the same laws and processes hold throughout all time, past, present, and future.

In contrast with this essentially pagan or atheistic theory, the Bible tells us that back at a period called "the beginning" forces and processes were manifested which then ceased and have since not been thus manifested. This is the doctrine of a completed Creation, of which the Sabbath was given to the race as the memorial. In harmony with this the Epistle to the Hebrews tells us that "the works were finished from the foundation of the world," though Christ also said that His Father still worked and He himself worked to sustain and perpetuate the creation which they had in the beginning brought into existence.

This distinction between the origin of things by a real Creation, and the present operation of "natural law" in sustaining and perpetuating what was originally created, is one of the most important, one of the most basic ideas of all Christianity. Fortified with this idea the Christian is never perplexed by all the confusion and turmoil of modern discussion; for he sees in radioactivity, in biology, and in other ways the steadily accumulating evidences that the whole theory of evolution is crumbling to pieces, and that a literal Creation of all the great primal types of plants and animals, including man, is the only fact left for men who are acquainted with the progress of scientific discoveries in modern times. And the botanists are now coming along with their very helpful contribution. Let us hope that some of the zoologists will adopt similar methods and reach similar conclusions.

*College View, Neb.*

GEORGE MCCREADY PRICE

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<sup>25</sup> *Q.E.D., or New Light on the Doctrine of Creation*, Revell, 1917.

## THE MODERN USE OF THE BIBLE\*

The "modern use of the Bible," as Dr. Fosdick sets it forth, consists first in a somewhat naïve application of the evolutionary point of view, and second in a separation between "abiding experiences" and the temporary "mental categories" in which those experiences were expressed. These two closely related aspects of the book may be considered briefly in turn.

In the first place, then, our author applies to the Bible the evolutionary point of view; the Bible, he insists, must not be treated as though it lay all on the same plane, but on the contrary "the new approach to the Bible saves us from the necessity of apologizing for immature stages in the development of the Biblical revelation."<sup>1</sup>

From the purely scientific point of view this [the arrangement of the documents of the Bible in their approximately chronological order] is an absorbingly interesting matter, but even more from the standpoint of practical results its importance is difficult to exaggerate. It means that we can trace the great ideas of Scripture in their development from their simple and elementary forms, when they first appear in the earliest writings, until they come to their full maturity in the latest books. Indeed, the general soundness of the critical results is tested by this fact that as one moves up from the earlier writings toward the later he can observe the development of any idea he chooses to select, such as God, man, duty, sin, worship.<sup>2</sup> . . . No longer can we think of the Book as on a level, no longer read its maturer messages back into its earlier sources. We know now that every idea in the Bible started from primitive and childlike origins and, with however many setbacks and delays, grew in scope and height toward the culmination in Christ's Gospel. We know now that the Bible is the record of an amazing spiritual development.<sup>3</sup>

We have called this evolutionary view of the Bible "naïve" for several reasons. In the first place it does not do justice to

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\**The Modern Use of the Bible*. By HARRY EMERSON FOSDICK, D. D., Morris K. Jessup Professor of Practical Theology, Union Theological Seminary, New York. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1924. Pp. 291.

<sup>1</sup> P. 27.

<sup>2</sup> Pp. 7f.

<sup>3</sup> Pp. 11f.



the possibility of retrogression as well as advance—a possibility which certainly exists if history be looked at from the naturalistic point of view. It is true that Dr. Fosdick speaks of the roadway that leads any religious and ethical idea of the Bible “to its climax in the teaching of Jesus” as a roadway that is “often uneven;”<sup>4</sup> it is true that he speaks of “set-backs and delays” that occurred in the development. But despite these admissions it seems fairly clear that the fact of progress is a dogma with Dr. Fosdick. Yet we are inclined to doubt whether that dogma is in such complete accord with the findings of modern science as our author seems to suppose.

In the second place, Dr. Fosdick does not seem to see that the chronological arrangement of the Biblical sources upon which the evolutionary reconstruction depends is itself based upon that elimination of supernatural revelation which it in turn is made to support. As it stands, of course, the Biblical history does not fall into the evolutionary scheme, but involves supernatural interpositions of God in miracle and in revelation; and if, after the sources are first arranged at will in the order that will show a regular development from crude beginnings to a higher spiritual religion, the rearranged Bible shows that beautifully regular development which is the goal of the rearrangement, the result can scarcely be called significant. The truth is that the critical reconstruction itself presupposes the naturalistic principle which it is made to demonstrate. The whole argument moves in a vicious circle.

But we have not yet commented on the most astonishing thing about Dr. Fosdick's presentation of the modern use of the Bible. The most astonishing thing is that in exalting the historical method of approach our author displays so little acquaintance with that to which he himself appeals. It would be difficult to discover a book which exhibits less understanding than this book does for the historical point of view.

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<sup>4</sup> P. 8.

It is not merely misinformation in detail to which we refer. Such misinformation is indeed at times surprising. It is somewhat surprising, for example, to find a modern man, professor in Union Theological Seminary, writing about textual criticism as though it were "a powerful help in correcting obscure and perverted renderings," and as though it enabled us to select "the more ancient or more sensible renderings."<sup>5</sup> What has textual criticism, which concerns, as Dr. Fosdick himself says, the task of getting back as nearly as possible to "the original autograph copies of the Scriptures," to do with the selection of the more ancient or more sensible "renderings"—that is, translations? The reader is almost tempted to doubt whether our author has any clear understanding of what textual criticism is.

But what is far more important than all such confusions in detail is the rejection of historical method at the central point—that is in the presentation of the teaching of Jesus and of the apostles. Our author is very severe upon the ancient allegorizers who read their own ideas into the Biblical writings; but what he does not seem to see is that he has made himself guilty, in a far more extreme form, of the fault which he blames in them. It would be difficult to discover a more complete abandonment of grammatico-historical exegesis, in fact though not in theory, than that which is to be found in the present book.

The prerequisite of grammatico-historical exegesis is a sharp separation between the question what the modern reader could have wished the Biblical writers to say and the question what the writers actually did say. This method has been practised, we believe, best of all by those scholars who have themselves been willing to learn from the Bible, who have been willing to mould their own views of God and the world and salvation upon the views which the Biblical writers present. But it has also been practised with considerable success by many modern scholars who have not at all accepted

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<sup>5</sup> Pp. 39f.

for themselves the teachings of the Biblical writers and yet have honestly endeavored to present those teachings as they are without admixture of their own modern predilections. In Dr. Fosdick's case, however, such historical method is abandoned, and the teachings of Jesus and of the apostles are presented not as the sources—even the critically reconstructed sources—show them to have been, but as the modern author would have liked to have them be.

We do not mean that our author is entirely unaware of the fact that the apostles and even Jesus taught things that he himself cannot believe to be true; he does, for example, face in passing the possibility that Jesus shared the apocalyptic ideas of His people, which "the modern man" of course rejects. He does, moreover, deal incidentally with the question of the Messianic consciousness. But at this point he finds refuge in an extreme skepticism about the Gospels which few even of modern naturalistic historians have been willing to share; he is doubtful whether Jesus ever presented himself as the Messiah—a view which makes the origin of the Church an insoluble enigma. At other points he takes refuge in a total ignoring of the problems. One could read Dr. Fosdick's presentation of the teaching of Jesus and not have the slightest inkling of the central place which Jesus gave, for example, to that theistic view of God which Dr. Fosdick so vigorously rejects, and to the awe-inspiring doctrine of heaven and hell which runs all through the words of Jesus and is at the very foundation of the terrible earnestness of His ethical demands. These central characteristics of Jesus' teaching are for Dr. Fosdick as though they did not exist; he does not even face the problem which they present to the "modern man." Very different is the attitude of real (however radical) scholarship like that of Dr. McGiffert, who in his *God of the Early Christians*,<sup>6</sup> despite a false limitation of the sources, has presented, though of course not explicitly, as devastating a refutation of Dr. Fosdick's anti-historical account of Jesus as any refutation which we might undertake.

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<sup>6</sup> Cf. this REVIEW, Vol. xxiii (October 1924), pp. 544 ff.

Our author's abandonment of historical method appears at many points; it appears, for example, as has already been observed, in his ignoring of Jesus' theism and of His teaching about future rewards and punishments. But it appears most crassly of all, perhaps, in his complete failure to recognize the factual or dispensational basis of all the New Testament teaching. The plain fact of history, a fact which must be recognized by all impartial historians, is that Jesus was conscious of standing at the threshold of a new era which was to be begun by a catastrophic event, and that the apostles were conscious of looking back upon that event and of having had its meaning revealed to them by God. In Dr. Fosdick's book this central feature of the New Testament is consistently or almost consistently ignored. The result appears in exegetical monstrosities like the following:<sup>7</sup>

In the second place, having thus appealed to the Old Testament against the clever and sophisticated interpretations that had been fathered [?] on it, he [Jesus] distinguished in the Old Testament between significant and negligible elements. He rated ceremonial law low and ethical law high. The Mosaic laws of clean and unclean foods were plainly written in the Book, but Jesus abolished them from the category of the ethical. . . .

In the third place, having appealed from the oral law to the written law, and within the written law having appealed from ceremonial elements to ethical principles, he went on to recognize that some ethical principles in the written law had been outgrown . . . . . His whole Sermon on the Mount, starting with its assurance that the old law is to be fulfilled and not destroyed, is a definite endeavor to see that it is fulfilled, carried to completion, with its outgrown elements superseded and its abiding ideals crowned and consummated.

What the Master did, in a word, was to plunge deep beneath the sophisticated exegesis of his time, the timid literalisms which bound men by a text instead of liberating them by a truth, and in the abiding experiences and principles of the Old Testament find a revelation of God that was fruitful and true.

Let it be clearly noted that this attitude of Jesus involved the recognition of the fact that the Scriptures did contain outgrown elements . . . .

Let us then frankly take our stand with the Master on this basic matter! Of course there are outgrown elements in Scripture. How could it be otherwise in a changing world? . . . .

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<sup>7</sup> Pp. 91 ff.

A similar method of treatment is applied even to Paul:

In this [that is, in "translating the formula back into the life out of which it came"] they [the modern liberals] are like Paul. Brought up a Jew, indoctrinated in the strictest sect of Hebrew orthodoxy, he discovered that much of the religious framework in which he had trusted was for him untenable. He gave up his old interpretation of the Scripture, dropped circumcision, clean and unclean foods, and the burden of ceremonial requirement. He gave up his old view of worship and left the temple behind. A more radical transition in mental framework and practical religious expression it would be hard to find. Paul, however, did not give up religion. He went deeper into it. His casting off of old forms sprang from the positive expansion of his religious experience. Cramped and prisoned in Judaism, he sought more room for his enlarging life. He became a liberal, from the standpoint of his older thinking, not because he was less religious, but because he was more religious. He struck out for air to breathe and he found it in the central regenerative experiences which lie at the heart of the Gospel. And when he was through he was sure that he understood the depths of the Old Testament as he had never understood them before. That is the very genius of liberalism. Its first step is to go through old formulas into the experiences out of which all religious formulas must come. In Phillips Brooks' figure, it beats the crust back into the batter.<sup>8</sup>

Such is Dr. Fosdick's presentation of Jesus and of Paul. Both Jesus and Paul appear, according to our author, to have been pragmatists of the most approved modern kind. But of course such a presentation has nothing in the world to do with history; it increases our knowledge of the agnostic Modernism of the present day, but as an account of those who lived in the first century it is nothing short of absurd.

To the historian, as distinguished from the propagandist, it should be abundantly plain that when Jesus opposed His stupendous "I say unto you" to the requirements of the Old Testament He was not appealing to a general right of man as man to take the commands of God with a grain of salt—to penetrate (if we may borrow from the very common misuse of 2 Cor. iii. 6) behind the "letter" to the "spirit;" but He was appealing to His own exalted right, as Messiah, to legislate for the new age which His coming was to usher in. Certainly He was not holding that the requirements of the Old Testament had been "outgrown" (what a really aston-

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<sup>8</sup> Pp. 186 ff.



ishing departure from historical method is involved in our author's repeated use, as expository of Jesus, of that word!); but He was announcing the beginning of an entirely new dispensation which was to be opened by an act of His which was also an act of God the Father.

So also it is an historical blunder of the crassest kind to represent Paul as though he were a "liberal" who rejected the ceremonial parts of the Old Testament law because of "the positive expansion of his religious experience." On the contrary the teaching of Paul is based, not upon a lax, but the strictest possible, understanding of the law. And, to speak precisely, he did not "give up" the ceremonial law at all; circumcision, just as truly as love and mercy, he believed, was a command of God. But it was a command intended for the old dispensation, and by the death and resurrection of Christ a new dispensation had been ushered in. The freedom of Paul was supported not by an appeal from positive commands to inner experiences, but by an exhibition of the epoch-making significance of the Cross of Christ. It was not an anticipation of modern liberalism but the diametrical opposite of it.

The whole of the New Testament centres in an event, the redeeming work of Christ in His death and resurrection. To that event Jesus Himself in the days of His flesh pointed forward; to it the apostles looked back. But both in Jesus and in the apostles the "gospel" did not consist in the setting forth of what always had been true, but in the proclamation, whether in advance or in retrospect, of something that happened. When that central feature of the New Testament is ignored, true historical exegesis is impossible. And ignored it is in Dr. Fosdick's book from beginning to end. The author of this book displays little acquaintance with scientific historical study of the New Testament.

Before we turn from the first aspect of the book, it may be well to point out that the Christian, as well as the naturalistic historian, has a conception of progress in revelation, though a very different conception. The Christian thinks of

the progress as being due to the unfolding of a gracious plan of redemption on the part of the transcendent God. That conception is certainly not wanting in grandeur. And it has the advantage, as compared with the naturalistic conception, of being true.

The other principal aspect of "the modern use of the Bible" as Dr. Fosdick sets it forth, is the separation between "abiding experiences" and the "mental categories" in which those experiences were expressed. "All doctrines," he says, "spring from life," and peace can be attained in the midst of controversy if the doctrines will only be translated back into the life from which they came; the theologies of various ages (including the "mental categories" contained in the New Testament) are merely codes in which experience is expressed, and if these codes become obsolete all that we have to do is to decode the underlying experience and start fresh. It is true that according to Dr. Fosdick even modern liberalism cannot do without theology; it must seek to clothe the religious experience which it shares with Jesus and other men of Bible times in the forms of thought that are suited to the modern age. But in doing so it incurs the disadvantage of establishing a new orthodoxy, which in some future generation will have to give place to a new liberalism,<sup>9</sup> and so on (we suppose) *ad infinitum*.

Dr. Fosdick places this theologizing which he thinks modern liberals must undertake in parallel with the creedmaking labors of the historic Church. But of course the difference is profound. It is not merely that the results of the activity are different in the two cases, but that the whole nature of the activity is different. The greatest difference between the doctrine which our author thinks that modern liberalism must produce and the great creeds of the Church is not that the historic creeds differ from the new doctrine in this detail or that, and it is not even that they differ from the new doctrine in *all* details. But the real difference is that the authors or

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<sup>9</sup> P. 190.

compilers of the historic creeds meant their creeds to be true, whereas the authors of these proposed Modernist compendia of belief do not believe their own assertions to be true but only believe them to be useful, as symbolic expressions of a really ineffable experience. But if theologizing is no more than that, we venture to think it is the most useless waste of time in which an able-bodied man could possibly engage. Very different were the great creeds of the Church, which were efforts to set forth what was not merely useful but also true.

There is no doubt that we have at this point the very centre and core of Dr. Fosdick's teaching. The assertion that "all doctrines spring from life" recurs like a refrain in the present work, and the changes are rung upon it in many different connections. But it involves of course the most radical skepticism that could possibly be conceived. It means simply that abandoning objective truth in the religious sphere, our author falls back upon pure positivism. Prior to all questions about God and creation and the future world, our lives can be changed, he holds, by the mere contemplation of the moral life of Jesus; we can enter into the experience which Jesus had. Then, Dr. Fosdick holds further, that experience into which Jesus leads us finds symbolic expression in doctrines like the divinity of Christ. Men used to apply the word "divinity" to a transcendent God, Maker and Ruler of the world. In such a God the Modernists no longer believe. But the word "God" or the word "divinity" is useful to express our veneration for the highest thing that we know; and the highest thing that Modernists know is the purely human Jesus of modern critical reconstruction.

At no point then does Dr. Fosdick's hostility to the Christian religion appear more clearly than in his assertion of the divinity of Christ. "Let us," he urges his readers, "say it abruptly: *it is not so much the humanity of Jesus that makes him imitable as it is his divinity.*"<sup>10</sup> There we have Modern-

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<sup>10</sup> P. 270. The italics are Dr. Fosdick's.

ism in a nutshell—the misleading use of Christian terminology, the blatancy of human pride, the breakdown of the distinction between God and man, the degradation of Jesus and the obliteration of the very idea of God.

In view of the underlying pragmatist skepticism of our author it hardly seems worth while to examine his teaching in detail. Since he does not believe in the objective truth of his own teaching, but regards it only as the temporary intellectual form in which an experience is expressed, we might be pardoned if we failed to be interested in it. He might affirm every jot and tittle of the Westminster Confession, for example; yet, since he would be affirming it merely as useful and not as true, he would be separated by a tremendous gulf from the Reformed Faith. As a matter of fact, however, the system of belief which Dr. Fosdick does set forth (as the temporary intellectual form in which his experience is expressed) is somewhat as follows.

God, according to Dr. Fosdick, is to be thought of as the “ideal-realizing Capacity in the universe or the creative Spirit at the heart of it,”<sup>11</sup> and he quotes with approval<sup>12</sup> words of John Herman Randall that set forth the ancient pagan *anima mundi* view of God: “The universe as we see it is God’s body; then God is the soul of the universe, just as you are the soul of your body.” The transcendence of God, which is at the root of all the ethical glories of the Christian religion, is by this preacher vigorously denied; Dr. Fosdick’s whole teaching, in marked contrast to that of Jesus—even the reduced Jesus to whom he appeals—is passionately anti-theistic. He has a “live cosmos,” but has given up the living God.

Equally opposed to Christianity is his view of man, the root of which is found in his rejection of any real consciousness of sin. “I believe in man,” Dr. Fosdick thinks, according to a recent sermon and according to the plain implications of this book, ought to be a fundamental article in our creed.

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<sup>11</sup> P. 161.

<sup>12</sup> P. 266.

Here we have the thoroughgoing paganism—the thoroughgoing confidence in human resources—which runs all through this preacher's teaching.

But if Dr. Fosdick is opposed to the Christian view of both these presuppositions of the Gospel, he is also opposed to the Christian view of the Book in which the gospel is set forth:

Men have always gone to any sacred scriptures they possessed primarily that they might find out how to live. That the Bible is "the infallible rule of faith and practise" is one of the most familiar statements which the church has ever framed, but in the historical development of our religion in the Old Testament the second item of that statement came first. The primary use of Scripture was to guide conduct, not to control belief. . . . . When, therefore, among the Hebrews we see the canon of sacred Scripture growing, when Josiah swore the people to a solemn league and covenant—the first example of a formal Hebrew Bible that we know—or when Ezra pledged the nation's loyalty to the keeping of the Levitical law, the Bible which thus was coming into being was primarily a book of divine requirements. It told the people what they ought to do. . . .<sup>13</sup>

Now it is true that according to Dr. Fosdick Jesus broke with this legalism of the Old Testament. But He did so, the author holds, not at all because He restored truth to the primary place as over against conduct, but because He substituted "a form of conduct, a quality of spirit"<sup>14</sup> for detailed rules. Thus according to our author the New Testament as well as the Old Testament is valuable primarily as setting forth a way of life and not as recording facts.

But the Christian view is the exact opposite: the Bible according to the Christian first sets forth truth—both eternal truth regarding God and also redemptive facts of history—and upon that truth grounds its ethical demands. That is the case with the Old Testament as well as with the New Testament. Dr. Fosdick is quite wrong in thinking that the Old Testament law is, like the ethics of skeptical Modernism, left hanging in the air; on the contrary it is grounded throughout in the nature of God. Law in the Old Testament is

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<sup>13</sup> Pp. 235 ff.

<sup>14</sup> P. 240.



always rooted in doctrine: the Ten Commandments are preceded by the words, "I am the Lord thy God, which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage" (Ex. xx. 2); and the law of love in Deuteronomy is based upon the great *Sh'ma*, "Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God is one Lord" (Deut. vi. 4). Similar is the case with regard to the New Testament. The "practical" parts of the Epistles are always based upon the great doctrinal passages that precede them; and the ethical demands of Jesus are always based upon His presentation of the facts not only about God but about His own person and about heaven and hell.

Thus the Shorter Catechism is true to the Bible from beginning to end in the order which it observes in the answer to the question, "What do the Scriptures principally teach?" "The Scriptures principally teach," it says quite correctly, "*what man is to believe concerning God* and what duty God requires of man." The reversal of the order, or rather the virtual elimination of the former part of the answer, by Dr. Fosdick, exhibits the great gulf which exists between his teaching on the one side and the Christian religion on the other. Christianity, in accordance with the whole Bible but unlike Dr. Fosdick, founds morality upon truth, and life upon doctrine.

Of course, in speaking of Dr. Fosdick's view of the Bible it would be easy to point out the vast sections of Scripture which he holds to be directly untrue. He does not indeed make the matter always perfectly clear to the unsophisticated reader, and his failure to do so is from the ethical point of view one of the most disappointing features of the book. If this writer stated in plain language, which the lay reader could understand, his critical views about the New Testament, for example, the favor which he now enjoys among many misinformed but devout persons in the Church would at once be lost. But such frankness is not his; he prefers to undermine the faith of the Church by an entirely different

method—more immediately effective, perhaps, but ethically far inferior.

But if Dr. Fosdick is opposed to the presuppositions of the Christian message and the Christian view of the Book in which the message is set forth, he is also opposed to the Christian view of the Person whose redeeming work forms the substance of the message. Jesus, according to Dr. Fosdick, is simply the fairest flower of humanity, divine in the sense in which all men are divine, the culmination of a process not the entrance of a creative interposition of God. "That differential quality in Jesus," he says, "is the most impressive spiritual fact that this earth has seen. It is the best we know. It is the fairest production that the race has to show for its millenniums of travail."<sup>15</sup> What an abysmal distance there is between this view of Christ as "the fairest production that the race has to show" and the Christian view of the eternal Son of God who entered freely into the world for our redemption!

Certainly the difference is not diminished but only exhibited in the clearer light when in the passage that has just been quoted the author speaks of the "differential quality in Jesus" as being "a revelation of creative reality." For here we have in striking form the degradation of the word "creative" which runs all through the book and which is involved in the passionate anti-theism which is a central characteristic of the Modernism of the present day.

The plain fact, of course, is that Dr. Fosdick eliminates from the pages of history all the miracles in the New Testament account of Jesus from the virgin birth to the empty tomb, as well as all the miracles in the Bible as a whole. He does speak, it is true, of miracles of Jesus that he accepts; but these "miracles," it turns out, are miracles which we also can experience. The miracles that show Jesus to have been unique are of course gone; what we have here is the elimination of the whole supernatural content of the Word of

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<sup>15</sup> P. 260.

God. And how indeed can it be otherwise? There can be no supernatural interposition of a transcendent God if no transcendent God exists—if "God," like ourselves, is bound to the course of this world.

Corresponding to this degraded *view* of Jesus is the author's *attitude* toward Jesus. There is not the slightest evidence in this book that Dr. Fosdick has ever exercised faith in Jesus or indeed has the slightest notion of what faith in Jesus means. Jesus is to him a leader whom he loves, but never really a Saviour whom he trusts. "Say 'Jesus' to a medieval Christian [rather, we should put it, to *any* Christian] and he instinctively would think of a king sitting on his throne or coming in the clouds of heaven. Say 'Jesus' to a man of to-day and he instinctly thinks of that gracious and courageous Nazarene who lived and worked and taught in ancient Palestine."<sup>16</sup> Here we have the contrast between the Christian attitude to Christ and Dr. Fosdick's attitude: the Christian thinks of the Christ now living in glory, Dr. Fosdick thinks of the Christ who instituted a type of religious life long ago; Dr. Fosdick calls Christ "the Master," the Christian calls Him "the Lord." The difference is profound, and it is a difference of the heart and of the inner life fully as much as of the head. Dr. Fosdick speaks of a personal Saviour "with whom to fall in love;"<sup>17</sup> the Christian thinks of Christ as one who first loved us. Dr. Fosdick *loves* the reconstructed Jesus of modern naturalism; the Christian *trusts* as well as loves the Jesus to whom is given all power in heaven and on earth.

In view of what has already been said, it is quite needless to point out our author's scorn for the gospel itself—the account of the redeeming work of Christ in His death and resurrection. "*The historic Jesus*," he says, "*has given the world its most appealing and effective exhibition of vicarious sacrifice.*"<sup>18</sup> Here the Cross of Christ is treated as a

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<sup>16</sup> P. 220.

<sup>17</sup> P. 231.

<sup>18</sup> P. 229. The italics are Dr. Fosdick's.

mere member of a series of acts of self-sacrifice, and so it is treated in the book throughout. But to the Christian such words about the tenderest and holiest thing in the Christian religion seem so blasphemous that even in quotation he can hardly bear to take them on his lips.

In reply to such an estimate of Dr. Fosdick as that which has here been made, the exponents of naturalistic Modernism in the creedal Churches, who themselves are just as much opposed to Christianity as this author is, are accustomed to point to individual utterances in the book, torn from their context—individual utterances in which Christian terminology is used. But that use of Christian terminology only serves to set in sharper light the divergence between this preacher and the whole tendency of Christianity; for it involves a certain carelessness about plain straightforwardness of speech, which would be thoroughly abhorrent to anyone who appreciated the Christian point of view. The truth is that the similarity between Dr. Fosdick and the Christian religion is largely verbal; both in thought and in feeling (so far as the latter can be revealed by words) the divergence, despite undoubted influences of Christianity upon Dr. Fosdick in certain spheres, is profound.

In closing, a word of explanation may be due as to the reason why we have treated this book at such great length. It is because the author is representative of a very large body of persons in the modern world. He himself has asserted that theological views similar to his are held by hundreds of ministers in the Presbyterian Church, and certainly similar conditions prevail in most other ecclesiastical bodies. The author of this book represents in fairly typical, and certainly in very popular, fashion the attack upon Christianity which is being carried on with such vigor at the present time.

It cannot be said that this fact reflects credit upon the intellectual standards of the day; on the contrary it is only one among many instances of the intellectual decadence which has set in with such force. It is just the faults of Dr. Fosdick, as much as his undoubted gifts, which make him popular.

The disinclination of this writer to clear definitions, the use of Christian terminology to veil a totally alien meaning, the lack of that breadth of mind which leads a man to enter at least into some sort of comprehension of the thing against which he is directing his attack—these faults, distressing as they may be to thoughtful persons, make the book typical of the present age, and hence contribute no doubt very largely to the popularity which the author enjoys.

But this is not the first period of decadence through which the world has passed, as it is not the first period of desperate conflict in the Church. God still rules, and in the midst of the darkness there will come in His good time the shining of a clearer light. There will come a great revival of the Christian religion; and with it there will come, we believe, a revival of true learning: the new Reformation for which we long and pray may well be accompanied by a new Renaissance.

*Princeton.*

J. GRESHAM MACHEN.



## A MODERNISTIC VIEW OF JEREMIAH

### THE BAIRD LECTURE FOR 1922\*

It is now thirty-five years since the volumes of the *Expositor's Bible* began to issue from the press. Among the early volumes of the series were those on *The Book of Isaiah* by Rev. George Adam Smith. It was no slight honor for a young man scarcely in his thirties to be associated in this great undertaking with his distinguished teachers at Edinburgh, Principal Rainy and Professor Blaikie, as well as with such men as Bishop Alexander, Dean Farrar, Principal Edwards, Principal (later Bishop) Moule, Professors Denney, Dods, Findlay, Milligan, Dr. Maclaren of Manchester, and others. Yet it is probably safe to say that no one of the contributors to this widely used commentary, did more to enhance its popularity or his own reputation than he. Within two years of the publication of the *Isaiah*, the author was called to Glasgow to succeed Principal Douglas as Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis in the Free Church College. In 1909 he was appointed Principal of the University of Aberdeen. He was knighted in 1916, and was in the same year Moderator of the General Assembly of the United Free Church of Scotland.

Professor Smith's position as a leading liberal theologian is too well known to require extended statement here. In briefly sketching the history of the Higher Criticism of the nineteenth century, Professor Briggs points out in his *Introduction*<sup>1</sup> that although Professor W. Robertson Smith was removed in 1881 from his chair at Glasgow "in order to the peace and harmony of the Church," his teacher Professor A. B. Davidson of Edinburgh, "who held essentially the same views" was left undisturbed, and in 1892 Dr. George Adam Smith was chosen "with full knowledge of the fact

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\* *Jeremiah: Being the Baird Lecture for 1922*. By the Very Rev. Sir GEORGE ADAMS SMITH, D. D., LL. D., Principal of the University of Aberdeen. 1924. New York: George H. Doran Company. 8°, pp. x, 394.

<sup>1</sup>*General Introduction to the Study of Holy Scripture* (1899), p. 286.

that he held similar views" to be the successor of Principal Douglas "who had been one of the chief opponents of W. Robertson Smith." Professor Briggs was naturally and we think properly disposed to see in this an indication that "this contest gained liberty of opinion in Great Britain." What was true twenty-five years ago when Dr. Briggs wrote, is true today. There is undoubtedly a close general similarity between the views of these two distinguished pupils of Professor Davidson—W. Robertson Smith and George Adam Smith—both of whom may be classed as disciples also of Wellhausen. But that which especially distinguishes the younger disciple is his artistic temperament, human insight and sympathy, passion for social righteousness, religious ardor and homiletic instinct. Coupled with the scholar's love of knowledge, he has the insight of the poet and the fervor of the mystic; and it shows in every thing which he writes.

After thirteen years at Aberdeen Professor Smith was invited to revisit Glasgow as Baird Lecturer for 1922. He chose for the theme of this course of six lectures "Jeremiah" and speaks of them as "the accomplishment of a work the materials for which were largely gathered" during the years of his professorship there. The reader will recognize the truth of this statement. The new volume does not differ essentially from *The Book of Isaiah* or *The Book of the Twelve Prophets*; and it will doubtless be warmly welcomed by Professor Smith's many admirers. Despite its comparative brevity (it is less than half the size of the *Isaiah*) and the disproportionate emphasis placed upon metrical and critical questions, the reader will find in it that literary charm, vivid imagination and religious fervor, which have made Professor Smith's other commentaries such fascinating and stimulating reading. But it is characterized also by the same freedom amounting even to ruthlessness in the critical manipulation, or rather mutilation, of the text, the same narrow view of prophecy, and the same setting of prophet over against priest (an antithesis with most serious New Testament implications), which has been characteristic of

Professor Smith's writings from the first. Such being the case the appearance of the *Jeremiah* furnishes a suitable occasion to call attention once again to these serious defects and destructive tendencies which appear in the work of this outstanding representative of the Higher Criticism, even though it be at the risk of repeating what has already been better said by others. We shall therefore state our criticisms of this volume under the following three heads: 1) The Text of Jeremiah; 2) Jeremiah and Prophecy; 3) Jeremiah, the Cultus, and the Cross.

### I. THE TEXT OF JEREMIAH

The first question regarding the text of Jeremiah concerns the relative merits of the Massoretic Hebrew text and the Septuagint version. As to this Professor Smith hesitates to express a definite judgment. After remarking that there is much difference of opinion among modern critics he goes on to say, "But the prevailing opinion, and, to my view, the right one, is that no general judgment is possible, and that each case of difference between the two witnesses must be decided by itself."<sup>2</sup> In support of this he quotes the words of Professor A. B. Davidson, "The Hebrew is qualitatively superior to the Greek, but quantitatively the Greek is nearer the original. This judgment is general, admitting many exceptions, and each passage has to be considered by itself." These two statements would seem to justify us in expecting that in this volume the Hebrew and the Greek will be treated at least with impartiality and that the author will be as ready to tell us on occasion that he is following the Hebrew as against the Greek as to point out that he is following the Greek as against the Hebrew. But such is not the case. When he follows the Greek as against the Hebrew Professor Smith frequently calls attention to it in a footnote. But when he

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<sup>2</sup> P. 15. Wherever, as here, the page alone is given, the reference is to Professor Smith's *Jeremiah*.

follows the Hebrew as against the Greek, as he usually does, he only exceptionally makes mention of this fact.<sup>3</sup>

This gives the reader a decidedly false impression of the relative merits of the Hebrew and the Greek. Finding the Hebrew text so frequently criticized or rejected he may infer that it is quite unreliable and needs careful and even drastic revision; and so be disposed to give Professor Smith wider liberty as a textual critic than he would do if he knew how often he has rejected the Greek in favor of the Hebrew or rejected both because of metrical theory or theological preconception.<sup>4</sup> It is decidedly inconsistent, to say the least, to call attention to the fact that in this or that place the translation follows the Greek as against the Hebrew and then, perhaps in the same verse, omit one or more words which are found in both Hebrew and Greek—omit them without a word of explanation, simply because he sees fit to do so. Despite his very moderate statements on the subject of metrics, his insistence, as against the extreme views of Professor Duhm,<sup>5</sup> that Jeremiah used prose as well as verse, irregular as well as regular metres,<sup>6</sup> Professor Smith is clearly far more influenced by metrical theory and applies it far more drastically to the text of Jeremiah, than a sound and rigidly objective study of text and versions would at all justify. And with all the caution and moderation of many of his statements there is manifest at times a confidence in his own ability to distinguish the genuine from the spurious, which is only matched by the contemptuous way in which he sometimes expresses his disrespect for those passages of the text which he rejects, or for the critics whose views differ from his own.

A man cannot be said to hold a reverent attitude toward

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<sup>3</sup> For confirmation of this statement the reader is referred to the Note at the end of this article (pp. 122 *infra*) where Professor Smith's treatment of the text of Jeremiah, especially with reference to metrical considerations, is considered in some detail.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, p. 128 *infra*.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*, p. 128 f. *infra*.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. especially p. 37.

Scripture who in rejecting considerable portions of the Book of Jeremiah speaks of them as "largely devoid of the style and the spiritual value of his undoubted Oracles and Discourses. They are more or less diffuse and vagrant, while his are concise and to the point. . . . We have in our Bible other and better utterances of the truths, questions, threats and hopes which they contain" (p. 21). And there is something almost brutal about such expressions as: "Hebrew uselessly adds" (pp. 57, 204), "betrays an editorial redundancy" (p. 91), "Hebrew is impossible" (p. 98), "later intrusions" (p. 180), "Hebrew adds *Jerusalem* with no sense and a disturbance to the metre" (p. 198), "Hebrew is hopeless" (p. 201), "addition . . . evidently wrong" (p. 243), "useless editorial addition" (p. 246), "Greek lacks the unnecessary remainder" (p. 247), "Greek again is devoid of the repetitions, etc., that overload the Hebrew" (p. 281), "One may eliminate the few words not found in Greek, and naturally suspect the liturgical clause in 11" (p. 291), "Hebrew adds the gloss . . ." (p. 294), "The whole seems a needless variant or paraphrase of 16" (p. 304), "Hebrew copyists senselessly repeat, *Thus saith the Lord of Hosts*; Greek omits" (p. 323). It is only to be expected, therefore, that Professor Smith would adopt somewhat the same tone in referring to the conclusions of scholars, even scholars of the critical school, when their conclusions differ from his own. He speaks of "a number of Duhm's emendations" as "not only unnecessary but harmful to the effectiveness of the verse" (p. 44), and uses such phrases as,— "drastic and often quite arbitrary" (p. 38), "padding the text" (p. 46), "objections . . . inadequate and even trifling" (p. 52), "merely on the grounds of his theory" (p. 82), "even for him, unusually arbitrary" (p. 194), "suggestion . . . . imaginary" (p. 243). Commenting on xxxi 7-9 he remarks: "It is singular how each of these three verses contains not four but five lines. Cornill, by using the introduction *Thus saith the Lord*, omitting *the remnant of Israel*, combining two pairs of lines and including the following couplet, effects



the arrangement of octastichs to which he has throughout the book arbitrarily committed himself. Duhm has another metrical arrangement" (p. 301). Clearly the "correct" text of Jeremiah and the laws of metrical arrangement are not yet an "assured result" of criticism.

But the Greek Version and the Metre while important are not the only criteria used by Professor Smith in his attempt to distinguish the genuine passages of Jeremiah from the spurious. Even when the Greek raises no difficulties and the metre is perfect, our author may hesitate to assert the genuineness of a passage. Of xxx. 12-15 he remarks, "If these Qinah quatrains are not Jeremiah's, some one else could match him to the letter and the very breath." But the most he ventures to say of it is that it is "more probably Jeremiah's" than verses 5-9 of which he is decidedly sceptical. How complicated the problem may become in the eyes of the critic is illustrated by the following comment on the latter part of chapter xxv. "The rest of the chapter, verses 15-38, is so full of expansions and repetitions, which we may partly see from a comparison of it with the Greek, as well as of inconsistencies with some earlier Oracles by Jeremiah, of traces of the later prophetic style and of echoes of other prophets, that many deny any part of the miscellany to be Jeremiah's own."<sup>7</sup> Professor Smith suggests that "the substance of verses 15-23" may be "reasonably left to Jeremiah." The balance he describes as more doubtful.

The inevitable result of this constant attitude of sceptical criticism is shown in such a statement as the following. Speaking of the passage on the New Covenant (Jer. xxxi. 31f) which he describes as "a prophecy of Christianity which has hardly its equal in the Old Testament" he remarks: "The weaving, it is true, is none of the deftest, but whether this is due to the aged Jeremiah's failing fingers or to the awkwardness of the disciple, the stuff and its dyes are all his own." There is another possibility—that it is due to that

<sup>7</sup> P. 182.

faultfinding propensity, which gradually becomes an obsession, of the "critical" student of the Bible.

## II. JEREMIAH AND PROPHECY

While Professor Smith attaches great importance to textual and literary (notably metrical) considerations as a means of determining the genuine utterances of Jeremiah, of even greater importance is his theory of prophecy. Our author believes that the Book of Jeremiah contains "a considerable, but not a preponderant, amount" of material which is due "to editors or compilers between his death soon after 586 and the close of the Prophetic Canon in 200 B. C." The criteria for the sifting out of such material he states as follows:

All Oracles or Narratives in the Book, which (apart from obvious intrusions) imply that the Exile is well advanced or that the Return from Exile has already happened, or which reflect the circumstances of the later Exile and subsequent periods or the spirit of Israel and the teaching of her prophets and scribes in those periods, we may rule out of the material on which we can rely for our knowledge of Jeremiah's life and his teaching.<sup>8</sup>

Such a statement as this should make clear to everyone the large claims which the critic is prepared to make for himself as an expert on prophecy and history, and the severe and searching test which any statement in the Book of Jeremiah must undergo before it can be accepted as genuine. "Obvious intrusions," "Exile well advanced," "later Exile," "return from Exile," "imply," "reflect," "spirit of Israel," "teaching of her prophets and scribes"—the more we ponder these words the clearer it becomes to us that it must be a very difficult task for a "critical" expert to separate the chaff from the wheat; and we cease to wonder that the critics differ so greatly among themselves. Such subtle shades of difference must be very hard to recognize. The difficulty would be great if for no other reason because of the meagre data at the critic's disposal upon which he must base his conclusions re-

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<sup>8</sup> P. 19.

garding so vague and intangible a thing as the "spirit of Israel" and the changes which it manifested during the course of the exilic and post-exilic periods. But the difficulty is greatly increased by the widely diverging opinions as to the extent of the evidence upon which the critic can rely.

Thus, among the passages of which Professor Smith feels entitled to say "In any case they reflect the situation and feelings of Israel in Babylonia about 540 B. C.," we find "parts of xxx and xxxi, especially xxxi. 7-14, the spirit of which is so much that of the Eve of the Return from Exile and the style so akin to that of the Great Prophet of that Eve that some take it as dependent on his prophecies."<sup>9</sup> It will be noted at once that one reason assigned by our author for denying the genuineness of these utterances is that they reveal the spirit and style of the "Great Unknown," commonly called "Deutero-Isaiah." This is significant because for centuries no Christian questioned and today *most* Christians (the critics to the contrary notwithstanding) still believe that Isaiah was the author of the entire book which bears his name. Yet so sure is the critical scholar of the exilic date of Isaiah xl-lv, or, to be more exact, of its origin in the "later Exile," that he uses it as an argument for assigning portions of Jeremiah to the same period. And this is but an illustration of what the critics have been doing with all those passages which speak of a Return from captivity. Hosea iii.5, Amos ix.14, Micah ii.12, Isaiah x.21, Zephaniah iii.20, all speak clearly of a Return. We might suppose that this would make it impossible for the critic to deny the genuineness of the above mentioned chapters of Jeremiah, that if such prophets as Hosea, Amos, Isaiah and Micah who lived long before the time of the Babylonian supremacy could foretell a return from Exile, Jeremiah who lived to see the fall of Jerusalem could certainly have done so. Yet we find that every one of these passages is rejected by eminent critics and assigned to an exilic or post-exilic date. Thus, while admitting that Amos ix.14 refers definitely to the "fall of

<sup>9</sup> P. 20.

Judah" and consequently to the return from Exile, Professor Smith rejects the passage and treats it as late. He maintains that it is "absolutely without a moral feature" and therefore unworthy of Amos, and that its "hopes" which he admits to be "legitimate" although he holds them to be unworthy of Amos, "are the hopes of a generation of other conditions and of other deserts than the generation of Amos." So is it also with Micah ii.12-13. These verses are, Professor Smith tells us, the only ones in the first three chapters of this book, the authenticity of which the critics might be disposed to question. He rejects them because "they speak of a return from the Exile, and interrupt the connection between verse 11 and the first verse of chap. iii."<sup>10</sup>

These examples serve to show that passages which refer to a return from exile are regarded by Professor Smith and by the critics pretty generally as *ipso facto* of late i.e. exilic date. And the point to which he is prepared to carry this opinion is illustrated by his unwillingness to admit that Jeremiah even, who survived the fall of Jerusalem by some time, how long we do not know, could have predicted or, to put it more moderately, was likely to predict or refer to, the Return.

Now it is evident, that back of all these questions as to the way in which the Exile or the Return is referred to, the way in which the "circumstances" and the "spirit" of the later period are "implied" or "reflected" in this or that passage of Jeremiah as well as in such other prophetic utterances as on various grounds are assigned to a later period, there lies as a fundamental presupposition a more or less clearly defined conception of prophecy, a conception characterized by a minimizing if not a positive rejection of the predictive element.<sup>11</sup> The "critical" conception of the prophet has been

<sup>10</sup> *The Twelve Prophets*, Vol. 1, pp. 192 f., 360, 393.

<sup>11</sup> "In vulgar use the name 'prophet' has degenerated to the meaning of 'one who foretells the future.' Of this meaning it is, perhaps, the first duty of every student of prophecy earnestly and stubbornly to rid himself . . . Prediction of the future is only a part, and often a subordinate and accidental part, of an office whose full function is to declare the

well expressed in the familiar dictum of A. B. Davidson: "The prophet is always a man of his own time, and it is always to the people of his own time that he speaks, not to a generation long after, nor to us."<sup>12</sup> We notice at once the connection between this dictum and the "criteria" laid down by our author for determining the Jeremian material in the Book of Jeremiah. If the prophet is always a man of his own time and always speaks to men of his own day,<sup>13</sup> then, of course, if we can identify the *period* we can date the prophecy. Consequently the "spirit" and "circumstances" become normative. To determine them is the great desideratum.

It is to be conceded at once that there is an important element of truth in this dictum. The prophets were not pillar saints or anchorites; they did not deliberately cut themselves off from human relationships. They were not visionaries who walked among men with eyes so holden by the vision splendid of a glory to come that they had no word of help or comfort, counsel or reproof, for their fellow men. The role which they played was a very different one. The very bitterness of the opposition which they incurred from their countrymen shows how potent was their influence and how much they were dreaded by the enemies of the Lord. Unquestionably they were men of the age in which they lived and they felt it their duty to speak in no uncertain terms to that age: to cry aloud and spare not, to show to Israel her transgressions and to Judah her sins.

But this must not hide from us the fact that *present* time is so emphasized in this dictum that it is easy to interpret it in terms of a denial of prediction which makes the prophets little more than preachers of righteousness. Professor Davidson did not indeed so restrict it. For he goes on to point out that

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character and the will of God" (*The Twelve Prophets*, I, p. 11f). This is certainly not a very appreciative way to speak of what the Bible represents as an important function of the prophet. But it was true to Professor Smith's position twenty years ago and it is true of it today.

<sup>12</sup> Hastings, *Dictionary of the Bible*, IV, p. 118b.

<sup>13</sup> "His message is never out of touch with events" (*The Twelve*, Vol. I, p. 13).



for the prophet "on many, perhaps on all occasions, the most powerful means of exerting an influence on the mind of his time may be what he is able to reveal to it of the future, whether the future be full of mercy or of judgment." But even in admitting this the emphasis is again placed upon the *present*; for the writer continues "but whether he speaks of the present or the future the direct and conscious object of the prophet is to influence the people of his own generation." The natural result of the acceptance of such a conception is to reduce predictive prophecy to a minimum if not to eliminate it altogether as a supernatural revelation. For what concerns men most vitally is after all the immediate future. They may be curious about a distant future, they may enjoy speculating about it. But it is the bearing of tomorrow upon the perplexities and distresses of today which is the great concern of most of us. It will all come right in the end!—may be a challenge to faith, but is cold comfort to the impatient sufferer. "In the latter days"—Ezekiel's contemporaries became impatient with him because his words travelled to distant horizons and left them as they thought to solve their problems as best they could. Consequently while this dictum of Professor Davidson's definitely admits prediction as an important element in prophecy, it none the less manifestly tends so to limit it to the immediate future as to make the element of real prediction negligible. For supernatural revelation may not be necessary to read the future when it is close at hand. When the storm clouds are dark and threatening it is easy to predict the tempest; when the clouds are beginning to break it is not hard to foretell its ending. In speaking of the age which produced Jeremiah, Professor Smith tells us: "The same conditions prevailed out of which a century before had come an Amos, a Hosea, a Micah and an Isaiah. Israel needed judgment and the North again stirred with its possibilities. Who would rise and spell into a clear Word of God the thunder which to all ears was rumbling there."<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> P. 77 f.

Elsewhere he has told us: "None of the prophets began to foretell the fall of Israel till they read, with keener eyes than their contemporaries, the signs of it in current history" and in contrasting them with Juvenal he pointed out that in Juvenal's day "there were no signs of the decline of the empire," whereas the prophets had "political proof of the nearness of God's judgment, and they spoke in the power of its coincidence with the moral corruption of their people."<sup>15</sup> And he here draws a parallel between John Knox and Jeremiah which is calculated to give the impression that there was little if any essential difference between the two: both were men of "spiritual convictions" and read the future in terms of the moral government of God.<sup>16</sup>

The foreshortening of the perspective of prophecy encourages the tendency to regard the prophets as far seeing statesmen who could read the book of history understandingly and wisely interpret its lessons, as moral guides who knew the laws of the moral government of God and could interpret the future in terms of ethical inevitability, as religious geniuses in whom Israel's "specialty" in religion reached its highest development. Prediction as involving the supernatural may not be definitely denied. But all the same the tendency to reduce it to the minimum, to make it nearly if not quite negligible, is obvious. And the proof of it in the case of Professor Smith is found in the very facts which we have cited. If Jeremiah is to be denied the authorship of xxxi. 7-14, for example, because of the reference to the Return and the nature of the reference, it is evident that we are far along the road to a naturalistic, or in the case of one so religiously minded as Professor Smith, a merely religious or spiritual, interpretation of prophecy. The prophet shows a tendency to become a kind of religious poet-philosopher, the Wordsworth of his day, who is able to read the

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<sup>15</sup> *The Twelve*, Vol. I, p. 152.

<sup>16</sup> P. 271f. cf. pp. 259f. where the difference between Jeremiah and the false prophets is explained as "moral" and "intellectual," and it is more than hinted that the "false" prophets are not given their full dues.

moral and religious meaning of the simple every day experiences of life, as well as a sagacious statesman who can read the future like an open book.<sup>17</sup>

There is no doubt something very attractive about such a conception and when it is portrayed to us by so skilful an advocate as Professor Smith, it undoubtedly makes a powerful appeal. But it must be recognized none the less that it is dangerously partial and represents a definite rejection of important elements of the Biblical teaching with regard to prophecy.

The question reduces itself simply to this: Should the Old Testament scholar formulate a theory of prophecy which by its minimizing of the supernatural will give the minimum of offense to that "bugaboo" of our age, the modern mind, fortify it by such Scripture texts as can be cited in its favor and then force the rest of Scripture to accept this interpretation? Or should our conception of prophecy be based upon a careful and thoroughly impartial study of all the relevant

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<sup>17</sup> Cf. *The Book of Isaiah*. Vol. II, p. 327f. Occasionally Professor Smith speaks as if there were a real difference between the "inspiration" of the prophets and the "illumination" of a truly spiritual man. But his whole tendency is to obliterate any such distinction. This is well illustrated by his language regarding the Immanuel prophecy (*The Book of Isaiah*, Vol. I. p. 132). He refers to "the awful conversation, in which Isaiah received from the Eternal the fundamentals of his teaching" as containing no reference to a Messiah. Such language seems to suggest a real *revelation* to the prophet. Yet on the next page we read, "If we consider the moment, chosen by Isaiah for announcing the Messiah and adding his seal to the national belief in the advent of a glorious Son of David . . ." The narrative on the contrary declares expressly (vss. 3, 7, 10) that Isaiah did not *choose* this moment but spoke because the *Lord spake to him*. In his *Jeremiah*, we find Professor Smith speaking of the prophet as "a master of observation" (p. 361), as "the one constant, rational, and far-seeing power in the national life" (p. 177), of his "searching eyes and detached mind" (p. 132), of his "political sagacity and military foresight" which "have their source in moral and spiritual convictions" (p. 271), of the "psychological differences" between him and the false prophets (p. 258). Such expressions as these have a definitely naturalistic ring which is not offset by such a phrase as "from a human point of view" (p. 333) or by the use of the words "Revelation" and "Divine impulse" (p. 185).

material? The one is the method of approach of the "higher critic;" the other is that of the evangelical expositor and theologian. The one is subjective and doctrinaire; the other is objective and scientific. The one stresses the "human side" of prophecy and so shortens its perspective as to empty it of much, if not all, of its Divine authoritativeness; the other emphasized the Godward side of prophecy and sees in its deep perspectives a proof that God has revealed His will to His servants the prophets. And the tragedy of Dr. Smith's position lies in his inability to see that as a critical scholar he is constantly engaged in undermining that Biblical conception of prophecy which should be most precious to him as a religiously minded man and as a Christian.

This difference, which is a vital one, is illustrated by Dr. Smith's comment on Jeremiah xxxi. 15ff.—

The next poems no one denies to Jeremiah; they are among the finest we have from him. And how natural that he should conceive and utter them in those quiet days when he was at, or near, Ramah, the grave of the mother of the people. He hears her century-long travail of mourning for the loss of the tribes that were sprung from her Joseph, aggravated now by the banishment of her Benjamin; but hears too the promise that her travail shall be rewarded by their return. The childless old man has the soul of mother and father both—now weeping with the comfortless Rachel and now, in human touches unmatched outside the Parable of the Prodigal, reading into the heart of God the same instinctive affections, to which, in spite of himself, every earthly father is stirred by the mere mention of the name of a rebellious and wandered son. The most vivid details are these: *after I had been brought to know*, which might also be translated *after I had been made to know myself* and so anticipate *when he came to himself* of our Lord's Parable; *I smote on my thigh*, the gesture of despair; and in 20a the very human attribution to the Deity of surprise that the mere name of Ephraim should move Him to affection, which recalls both in form and substance the similar question attributed to the Lord in xii.9.<sup>18</sup>

Here we have the issue clearly presented. Our author compares this passage to the Parable of the Prodigal; he undoubtedly regards it as one of the greatest utterances of the Old Testament. But what is his explanation of it? Jeremiah is "childless" and "old." Jeremiah has the "soul of mother

<sup>18</sup> P. 302f.

and father both." Jeremiah has the "human" touch. So we find him "*reading into the heart of God—the same instinctive affections—to which in spite of himself—every earthly father—is stirred by the mere mention of the name— of a rebellious and wandered son.*" In other words man, *every* earthly father is so loving, so forgiving that God must be equally good. And Jeremiah, because human nature is so exquisitely developed in his personality, is capable of "reading into the heart of God" the *instinctive* affections of man.

Now it is perfectly true that the anthropomorphic argument is a legitimate one, that human fatherhood at its best and highest is a type of the Divine. But as based on the goodness of man, there are serious weaknesses in this argument. It is not true that "*every man*" has an inextinguishable love even for a good, not to say an erring, son. If there are unnatural sons, there are also inhuman fathers. And it is not the case that even a loving father will always forgive and forget and save. If the prodigal insists on remaining in the far country, the father is powerless. There are sins which close the door to the prodigal. There are times when even the most loving father must disown a son. If we are to judge of God by comparing Him with "every earthly father," we will have a fickle and feeble Heavenly Father. The thing which gives to this great passage its preciousness is not that it represents a generalization, based on thorough study of human relations and "sublimated" in the heroic personality of Jeremiah, that God must be as good as man. That which gives this passage its meaning is exactly what gives the Parable of the Prodigal its wonderful appeal. It is a *revelation from God of the love of God*. The Parable is a beautiful story, too good to be true of this wicked sin-cursed world, too simple to satisfy a heart burdened with the guilt of sin and deeply troubled with the question, How shall a man be just with God? The sinner cannot believe it until he realizes that it was uttered by One who spake as never man spake and therefore carries with it the stamp and the authority of Deity. And this passage as interpreted by Professor Smith



may be set aside as the utterance of a gentle, fond, soft hearted old man, a grandfatherly sort of figure, a message which can be contrasted to its own disadvantage with the stern utterances of an Amos or a John Baptist. It is only when we observe that these verses in Jeremiah are introduced by "(thus) saith the Lord" and that this phrase is repeated *four* times in the brief compass of seven verses that we realize the true meaning of this wondrous picture of forgiving love. If, as this phrase clearly implies, what we have here is *the word of the Lord* to the prophet Jeremiah, the picture of God as a loving and forgiving father becomes exceeding precious. But in his metrical rendering of the passage Professor Smith three out of five times omits the prophetic formula, "saith the Lord," and in commenting on the passage he tells the reader that the prophet Jeremiah *read* these things *into* the heart of God. The very language employed suggests the uncertainty of the inference. In the last analysis, Professor Smith invites us to exchange human speculation and inference for divine revelation.

As a further illustration of this tendency to stress the human side of prophecy, the call of the prophet may be cited. While affirming that the account of Jeremiah's call was not recorded by the prophet till some twenty-three years after he received it and may have been expanded "in terms of his intervening experience," Professor Smith is inclined to magnify the significance of this event, to believe that Jeremiah early had "the forebodings at least of a task so vast as that of *prophet to the nations*." Yet he gives an account of Jeremiah's reluctance to respond to the call which suggests that in Professor Smith's opinion this was due to very secondary considerations, that the prophet considered the form of his message as more important than its substance:

No wonder that Jeremiah shrank from such a task: *Ah, Lord God, I know not to speak, I am too young*. His excuse is interesting. Had he not developed his gift for verse? Or, conscious of its rustic simplicity, did he fear to take the prophet's thunder on lips, that had hitherto moved only to the music of his country-side? In the light of his later experience the second alternative is not impossible. When much practice must have

made him confident of his art as a singer, he tells us how burning he felt the Word of the Lord to be.<sup>19</sup>

Is this the explanation of Jeremiah's reluctance? Was he afraid that his metres would not pass muster, that his rhythm might be thought clumsy? Was he asking for a little longer time to study Hebrew prosody and master the difficult art of improvisation? It might seem so. Were the utterances of the prophets the products of conscious art, or were they the word of the Lord at their lips? To say that the prophet speaking under the inspiration of the Almighty might be expected to use language worthy of the Author of his message, is one thing. But to make the form so important as to be a prime qualification, as Professor Smith seems to do, is again to emphasize the human side of prophecy out of all proportion to its importance. And this is characteristic of the school to which our author belongs.

We have already called attention to the fact that Professor Smith rejects considerable portions of Jeremiah because they presuppose the conditions of a later age. We have seen that he regards the literary form as important enough to make Jeremiah hesitate to stand forth as a prophet. It is also to be noticed that Professor Smith feels that he knows quite definitely how Jeremiah's "revelations" came to him, or rather how they did not come to him. This appears in his comment on xxxi.26.<sup>20</sup> The bulk of this chapter he regards apparently as genuinely Jeremian. But he encloses verse 26

On this I awoke and beheld  
And sweet unto me was my sleep

in brackets to indicate that it is suspicious; and he adds the following footnote: "Doubtful. Jeremiah had nothing to do with dreams as means of prophecy." How does Professor Smith know this? He accepts as genuine the inaugural *visions* of the almond tree and the seething cauldron.<sup>21</sup> He

<sup>19</sup> P. 82. Of course this is only one phase of Jeremiah's "reluctance," though it is stated here as if it were an important matter. Professor Smith elsewhere makes much of Jeremiah's temperamental "revolt" against his prophetic vocation (cf. especially Lecture VII).

<sup>20</sup> P. 306.

<sup>21</sup> Pp. 84f, 351.

also accepts the *vision* of the two baskets of fruit.<sup>22</sup> Yet he denies that Jeremiah could have had *dreams*. Does Professor Smith understand the difference between visions and dreams so clearly that he can assert that Jeremiah had the one and did not have the other? If so he is a past master in Biblical psychology. To us the distinction which he draws seems arbitrary in the extreme. And again we ask the question, What is the correct way to study so important a subject as Old Testament prophecy? Are we to believe that God revealed Himself to Jeremiah in dreams because this verse says so? Or shall we reject this verse because the same statement is not made elsewhere? If a statement is false because it is only made once, would repetition of the falsehood make it true? How many times must the Bible make a statement in order that a "higher critic" may be induced to accept it as credible?

### III. JEREMIAH, THE CULTUS, AND THE CROSS

It is a well established fact that in the modern reconstruction of the Old Testament as represented by the Graf-Wellhausen hypothesis, the problem of ritual sacrifice occupies a central place. According to this theory it is clearly taught in the writings of the great prophets of the eighth and seventh centuries that ritual sacrifice as practised in Israel had no Mosaic authorization and did not form an essential element in religious worship. Such passages as Amos iv.4, v.21; Hosea iv.6, viii.11; Isaiah i.10; Micah vi.6; Jeremiah vii.22 are appealed to in proof of it. The exact meaning and scope of this prophetic protest against ritual sacrifice has been variously interpreted. All members of the school would agree with Graf<sup>23</sup> that Jeremiah vii.22-23 proves that the "middle part of the Pentateuch" which contains the bulk of the priestly writing (P) could not have been known in his days. But there is difference of opinion as to the exact nature of the opposition of these prophets to sacrifice. The more mod-

<sup>22</sup> P. 238.

<sup>23</sup> *Der Prophet Jeremia* (1862), p. 122.

erate view is that while opposed to the cultus as practised in their days because they regarded it as a fosterer of vice and the enemy of pure spiritual religion, while denying that it had any such divine imperative back of it as the potent name of Moses implied, the prophets were not opposed to sacrifice *as such*. Wellhausen appeals to Jeremiah xvii.26 as indicating that Jeremiah "is far from hating the cultus"<sup>24</sup> and Canon Driver is another outstanding representative of this "tolerant" position if we may so describe it.<sup>25</sup> But this position is one which is very hard to defend. If, in the face of the many passages in the Old Testament which directly connect the priestly ritual with the name of Moses, the critic feels that he is in a position to deny to it any Mosaic authorization, the question at once emerges, Has it any real authority back of it at all, or is it rather to be regarded simply as the survival in Israel of a primitive cult, "a universal and immemorial habit," which though particularly dear to the heart of the Semite, was essentially primitive and pagan both in its nature and origin? If this latter view be adopted, as is done by Professor Smith, the prophet appears in the light not of a reformer and restorer of the ancient and divinely ordained religion of Israel, but as the exponent, we may even say the discoverer of a new conception of religion, a religion without sacrifice.

Now while this conception of "prophetic religion" as of a religion without sacrifice is in some respects an attractive one, especially when we view it with the abuse of ritual which characterized their age as a foil, it is open to most serious objection. First of all, it is to be noticed that this teaching is, on the critics' own admission, far from being representative of the prophets as a whole. The critics are forced to distinguish between the "great" prophets, who represent this viewpoint, and the others who do not. Joel, Ezekiel, Haggai, Zechariah and Malachi must be and are regarded as inferior, even renegade, prophets because of their zeal for the temple

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<sup>24</sup> *Prolegomena* (Eng. Trans.) p. 59.

<sup>25</sup> *Jeremiah* (1906) p. 44.

and its worship. Wellhausen has called Ezekiel the "priest in prophet's mantle"; and McFadyen describes him as a "prophet with a priestly heart." Furthermore the "great" prophets themselves do not testify as clearly in favor of "prophetic religion" as the critics could desire. Jeremiah xvii. 19-26, xxxi. 14, xxxiii. 11, 18 have to be denied to the prophet Jeremiah; Isaiah lvi. 7, lx. 7, lxii. 9, lxvi. 20 can no more be conceded to the "Great Unknown" than to the genuine Isaiah. And no less a critic than Stade has said of Hosea: "For him a relation to Yahweh without external worship, without priest and offerings, is inconceivable." Clearly the conception of "prophetic religion" as a religion without sacrifice does not lie on the surface of the Prophetic Books of the Old Testament.

In the second place, the religious history of Israel in later times must be looked upon as largely if not wholly a lamentable departure from the lofty prophetic ideal of a spiritual religion set before the people by the great prophets of the eighth and seventh centuries, as a return to those weak and beggarly elements which they so scornfully rejected. The critics do not attempt to deny that ritual and sacrifice held a prominent place in the religion of the Jews in the period after the Exile. On the contrary so certain are they of this that they assign to that period most of those references to ritual which are found in the writings of the men whom they regard as the great protagonists of prophetic, i.e. true, religion. Yet this strong and long continued reaction against the teachings of the prophets, as it is portrayed by the critics, certainly does not accord well with that frankly evolutionary theory of the religion of Israel which is the real basis of their reconstruction of it; and the explanation given by Wellhausen is obviously inadequate and inconsistent with the theory which he advocates. He treats the emphasis on the cultus in the later period as intended to preserve the identity of Israel as a race during that period when it was in the greatest danger of being absorbed by the great world power, Babylon:—



The cultus had no longer any real value for the Deity; it was valuable only as an exercise of obedience to the law. If it had been at first the bond connecting Israel with heathenism, now, on the contrary, it was the shield behind which Judaism retreated to be safe from heathenism. There was no other means to make Judaism secure, and the cultus was nothing more than a means to that end.<sup>26</sup>

There is, it must be admitted, an element of plausibility in this explanation. The cultus was in a very real sense a national cultus and by emphasizing it the leaders of the Jews were stressing a national and racial institution which might justly claim the devotion and inspire the enthusiasm of their fellow-countrymen. This is perfectly true; and the argument is a valid one. But the important thing to notice is that it is not a valid argument for the critics. For the critics are themselves at pains to weaken this argument as much as possible. As a Mosaic institution the cultus was calculated to challenge the devotion of every devout Jew. But the critics tell us that sacrifice had no Mosaic authorization. As a system which was peculiarly their own and possessed unique features shared with no other race or nation, it might claim their enthusiastic support. But the critics are concerned to prove that the ritual features of Israel's worship were common to the Semitic peoples, shared by Israel with, even borrowed by them from, the neighboring peoples, notably Babylon. They are prone to regard as genuine elements in Israel's religious worship those perversions of the cultus against which the prophets fulminated as foreign additions and abuses of the true religion of Israel. Indeed, it has even been asserted that Jeroboam in introducing the calf worship into Northern Israel was merely playing the rôle, a slightly belated one, of "religious conservative." That this is substantially the view of Professor Smith is clear from the following statement:

The sacrificial system of Israel is in its origins of far earlier date than the days of Moses and the Exodus from Egypt. It has so much, both of form and meaning, in common with the systems of kindred nations as to prove it to be part of the heritage naturally derived by all of them

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<sup>26</sup> *Prolegomena*, p. 499.

from their Semitic forefathers. And the new element brought into the traditional religion at Sinai was just that on which Jeremiah lays stress—the ethical, which in time purified the ritual of sacrifice and burnt-offering but had nothing to do with the origins of this.<sup>27</sup>

Here we have the situation clearly presented. That which is distinctive of the religion of Israel both according to Moses and according to the “great” prophets was, the critics assure us, ethical not ceremonial. Moses, ignored sacrifice or we may better say tolerated or winked at it: the prophets repudiated it *in toto*. The sacrificial ritual of Israel was derived from the nations: it had been for centuries a connecting link with them. The “real,” “new,” distinctive religion of Israel was ethical, a religion without sacrifice. It was a teaching so new, so unique, so epoch-making, the critics tell us, that they can scarcely find words to express their amazement at the “shear and magnificent originality” of an Amos and a Hosea, the “singular independence” of an Isaiah, a Jeremiah in proclaiming it. Yet the founder of this modern school assures us that exiled Israel elaborated and clung to the Law, a law which centered about the sacrificial cultus, in order not to lose its national existence. In other words Israel repudiated the “original” teachings of the prophets, teachings which the critics somewhat inconsistently trace back to Moses,<sup>28</sup> teachings which constituted Israel’s supreme contribution to religion, and took refuge in a slavish devotion to, a fanatical cultivation of, a cultus which was essentially the same as that of her enemies, and which she

<sup>27</sup> P. 158. Cf. *The Twelve*, Vol. I, p. 104 for a similar statement.

<sup>28</sup> The task of reconciling the critical view which tends to lay great stress on the “originality” of the prophets with the fact that the most severe charge which they brought against the people was their failure to follow the religion of their *fathers*, is a difficult one. Professor Smith has recognized the problem and made an effort to solve it (*The Twelve*, p. 96 f), but the explanation cannot be regarded as satisfactory. “Mosaic” and “original” are really mutually exclusive expressions. In so far as the teachings of the prophets were original they were not Mosaic; in so far as they were Mosaic they were not original. Professor Smith’s tendency like that of the critics generally seems to be to place the emphasis strongly on originality. Not to do this would be disastrous to their theory.

had originally derived in large measure perhaps from Babylon itself. How inconsistent and illogical!

Yet what other explanation can the critic give of this half-millennium long lapse into what he regards as a primitive conception of religion? He can of course call it just this, a lapse. And in doing so he can moralize over the tragic unresponsiveness of humanity, taken in the large, to the challenge of lofty ethical and religious ideals. But to admit this is to concede that the religion of Israel was not marked by progress and evolution nearly so much as by rebellion and deterioration. And if the post-captivity history of Israel is possible despite the prophetic repudiation of sacrifice in the days of Isaiah and Jeremiah, it becomes absurd for the critic to maintain that the Mosaic institution of the Law is impossible because it was later disobeyed and ignored. The latter lapse is surely no more difficult to explain than the former. And the latter is clearly taught in the Old Testament, while the former is the result of a critical theory of prophecy and its alleged repudiation of sacrifices which is not supported by the prophets themselves. Of course it is easy to say that the prophets were religious geniuses, pioneers, solitary figures, men of intuition and insight, men born out of due time, heralds of the dawn whose words passed into forgetfulness because they fell upon the deaf ears of a slumbering world. And it is easy to point out how bitterly the prophets were opposed by the men of their own age. But the same can be said of Moses who in this respect was the true pattern of the prophecy of the future. The generation which he brought out of Egypt perished through disobedience in the wilderness and he saw in it a type and prophecy of the generations yet to come.

But while the question of the relation between Prophetism, as understood by the critics, and later Judaism is an important one and presents we believe serious difficulties to the critic, a far more serious question is that of the relation between Prophetism and Christianity. If as is claimed the prophets repudiated sacrifice as such from their conception of true

religion, can the Christian who believes that Christianity is the fulfilment of prophetic religion continue to regard the Cross as the central fact of his religion? Can he still believe that Christ died "as a sacrifice to satisfy divine justice and reconcile us to God"? If the prophets who "laid the true foundations and proclaimed the essence of Jewish religion"; were "the implacable foes" of priestly ritual,<sup>29</sup> then the critic must conclude either that Christianity differs from Judaism as to what he has come to regard as Judaism's loftiest development, he must even say that as religions the two are essentially different; or accepting the oneness of the Old Testament and the New Testament he must assert that there is essential agreement between Prophetism regarded as the culmination of Old Testament religion and Christianity. As far as we are aware the critics would all be disposed to assert and even to stress the essential harmony between Prophetism and Christianity.

If then it be admitted that there is essential agreement between the prophetic religion of the Old Testament, as understood by the critics, and the religion of the New Testament, two courses of action are open to the critic. He may accept the obvious New Testament implications of his Old Testament theory of Prophetism. He may repudiate the preaching of the Cross as the tragic survival of that primitive "theology of the slaughter-house" against which, as he believes, the prophets fulminated centuries before the birth of the last and greatest of their line. He may appeal to the Parable of the Prodigal as expressing the essence of the religion of Jesus and the quintessence of Prophetism and repudiate the doctrine of the Cross as due to a Pauline perversion of the religion of Jesus. He may assure us that the Epistle to the Hebrews which quite unmistakably regards the Cross as the fulfilment of the typical ritual of the Old Testament, the fulfilment of the priestly conception of religion, was an elaborate attempt to explain how Christianity which is the fulfil-

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<sup>29</sup> Professor McFayden has recently put this view very strongly in an article "Zionism" in the *Expository Times* (May 1924). p. 343 f.

ment of Prophetism could "discard" the "world-old custom" of ritual sacrifice.<sup>30</sup> The interpretation of the death of Christ in sacrificial terms becomes then merely a concession to human prejudice and conservatism, an attempt to mediate between two mutually exclusive positions. Jesus may be regarded as a prophet, even the last and greatest of them all, but the worship of the "Saviour-God of Paul, of Hellenism, of historical Christianity" becomes a perversion—an age-long perversion—of the religion of Jesus.<sup>31</sup> To those who hold this view, who carry the inference of their theory of a fundamental antithesis between prophetic and priestly religion out to its logical conclusion, the lapse of post-captivity Judaism from the purely ethical teachings of the prophets is only surpassed by the lapse of the Christian Church from the religion of its founder and noblest advocate. To them it is the distinctive merit of the "higher critic" to have removed the offense of the Cross from the religion of Jesus. For the Cross is to them, as it was to Jew and Greek in Paul's day, a stumbling-block and foolishness. But contrariwise to every one to whom the blood of Christ is precious, the fact that this theory of prophecy, which is essential to the critical reconstruction of the Old Testament and has figured so largely in it, bears such apples of Sodom, becomes the clearest proof, the all sufficient proof, that it is false, dangerous and anti-Christian. The Cross is the great central fact of

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<sup>30</sup> Cf. G. A. Barton, *The Religion of Israel*, p. 210. Professor Barton believes that the 51st Psalm "anticipates the parable of the prodigal son. The Father needs no propitiation except the penitence of the son for whom he has waited so long" (p. 215).

<sup>31</sup> This view has recently been very strongly put by Professor Fagnani of Union Seminary, New York. Writing a few months ago in the *American Hebrew*, (April 18, 1924), he congratulated the Jews that even in the face of persecution they had throughout the centuries "steadfastly refused to believe that the Prophet of Nazareth was the Saviour-God of Paul, of Hellenism and of historic Christianity." He exhorted them to assert their "indisputable claim" to "Joshua ben Joseph of Nazareth" whom he described as the last and greatest of the prophets, and regarding whom he quoted with approval Rabbi Wise's eulogy of Jesus, "the man, the Jew, the prophet."



Christianity. Cut it out of Christianity and Christianity ceases to be a religion of redemption.

But can the critic, while accepting in its uncompromising form that theory of prophetic religion which is regarded as fundamental in critical circles, escape the conclusions regarding the New Testament religion, the religion of Jesus, which have just been stated? It will be objected at once that there are many Christians who accept the "assured results" of criticism and yet believe quite devoutly in the atoning death of Christ as a sacrifice for sin, or at least have never denied this precious article of the Christian faith. There are unquestionably men and women of this type, many of them. How then are they to be accounted for? In one or other of two ways, we think. Either they consciously or unconsciously refuse to think their critical views regarding the Old Testament through to their logical conclusion, in other words refuse or neglect to apply them to the New Testament; or else they must seek another foreshadowing of the Cross than the Old Testament ritual of sacrifice, an argument for it which will not conflict with the prophetic ideal of a religion without ritual sacrifice. There are many who follow the first of these two courses. Their position is, we believe, quite illogical; but it is better to be an illogical and inconsistent Christian than a logical unbeliever. Still it is impossible but that their views of the Old Testament should have some influence upon their Christian faith. They are in an unsafe because an inconsistent position. They are endeavoring to hold two mutually exclusive views as to matters of vital import to Christian faith. But it is with the other position that we are now concerned, with the attempt to find an Old Testament basis for the Cross which will not clash with that critical theory regarding prophetic religion which is now so popular.

The solution which is advocated by influential critics and notably by Professor Smith, both in his earlier writings and also in this his latest volume, is this. The prophets and notably Jeremiah we are told while rejecting the sacrificial

cultus *in toto*, while indignantly denying that God could have commanded the shedding of the blood of bulls and goats as an atonement for sin, themselves in their own sufferings with and for their people illustrated and typified the atoning death of Christ. This view is ably set forth by Professor Smith in the lecture entitled "The Story of His Soul." The lecture is divided into three heads: Protest and Agony; Predestination, Sacrifice. The first two are concerned especially with the question how Jeremiah achieved his sense of individuality, the critics being disposed to magnify Jeremiah as the discoverer of personality, especially in the religious sphere. It is the third which especially concerns us at present. The first paragraph reads thus:

But in thus achieving his individuality over against both his nation and his God, Jeremiah accomplished only half of the work he did for Israel and mankind. It is proof of how great a prophet we have in him that he who was the first in Israel to realise the independence of the single self in religion should also become the supreme example under the Old Covenant of the sacrifice of that self for others, that he should break from one type of religious solidarity only to illustrate another and a nobler, that the prophet of individuality should be also the symbol if not the conscious preacher of vicariousness. This further stage in Jeremiah's experience is of equally dramatic interest, though we cannot always trace the order of his utterances which bear witness to it.<sup>32</sup>

The "one type of religious solidarity" referred to is clearly ritual sacrifice; Jeremiah as a true prophet breaks with it. At the same time he is himself the "symbol if not the conscious preacher of vicariousness," of the sacrifice of self for others. The meaning and implication of this is set forth more fully a few paragraphs later on where we read of Jeremiah in Egypt:

There, on alien soil and among countrymen who had given themselves to an alien religion, the one great personality of his time, who had served the highest interests of his nation for forty years, reluctant but unfaltering, and whose scorned words, every one, had been vindicated by events, is with the dregs of his people swept from our sight. *He had given his back to the smiters and his cheeks to them who plucked out the hair; he had not hidden his face from the shame and the spitting. He was a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief. He was taken from prison*

<sup>32</sup> P. 341.

*and from judgment and cut off from the land of the living; and they made his grave with the wicked, though he had done no violence neither was deceit in his mouth.* It is the second greatest sacrifice that Israel has offered for mankind.<sup>33</sup>

Before examining this view we shall quote one more passage at the close of the chapter :

I may be going too far in interpreting the longing and faith that lie behind these words [xiv.8,9]. But they come out very fully in later prophets who explicitly assert that the Divine Nature does dwell with men, shares their ethical warfare and bears the shame of their sins. And the truth of it all was manifested past doubt in the Incarnation, the Passion and the Cross of the Son of God.

But whether Jeremiah had instinct of it, as I have ventured to think from his prayer, or had not, he foreshadowed, as far as mere man can, the sufferings of Jesus Christ for men—and this is his greatest glory as a prophet.<sup>34</sup>

It is clear that we have here a very earnest effort to vindicate for the "liberal" Christian the right to call Jesus Saviour as well as Prophet. This is brought about by what we may call a process of "sublimation." The prophet, while rejecting animal sacrifice, experiences and exhibits in his own life of suffering with and for his people the sublimation of the idea which is crudely expressed in the rite which he rejects. And it would seem that in somewhat similar manner the sufferings of Christ represent the "sublimation" of the sufferings of the prophets. As an attempt to save the Cross this theory is commendable; and its appeal to those who feel obliged to accept the critical theory of the Old Testament with its rejection of ritual and yet desire to hold on to redemptive Christianity, must be very great. But we need not dwell upon its advantages. They are sufficiently obvious and are largely the explanation of its popularity. The question is this, Is it true? Can it be defended on Scriptural grounds? We believe that it cannot, and for the following reasons.

It is to be noted in the first place that the thought of the prophet as saviour in the sense of substitute is foreign to the

<sup>33</sup> P. 344. The italics are Professor Smith's, apparently used not for emphasis, but in accordance with our author's regular custom of putting Scripture citations in italics.

<sup>34</sup> P. 348. Cf. also pp. 6f, 113, 159, 373.

Old Testament, or rather, is expressly rejected in it. The impotence of the prophets to save their doomed compatriots is made very clear to us. It is expressly declared that even the greatest of Israel's leaders would be powerless to save their city from destruction, a destruction expressly foretold as the punishment of sin. "Though Moses and Samuel stood before me, yet my mind could not be toward this people; cast them out of my sight, and let them go forth"—is Jeremiah's rebuke to any confidence in the goodness of man, in the good offices of even the best of men, in this time of desperate need. "Though these three men, Noah, Daniel, and Job, were in it, they should deliver but their own souls by their righteousness, saith the Lord"—is Ezekiel's thrice repeated reply to a similar attitude of mind on the part of the Jews already in captivity. The merit of men, however good, however great their favor with God, will not avail Israel in her hour of doom. Furthermore we find that the prophet is forbidden to intercede for the people (vii.16, xi.14, xiv.11). As saviours of their people the prophets were decided failures. Amos and Hosea did not save the Northern kingdom from Assyria; Jeremiah did not save Judah from Babylon. They testified in vain to and against a stubborn and sinful people. And we nowhere read that the sufferings of these prophets atoned for the sin of the people. Rather is it made clear that the refusal of the people to hearken to the prophets, their harsh reception of them, deepened their guilt. It is this fact especially which makes it so necessary for us to interpret the 53rd chapter of Isaiah as strictly Messianic. The prophets were not able to atone for the sin of Israel; but this prophecy speaks expressly of One who could and would do this by His death.

We have seen that Professor Smith refers to the 53rd of Isaiah as setting before us a prophetic ideal which was first suggested by the life of Jeremiah and later applied to the Messiah. Yet this very passage points us to perhaps the clearest proof of the inadequacy of the theory we are discussing, viz., the failure of the Scriptures to attach any special signifi-

cance to the *death* of the prophet. It is true that the Old Testament records the martyr deaths of several prophets—Uriah the son of Shemaiah (Jer. xxvi.20), Zechariah the son of Jehoiada (2 Chron. xxiv.21)—and that in the New Testament the persecution even unto death which the prophets suffered at the hand of their countrymen is cited by the Lord (Matt. xxiii. 24f) and by His followers (e.g., Acts vii. 51f) as a signal proof of the rebellion and hardness of heart which had characterized Israel throughout the course of her history; and the treatment given to the servants is declared to be typical of that reception which the Son is to receive at their hands. James sets before the Christian believer the prophets as a heroic example of patient endurance. In Hebrews the triumphs of faith are described and we can read between the lines allusions to the sufferings of some, perhaps many, of those “men of God,” the faithful prophets. This is clear; but on the other hand it is to be noticed that no special significance, certainly no redemptive significance is attached to their death. Not merely is no express reference made to the death of any of the “great” prophets, as a matter of fact we do not know when or how they died. Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Micah, Jeremiah—these are the men in whom the critics find the loftiest development of prophecy. Yet the Bible does not tell us how a single one of them met the last enemy. If Isaiah was “sawn asunder,” we know this only from tradition, not from any express statement in Scripture. And as for Jeremiah, what is emphasized in his case is that he did not die, that when Jerusalem fell, this faithful prophet was expressly singled out for life. The king and many of the leaders perished or were exiled; Jeremiah was spared and shown royal favor. When or how he died we do not know. The death of a true prophet did not differ *per se* from that of any other man. The peaceful close of the life of Elisha is described to us in a way which tempts us to apply to him the words of Isaiah, “taken away from the evil to come.” And Elijah, the great representative of prophetism, is distinguished not by his death, but by his failure to die. He alone



of all who have lived on earth since the days of the Flood is made an exception to the universal law of death; like Enoch (one of the heroes of faith mentioned in Heb. xi) he was translated that he should not see death. The prophets were messengers and representatives of God to men. Their faithful witness was doubtless often sealed with their blood. Their sufferings were typical alike of the sufferings of Christ and of those of His faithful followers and witnesses in every age. But death was not the aim and goal of their lives. They were not sent to die, but to be faithful even unto death.

On the other hand the life of the Lord Jesus Christ is set before us both in prophecy (Isa. liii) and historically in the Gospels and theologically in the Epistles as the life of one who come to *die*. All three of the Synoptists tell us that in connection with Peter's confession at Caesarea Philippi, Jesus began to teach His disciples the necessity of His death (Matt. xvii.22, Mark viii.31, Luke ix.22). And each of the four gospels gives a detailed account of His passion, death and resurrection. Jesus' death was the climax of His life. His life was *prophetic*. His death was *priestly*. His life was one of testimony to, of suffering *with*, His people; His death was one of atonement *for* His people. In His earthly ministry He perfectly declared the will of God and perfectly illustrated it in His obedience to the Father. And the sufferings and persecution which the Divine Son endured in the days of His flesh and which had been endured by the prophets before Him were the supreme illustration and proof of the inability of the *prophet* even the Divine prophet to save a people dead in sin. Something more was needed, the *priestly* death of the Son of God for sinners.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> In thus contrasting the prophetic life and the priestly death of our Lord we have solely in view the question of *expiation* of sin. As a prophet Christ revealed to men by His Word and Spirit the will of God for their salvation; as a priest, He once offered up Himself a sacrifice to satisfy divine justice and reconcile us to God. The difference is clear; and those who regard the prophets as the chief and most important Old Testament types of Christ will naturally tend to think of Him mainly if not solely as revealer and example, all the more since they

But important as is the fact that the death of the prophets is never set before us as a type of the sacrificial death of Christ, this is only the negative side of the argument. Of still greater moment is the fact that in the New Testament, the type and foreshadowing of the death of Christ is expressly and explicitly found in that very ritual of sacrifice which the critics regard as essentially pagan in its origin and as the object of the especial reprobation of the "great" prophets. The words of the Baptist, "Behold the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world," epitomize the teaching of the New Testament in this regard. It is the lamb of sacrifice, the paschal lamb especially, of which John speaks. It is as sacrifice for sin that he acclaims the world's Redeemer. And Jesus makes these words His own when He utters the words of institution of the Last Supper, that Communion feast which His disciples are to keep in remembrance of Him: "This is my body broken for you," "This cup is the New Testament in my blood, which is shed for many for the remission of sins." Here is no allusion, not the remotest, to the death of Jeremiah of which we know nothing or to the death of any man, be he prophet or otherwise, of whose death we know something. But we do have brought home to us irresistably the great teaching of the ceremonial Law, as summarized for us in the Epistle to the Hebrews: without the shedding of blood there is no remission. And this great truth that the atoning death of Christ is the fulfilment of the Old Testament ritual of sacrifice is further illustrated by the fact that this is the consistent representation of the New Testament writers. The three Synoptists and Paul give us the account of this solemn rite and make its remembrance a perpetual duty of the Christian Church, until He come. It is

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ignore or reject the Levitical ritual with its emphasis upon expiation through death. But the distinction which we have drawn does not of course exhaust the meaning of either the life or the death of Jesus. His life, though prophetic, was also priestly in that His active obedience is imputed to the believer for righteousness. His death, though priestly, was also prophetic in that it was the supreme revelation of God's hatred of sin and love of the sinner.

natural therefore that Paul should exhort the Christians, "Purge out the old leaven that ye may be a new lump. . . . For even Christ our passover is sacrificed for us" (1 Cor. v.7; cf. Acts xx.28, 2 Cor. v.21, Titus ii.14, etc.); that Peter should remind the Christian that he is "redeemed with the precious blood of Christ as of a lamb without blemish and without spot"; that John in the Book of Revelation should speak of Jesus as the *Lamb*, the Lamb that was *slain* and of the redeemed as washed in His *blood* (cf. 1 John iv.10); and that in the Epistle to the Hebrews the death of Christ should be repeatedly declared to be the fulfilment of the Old Testament ritual of sacrifice, *e.g.* in vii.27 where Christ is set before us as a high priest "who needeth not daily, as those high priests to offer up sacrifice, first for his own sins, and then for the people's; for this he did once, when he offered up himself." That the death of Christ as an Atonement for sin was the fulfilment of the ritual sacrifices of the Law and was clearly foretold by the Prophets is definitely and repeatedly affirmed in the New Testament.

It is impossible to find in the New Testament any evidence of that break with ritual sacrifice as "one type of religious solidarity" and of that emphasis upon the vicarious suffering of the prophets as representative of another type, which Jeremiah is said to illustrate so clearly. If the ritual sacrifices of the post captivity period represent a lapse from the new and better standards of the great prophets, it is impossible to avoid the admission that this lapse, this pagan viewpoint, was characteristic of Christianity from the very first. Luke apparently deems it important to inform Theophilus that John the Baptist and Jesus were born and nurtured in homes which were zealous for the Law. The incident of Jesus' twelfth year and the fact that, during His public ministry, He apparently went up every year to the Passover, and also to other feasts is an indication that, despite His denunciation of its abuse, Jesus was no foe of the temple ritual as such. On the contrary we find Him repeatedly enjoining upon His disciples obedience to the Law.

There are we believe two reasons for this attitude of the New Testament writers; two reasons why they connected the death of Christ with the priestly ritual of atonement and not with the sublime and heroic sufferings of the prophets. The first of these is that they recognized no such antithesis between prophet and priest as is claimed by the critic of today. They regarded the Law as Mosaic and the ritual of sacrifice with which it was so largely concerned as of Divine authority. Consequently they were prepared to see in the death of Christ the fulfilment of this ritual. It became necessary for them to do this when Jesus expressly spoke of His death in sacrificial terms and in the Last Supper identified Himself with the Passover Lamb as its fulfilment. The attempt can of course be made with some measure of plausibility to magnify Jesus' denunciation of the perversion of the ritual by the scribes, Pharisees and hypocrites into a rejection of sacrifice as such. This is merely to repeat in the New Testament the tactics which the critic applies to the Old. It means to magnify a rejection of the perversion of sacrifice into a rejection of sacrifice as such. And the Old Testament critic who makes Jeremiah's Temple Address (Jer. vii) a rejection of all external rites and sites, despite the indignant emphasis upon the words "this house which is *called by My name*" (vss. 10, 11, 14), will of course by parity of reasoning ignore the force of Jesus' denunciation of those who have made "*My Father's house* a place of merchandise." But even the most destructive critic will find it no easy task to prove that Jesus shared the view of the "great" prophets, as critically interpreted, that the Old Testament ritual of sacrifice was essentially pagan and immoral.

The second reason which is a more general one is found in the peculiar appropriateness of the Old Testament ritual to prefigure and typify the atonement of Christ and the danger which attaches to such a use of the sufferings of the prophets. In the case of animal sacrifice the inadequacy of the type, save as type, is obvious. The New Testament makes it clear that "it is impossible that the blood of bulls or goats

could take away sin," *impossible* in the very nature of things. It was accepted by God as a substitute, because He had been pleased to accept it as a type of the perfect sacrifice to come. Of course there was a tendency in Israel, following the lead of other nations to strive to make the sacrifice adequate in itself. Hence we have human sacrifice in Israel, the offering of the first born to Molech, as well as the multiplication of animal sacrifice,—hecatombs and rivers of oil. But the simplicity, even frugality, if we may so describe it, of the Old Testament ritual was designed to show that the offering owed its adequacy not to any sufficiency in itself, but to God's grace in accepting the offering of His people when made in faith and repentance in the manner of His appointing. It is shown that they prefigured a better and more perfect offering. But in the types it was in the death of the innocent victim, the shedding of the blood, which is the life, that the act of atonement was clearly typified. Not its sufferings, which were relatively slight, but its death! And this was not a matter of inference. It was clearly taught in the Law, that "it is the blood that maketh an atonement for the soul." In the Old Testament ritual the necessity of expiation by blood is made inescapably plain. And it is in the language of this ritual and as the express fulfilment of its types that the death of Christ is set before us in the New Testament.

When on the contrary the sufferings of the prophets are made typical of the saving work of Christ, two dangers at once emerge. There is first the tendency so to magnify the type as to make it almost equal to the antitype, to regard the sufferings of the prophets as almost equal to the sufferings of Christ, as differing from His only in degree. We see this very plainly in Professor Smith's statement as quoted above. Not merely does he apply to Jeremiah the language of the 53rd of Isaiah, language which the Apostolic Church regarded as distinctly Messianic, he even goes on to say of the life of Jeremiah as therein set forth: "It is the second greatest sacrifice that Israel has offered for mankind." And a little later on in speaking of the inevitable obligation of suf-



fering for his people which comes to a man who has "the Divine gifts of a keener conscience and a more loving heart than his fellows," Professor Smith tells us:

This spiritual distress Jeremiah felt for the people long before he shared with them the physical penalties of their sins. Just there—in his keener conscience, in his hot shame for sins not his as if they were his, in his agony for his people's estrangement from God and in his own constantly wounded love—lay his real substitution, his vicarious offering for his people.<sup>36</sup>

These words, "second greatest sacrifice," "real substitution," "vicarious offering" show with unescapable plainness the disastrous tendency of this theory. But this is not its only weakness. There is coupled with it the danger of so comparing the death of Christ to the death of the prophet, as to regard the Crucifixion as merely incidental, as the probable and under given circumstances inevitable, but by no means inherently necessary, result of His faithful witness as a messenger of God. If the greatest of the Old Testament prophets did not as far as we know seal his testimony with his blood, death cannot be the goal of the prophet's mission. Consequently in so far as the prophet is a type of Christ the death of Jesus is to be regarded as a martyrdom. The emphasis is shifted from the atoning death to the suffering life of our Lord.

As we have just seen Professor Smith's own language with regard to the sufferings of Jeremiah illustrates very clearly how great is the danger which inheres in it of so magnifying the sufferings of the prophets as practically to deny that there is any real difference save of degree between them and the sufferings of Christ. The expressions we have quoted "second greatest sacrifice," "real substitution," "vicarious offering" show this plainly. And apparently because he recognizes this danger, Professor Smith at the close of the chapter inserts as we have seen the qualifying words "foreshadowed, as far as mere man can." Clearly he feels the danger of the position in which he has placed himself by what almost amounts to an apotheosis of Jeremiah.

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<sup>36</sup> P. 347.

He has used words of a mere man which the Christian believer has reserved for Deity. But the very words which he uses to save himself from the one error increase the danger in which he stands of falling into the other. "Foreshadowed, as far as mere man can"—does not this phrase of itself point in the direction of a minimizing or rejecting of the Cross? If death played an important, a necessary part in the work of atonement, could this not have been foreshadowed in the martyr deaths of Amos, Hosea, Micah, Isaiah, Jeremiah? Does not the failure even to mention the death of any one of these great prophets indicate that death is not the all important thing in the career of the One whose coming they foreshadowed? If Jeremiah "foreshadowed, as far as mere man can" the redemptive work of Christ, how can we attach supreme value and importance to His death?

Professor Smith has never, as far as we are aware, denied the necessity of the atoning death of Christ. On the contrary he has referred to it in language which goes beyond the mere moral influence theory of the Atonement. We are glad to think that he believes that Jesus' death was not exemplary but expiatory, not incidental but necessary, not the conclusion merely, but the goal, the climax of His life. But there are many who are today using the theory, which Professor Smith has so ably defended, to avoid the offense of the Cross by making it merely the sublime illustration of that law of vicarious suffering which runs through the Universe. And if Professor Smith is willing in the interest of a modern theory to reject the Old Testament teaching regarding the necessity of expiation, he should not be surprised if many who accept his arguments draw from them inferences which he must greatly deplore. For if the prophets rejected the ritual sacrifices in which the thought of substitutionary expiation was so prominent, if in their lives they exhibited the law of vicarious suffering, and if their deaths are mentioned if at all merely to tell us that they knew how if need be to die for their convictions, and if in all this they were types of Christ, then it is natural to see in Him the greatest of the

prophets, Israel's supreme illustration of the law of vicarious suffering, but to deny that He is the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world.

How much better it would be to revise the critic's theory, to admit that the prophets were foes of the abuse of sacrifice but not foes of sacrifice as such, that the prophetic and the priestly religions of the Old Testament are both alike elements and essential elements in the one true Religion of Revelation, that the theory of a fundamental antagonism between them is a myth. History offers the critic an instructive lesson if he will but heed it. It is nearly a century since Baur propounded at Tübingen his theory of a conflict between Paul and Peter, between Gentile Christians and Jewish Christians in the Early Church. For a time it seemed as if this theory would destroy the authority of the New Testament. The books of the New Testament were condemned or approved according to the side which they were supposed to take in the alleged controversy. Paul's genuine epistles were reduced to four. But now the Tübingen hypothesis has run its course and even critical scholars have largely won back what Baur threw away in the interest of a theory. And every one who believes that the Bible is the Word of God is entitled to believe that the Graf-Wellhausen hypothesis will sooner or later follow the Tübingen to the limbo of forgotten theories and that the "priestly" religion of the Old Testament which it scorns will be restored to its true and proper place and once more recognized as the great Old Testament type of the Gospel of Reconciliation.

The volume which we have been examining illustrates very clearly the difficult and unfortunate position in which a student of the Bible is placed who believes that the Bible contains the Word of God, that it is a priceless treasure house of inestimable religious values, and yet feels obliged to pass every statement, every gem of truth which it contains through the crucible of a rationalistic philosophy which forces him to reject large portions of it as false and even

vicious and to retain other portions only at the expense of placing on them a meaning which is clearly not the one originally intended. We have in Professor Smith a combination of contradictions. He is a devoted student of the Scriptures; but he does not hesitate to reject or correct any statement with which he does not agree. He regards the message of the prophets as of supreme religious value, yet is constantly engaged in the effort to prove that "Thus saith the Lord" means "I (Amos) have discovered," "I (Jeremiah) have reached the conclusion." He believes in the Atonement of Christ, but rejects as essentially pagan that ritual of sacrifice which figures so largely in the history of Israel from beginning to end, and which is described in the New Testament as typical of the Death of Christ for human sin; and he magnifies the sufferings of the prophets until they almost equal the sufferings of Christ and obscure the necessity of His death. One moment he speaks with the fervor of a Luther and we feel in him the spirit of the ancient prophets burning with moral earnestness and aglow with the consciousness of the might and majesty, justice and mercy of the Lord God Almighty. The next he speaks with the cold dogmatic scepticism of one who is prepared to measure all things with the yardstick of his finite understanding, who knows both what man is and what God is, knows it profoundly and intimately, and who is therefore able to set bounds, definite and impassable, to the actions and activities of both.

We have endeavored to point out what seem to us the most serious defects in this most recent work of a well-known scholar. There are other matters—e.g. Jeremiah and Deuteronomy, Jeremiah and Life after Death—which might well be discussed did space permit. In closing we call attention to a statement which seems to us to illustrate with unusual clearness the fatal weakness of Professor Smith's attitude toward those Scriptures of which he has been for many years one of the foremost of living interpreters.

We have seen that to Professor Smith the acceptance of the view that the great prophets rejected *in toto* the ritual of

sacrifice is indispensable to the proper understanding of their writings and of the Bible as a whole. One of the key passages which are depended on to establish this, is Jeremiah vii. 21-23. Professor Smith says of it that "there is no good reason for denying it to Jeremiah." Yet he is of course aware that other critics question it, so after citing the passage in full he goes on to say:

Whether from Jeremiah or not, this is one of the most critical texts of the Old Testament because while repeating what the prophet has already fervently accepted, that the terms of the deuteronomic Covenant were simply obedience to the ethical demands of God, it contradicts Deuteronomy and even more strongly Leviticus, in their repeated statements that in the wilderness God also commanded sacrifices.<sup>37</sup>

*Whether from Jeremiah or not!*—a startling way to speak of one of the passages of the Old Testament which is most vital to the "critical" reconstruction of Old Testament religion and upon which for half a century the Wellhausen School has relied as a convincing argument that the bulk of the Law cannot be Mosaic. Suppose it is not from Jeremiah—Professor Smith is not willing to deny this possibility—what guarantee have we that it is true? If it contradicts Deuteronomy and Leviticus why not reject it as a later unauthorized insertion? Professor Smith, as we have seen, does not hesitate to reject other passages which do not suit him. Why accept this one as true, *whether from Jeremiah or not?* There is only one answer. Our author accepts it, because it harmonizes as he thinks with his theory of the Old Testament. Otherwise he would reject it as he does other passages. And in this his attitude is typical of the Wellhausen School. It would be a natural thing for the conservative scholar to do the same, to reject this and the few other passages, which the critics cite most confidently as proving their theory of Prophetic Religion. Our author should be the last to object that such a method is drastic or arbitrary. It is his own method. He would be helpless without it. The conservative scholar does not adopt this seemingly easy course because he reveres the

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<sup>37</sup> P. 156.



Bible, the *whole* Bible as the Word of God, and is seeking to interpret every passage not in terms of a preconceived theory but in the light of the Bible as a whole. And he has his reward. For while he may not realize it, our author because of his arbitrary methods must rest his case for his *Jeremiah* ultimately on a confident, "Thus saith the critic"; he is his own authority and guide. But the Bible Christian is able to say, "Thus saith the Lord," and to appeal to an Authority other and greater than his own. Professor Smith is constantly finding difficulties and alleging errors and contradictions in the Bible; he cannot really trust it, if he would. But the Bible Christian, who believes that "the infallible rule of interpretation of Scripture is the Scripture itself," not some subjective and destructive theory about it, is increasingly impressed with the unity, harmony and Divine authority of that precious volume which God has given to man to be a lamp unto his feet and light unto his path.

*Princeton.*

OSWALD T. ALLIS.

#### NOTE ON THE TEXT AND METRES OF JEREMIAH

It has been pointed out above<sup>1</sup> that Professor Smith shows a very marked disposition to contrast the Hebrew text of Jeremiah with the Greek version in such a way as to indicate to the reader that the one is decidedly less reliable than the other. As an illustration of this we quote his metrical version of viii. 14—ix. 1, (p. 63 f.), together with the appended footnotes.<sup>2</sup> This passage is of especial interest partly because he speaks of the latter part of it as "the incomparable elegy" (p. 197), partly because he gives us a second version of it (p. 200f) with variations which are not without interest.

For what sit we still?  
Sweep together,  
And into the fortified cities,  
That there we may perish!  
For our God<sup>a</sup> hath doomed us to perish,

<sup>1</sup> P. 85 *supra* of this REVIEW.

<sup>2</sup> To avoid confusion Professor Smith's footnotes are designated by letters of the alphabet.

And given us poison to drink,  
     For to Him<sup>a</sup> have we sinned.  
 Hope for peace there was once—  
     But no good—  
 For a season of healing—  
     Lo, panic.<sup>b</sup>  
 From Dan the sound has been heard,<sup>c</sup>  
     The hinnying of his horses;  
 With the noise of the neighing of his stallions  
     All the land is aquake.  
 For that this grief hath no comfort,<sup>d</sup>  
     Sickens my heart upon me.  
 Hark to the cry of my people  
     Wide o'er the land—  
 'Is the Lord not in Sion,  
 Is there no King there?'<sup>e</sup>  
  
 Harvest is over, summer is ended  
     And we are not saved!  
 For the breach of the Daughter of my people  
     I break, I darken,  
 Horror hath seized upon me,  
     Pangs as of her that beareth.<sup>f</sup>  
 Is there no balm in Gilead,  
     Is there no healer?  
 Why will the wounds never stanch  
     Of the daughter of my people?  
 O that my head were waters,  
     Mine eyes a fountain of tears,  
 That day and night I might weep  
     For the slain of my people!

<sup>a</sup> Greek;<sup>3</sup> in both cases Hebrew adds *the Lord*.

<sup>b</sup> This verse is uncertain; for Hebrew בַּעֲתָה read with the Greek בַּהֲלָה. For another arrangement see above, p. 51.

<sup>c</sup> So Greek; Hebrew omits *sound*. <sup>d</sup> This line is uncertain.

<sup>e</sup> Greek.

<sup>f</sup> So Greek; Hebrew omits this line.

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Verse 14. *Sweep together* is a picturesque but farfetched substitute for "assemble yourselves" (AV). Both Hebrew and Greek add "and let us come into the fortified cities." This is suggested by the rendering of the next line *And into the fortified cities*. But no mention is made of the omission. *For our God hath doomed*, etc., Hebrew, "For the LORD our God"; Greek, "For the God," etc. Here neither Hebrew nor Greek is followed exactly. Yet the footnote seems to imply that it is the Greek. In the other rendering (p. 200), we read "For the Lord our own God." There but for the word "own" the Hebrew is exactly followed; but no footnote calls attention to this. *For to Him have we sinned*. On p. 200 a footnote reads: "Hebrew, *the Lord*."

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<sup>3</sup> It is to be noted that when Professor Smith uses the word "Greek" he is apparently referring primarily to the Vatican MS (Codex B) of the LXX (as given for example in Swete's *The Old Testament in Greek*), which many of the critics regard as the best text. Occasionally reference is made to other versions, e.g. pp. 96, 152, 245, 255, 258.

Verse 15. *Hope for peace there was once*, etc. On p. 200, this verse is rendered:—

Hoping for peace?  
'Twas no good,  
For a season of healing?  
Lo, panic.

and a footnote at the end reads: "So Greek. The verse is another instance of the two-stresses-to-a-line metre; see p. 46." If the metre is two-stress, "Hope for peace there was once" does not indicate it: "Hoping for peace?" is better. The parallel passage xiv.18 gives us a third rendering (p. 51).

Hoped we for peace—no good,  
For time to heal—and lo panic!

This certainly does not bring out a two-stress metre. *Panic*. The footnote, "This verse is uncertain; for Hebrew בַּעֲתָה read with the Greek בַּהֲלָה," is rather remarkable. This noun is found only here and in xiv. 19. The verb means "to fall upon, startle, terrify" (Gesenius-Brown). "Panic" would seem to be a good rendering. And its correctness is favored by the Greek (ταραχή) of xiv.19. Yet apparently because in this passage the Greek has σπουδή, which twice elsewhere renders the word בַּהֲלָה, Professor Smith insists on correcting the Hebrew text. But to do this is to overlook one of those very indications of poetic form, namely the alliteration, which so ardent a metricist as Professor Smith should regard as decisive. The use of the unusual word "panic" (בַּעֲתָה) is clearly favored by the context "for a season (לְעֵת) of healing—Lo, panic (בַּעֲתָה)." In like manner the alliteration in Psalm lxxviii. 33 "Therefore their days did he consume in vanity (בַּהֲבִלָה) and their years in trouble (בַּבְּהִלָה)" argues for the correctness of the text of that passage. Professor Smith appeals to this feature in the case of ii.12 (p. 93), which he renders "Be heavy, O heavens, for this" (lit. "be aghast"), because of the Hebrew *shommû shamaim*.

Verse 16. *From Dan the sound has been heard* (cf. p. 200 where "bruit" is used instead of "sound" and the footnote reads: "So Greek."). The footnote reads: "So Greek; Hebrew omits *sound*." True, but it might be well to point out that this does not necessarily indicate any difference in text. And if Professor Smith is desirous of being exact about details should he not add that in rendering "has been heard" he is following the Hebrew, since the Greek has "we shall hear."<sup>4</sup> *With the noise of the neighing of his stallions* follows the Hebrew (cf. AV "at the sound of the neighing of his strong ones") more closely than the

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<sup>4</sup> This does not imply any difference in the consonantal text or even in the pointing. The Hebrew word can be translated either way.

Greek which has "at the voice of the thunder (lit. neighing) of the driving of his horses," which is to say the least pleonastic.

Verses 16b, 17, which are here (p. 64) omitted as probably a later insertion are rendered on p. 201 as follows:

He comes, he devours the land and her fullness  
 The cities and her dwellers.  
 For behold, I am sending upon you  
 Basilisk-serpents  
 Against whom availeth no charm  
 But they shall bite you.

These verses are found in both Hebrew and Greek and a footnote says regarding the tense of the verbs of the first line, "So Greek," despite the fact that the Hebrew might also be so rendered. At the end a note is added: "Hebrew adds *Rede of the Lord*." Why not say, "Greek omits"?

Verse 18. *For that this grief*, etc. Pg. 201 this verse is rendered:

Ah! That my grief is past comfort  
 Faints on me my heart,

and there the footnote to the first line reads: "After the Greek. Hebrew is hopeless," a considerably stronger statement than "This line is uncertain." Whether the Hebrew is "hopeless" or not, Professor Smith has not followed the Greek. How he can get his rendering of verse 18 out of *ἀντάρτα μετ' ὀδύνης*, which certainly seems to mean "(they shall bite you) unhealably with pain," it is difficult to see. And he might at least point out that "sickens my heart upon me" follows the Hebrew as against Greek *καρδίας ὑμῶν ἀπορουμένης*. Furthermore we will do well to consider Professor Smith's words "Hebrew hopeless" in the light of the following statement: "And in all this textual criticism we must keep in mind, that the obscurity of the present text of a verse, so far from being an adequate proof of its subsequent insertion, may be the very token of its antiquity scribes or translators having been unable to understand it" (*The Twelve*, Vol. I., p. 142). Perhaps it is not the Hebrew which is hopeless, but our knowledge of the Hebrew which is inadequate to solve the difficulties of this verse.

Verse 19. *Hark to the cry of my people*. Pg. 201 it is more accurately rendered "Lo, hark," etc., following the Hebrew and Greek. Both Hebrew and Greek also read "cry of *the daughter of my people*." Professor Smith makes no mention of this fact, but shortens the verse arbitrarily for the sake of the metre. But in the line *Is there no King there?* he points out that he follows the Greek as against Hebrew: "Is not her King in her?" Pg. 201, the line is rendered "Is there no King?" and the footnote "So Greek" is added despite the fact that the Greek says "Is there no king *there* (*ἵε ἐκ*). Just why he should call special attention to the Greek which may represent only a slightly different reading of the Hebrew is not clear. The rest of verse 19, "Why have they provoked me to anger with their graven images, and with strange vanities?" is

omitted despite the fact that it is found in both Hebrew and Greek. Pg. 201, it is allowed to remain although enclosed in brackets and the margin remarks: "The couplet seems an intrusion breaking between the two parts of the people's cry."

Verse 21, *For the breach of the Daughter of my people I break, I darken*. Here the Hebrew is followed as against the Greek, which omits "I break." *Horror hath seized me* also follows Hebrew against Greek: "In horror seized me pains as of her that beareth." But Professor Smith sees fit only to mention the fact that the Hebrew "omits" the last line, which is by no means essential to the sense.

ix. 1, *O that my head were waters*, etc. This follows the Hebrew. The Greek, "O that there were to my head water" is much weaker.<sup>5</sup> *For the slain of my people*. Both Hebrew and Greek read, "For the slain of the daughter of my people."

That the passage we have been examining is a fair example of Professor Smith's method is indicated by his treatment of chapter xxxi. Thus in verse 1 where the phrase occurs "I shall be God to all the families of Israel" a note in the margin points out that the word rendered "families" is singular in the Greek ("Greek, *family*"). This would naturally be regarded as indicating painstaking accuracy on the part of the author. But on comparing the Greek we find that it reads, not as we might expect "all the family," but simply "the family" (τῇ γένει). No mention is made of the fact that the Greek also omits the word "all."<sup>6</sup>

Verse 2 is rendered thus:

Grace have they found in the desert,  
The people escaped from the sword;  
While Israel makes for his rest from afar  
The Lord appears to him:

Here Professor Smith has followed the Hebrew throughout as against the Greek,<sup>7</sup> except in the last line where he reads "him" as against "me" of the MT. But while adding a footnote "So Greek" to call attention to this *one* instance, in which he has followed the Greek as against the Hebrew, he makes no mention of the instances in which he has followed the Hebrew as against the Greek. This cannot fail to give a reader who does not have the Hebrew and Greek before him a very erroneous im-

<sup>5</sup> Perhaps, however, the Greek should be rendered "O that it were to my head (to be) waters," which would then be the exact equivalent of the Hebrew.

<sup>6</sup> Perhaps the Greek rendering "the family" i.e. *race* is intended to cover "all the families" or *clans*. If so the Greek and Hebrew are essentially the same.

<sup>7</sup> Viz., 1.1, Gk., "heat" ( חם ) instead "grace" ( חן ); 1.2, Gk., "with those destroyed by the sword" (reading probably שרר instead of שר; 1.3, Gk., "go ye and destroy not Israel;" 1.4, Greek follows Hebrew verse division "The Lord from afar appeared to him," and differs in reading "him" instead of "me."



pression as to the relative merits of the two as represented in Professor Smith's rendering.

Verse 7, it is pointed out regarding the rendering "The Lord hath saved His people" that the Greek and Targum are followed ("So Greek and Targum"). The Hebrew has "Lord, save Thy people." And regarding the first part of verse 9,

With weeping forth did they go,  
With consolations I bring them.

we are told twice that the Greek is followed. But no mention is made of the fact that in verse 8 the Hebrew is followed as against the Greek.

Behold from the North I bring them,  
And gather from the ends of the earth;  
Their blind and their lame together,  
The mother-to-be and her who hath borne  
In concourse great back they come together.

Except that the Hebrew has "land of the North" Professor Smith follows the Hebrew fairly closely. On the other hand the LXX differs materially, "Behold I am bringing them from the North and will gather them from the end of the earth in the feast of the Passover; and thou shalt bear a great multitude and they shall return hither." The Greek text is here slightly shorter than the Hebrew (a characteristic which the critics are disposed to regard as a proof of superiority), yet Professor Smith follows the Hebrew. And while it is true that the Greek does not differ as much from the Hebrew as might be at first supposed, Professor Smith makes no mention of the fact that there is any difference and does not state that he follows the Hebrew as against the Greek. This would be more excusable if he had not three times in the

<sup>8</sup> Between "lame" (*pisse<sup>ah</sup>*) and "passover" (*pesah*) the difference is only one of pointing. As regards the phrase "in the feast of the pass-over," Professor R. D. Wilson has suggested to the writer that the Greek may have read כמער instead of the כם עור ופסח of the MT.

<sup>9</sup> The note on the phrase "unafraid at the coming of heat" (Jeremiah xvii.8) which reads, "So Greek and Vulg.; Hebrew has *he shall not see*," illustrates this. It is decidedly misleading. The text is ירא which might properly and very naturally be read "he shall not fear" (*yîra'*). The Massorettes have regarded it as a defective writing of "he shall not see" (*yir'eh* ראה). Professor Smith's quarrel is not with the Hebrew text itself (the *Kethibh*), but with the Massoretic pointing of the text (the *Qeri*). That he should have no hesitation in changing the pointing which is later by many centuries than the consonantal text, is not strange. But it is significant that he should speak of this Massoretic pointing (the *Qeri*) as "the Hebrew," reject it in favor of the Greek, and ignore the fact that the Hebrew consonantal text agrees with the Greek and is consequently supported by it. Cf. p. 328 for a similar example. Yet when the Greek is at fault he shows a tendency to apologize for it, cf pp. 220, 269, 287.

immediate context called attention to his preference for the Greek as against the Hebrew.

It is difficult to avoid the impression that the disparaging attitude taken by Professor Smith toward the Hebrew is intended to make the impression upon the reader that the Hebrew text is quite corrupt and unreliable,<sup>9</sup> and that he is abundantly justified in making such changes as he sees fit, without being under the necessity of proving his right to do so. That these changes are very frequently made for metrical reasons seems plain. Professor Smith is clearly very desirous to restore what he believes to have been the original metres in which many of Jeremiah's utterances were cast. He does not indeed hold that all of Jeremiah's utterances were in metre. On the contrary he is strongly opposed to the extreme view of Duhm who would reduce the genuine utterances of Jeremiah to "some sixty short poems in a uniform measure" (p. 40). Consequently he is not obliged either to reject as much of the book as does Duhm as non-Jeremian, or to attempt to "restore" ordinary prose or rhythmic prose to a metrical form in order to save it for Jeremiah, or to regard all irregularity of metre as indicative of textual corruption. But all the same the tendency is strongly manifest to attach great importance to metrics and to make changes in the text whenever metrical considerations favor this. Believing as Professor Smith does that Jeremiah used prose as well as verse, that in writing verse he made use of more than one metre, that as an Oriental he would have "an aversion to absolute symmetry" (p. 35) he cannot well afford to attach much significance to metrics as a tool for the textual critic; and yet the samples which we have given indicate that he makes very extensive use of it and feels justified in introducing radical changes in the text largely if not solely because of it.

The whole subject of Hebrew metrics is a particularly thorny subject for the student of the Old Testament. It is only within the lifetime of scholars of Professor Smith's generation—Julius Levy's epoch-making *Grundzüge* appeared in 1875—that we have attained to anything like a clear understanding of it. It is perfectly clear that as Professor Smith points out there is in Hebrew poetry a parallelism or balance, first of thought, and then of metrical phrasing, a rhythm produced by "the observing of a varying proportion between stressed or heavily accented syllables and unstressed" (p. 33). But when the question comes up as to

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<sup>10</sup> xv. 110 is an instructive instance. A fenced brazen wall" (AV) is rendered "an impassable wall" (p. 325). The margin tells us: "Omit *of bronze* for the metre's sake; it is a copyist's error of 1, 18. Cornill omits impassable instead". Here the Hebrew has *two* words, where the metre, according to Professor Smith can admit only *one*. The two-word reading is supported by Greek, Vulgate, Targum, Syriac, and Arabic. But this does not deter Professor Smith from saying that it *is* a copyist's error. Yet he rather naïvely points out that Professor Cornill omits the word which he retains and retains the word which he omits. This would seem to indicate some uncertainty as to which is the copyist's error.

the exact nature of the balance in thought, the requirements of the balance in rhythm, the differences at once emerge. Some scholars like Duhm and Rothstein insist that the metrical laws in Hebrew poetry are very rigid; and they regard every variation from what they consider the correct metre, to be an indication of a corrupt text. To them metrics is primarily a "tool" of the critic; its chief value is as a means to the restoring or correcting of the text.

An obvious objection to such a method as that of Duhm and Rothstein is that it is based upon three unproved assumptions: that Hebrew poetry employs only uniform metres, that these metres are now sufficiently clearly understood to make them the basis of a revision of the text, and that the difference between poetry and prose is so clear that there can be no reasonable doubt that a given passage is poetic in form. Each one of these positions is as we have said improved.

Thus, the line of demarcation between poetry and prose is not clear. As an illustration of this we cite the first part of the story of Joseph (Gen. xxxvii.2-35). In Kittel's *Biblia Hebraica* (1913) this is treated as simple prose. In the following year Erich Weber published a metrical arrangement of this passage, arrived at by means of a process of liberal textual editing. This was not particularly remarkable in itself and the methods were not more drastic than those adopted by others. But he endeavored to analyze it on the basis of metrics into two recensions of the story, the one written in three accent, the other in four accent metre. It is interesting to note that this metrical analysis does not agree with the documentary analysis (J E) as generally accepted by the critics. Consequently Weber made only very casual reference to the latter. Had it been closely agreed with the J E analysis, it undoubtedly would have been widely acclaimed as a striking confirmation of the documentary hypothesis.

Turning again to the *Biblia Hebraica* we notice that the chapter containing the long prayer offered by Solomon at the Dedication of the Temple is printed almost entirely as prose. But in verse 12-13 Professor Kittel identifies a poem which we may render as follows:

[(Though) the sún hath established in héaven] Jehóvah,  
He hath sâid in dárkness thick he would dwéll;  
I have cértainly built thee a résidence hóuse  
A pláce for thy dwélling foréver.

The words "(Though) the sun hath established in heaven" do not occur in the MT, the Targum of Onkelos, the Vulgate, the Peshitto. They are not found in Codices A & B of the LXX. They are apparently supplied largely, if not wholly, conjecturally. Yet there are other verses in Solomon's prayer which with a little revision could be reset in metrical form; the simple reason being that the tendency toward balance in thought and diction is noticeable even in ordinary prose and becomes at times very marked when the words are expressive of lofty emotion. For example verse 8. can be arranged metrically although it is clearly simple prose.

Naught was in the ark save two tables of stone  
 Which Moses placed there at Horeb  
 When the Lord covenanted with the children of Israel  
 When they went out from the land of Egypt.

Similarly, verse 21. shows a certain rhythm:

And I put there a place for the ark  
 Which the covenant of the Lord was there  
 Which he made with our fathers  
 When he brought them from the land of Egypt.

Professor Kittel makes no effort to find poetical passages in the book of Ruth. But Ruth's immortal words to Naomi show balance and rhythm to no slight degree:

Urge me not to leave thee,  
 To return from following thee  
 For whither thou goest, I go  
 And where thou lodgest I lodge  
 Thy people my people  
 And thy god my god.  
 Where thou dies, I die  
 And there buried I'll be.  
 So do the Lord to me  
 And so increase may he  
 If death separation make  
 Between me and between thee.

This is the language of lofty emotion. The presence of balance and rhythm is unmistakable. It is fully as poetic as Nathan's parable of the Rich Man and the Poor Man. Yet Professor Kittel treats the one as simple prose the other as a decidedly halting kind of verse. Is it because he feels a prophet should express himself in verse, but this is too much to expect of an ignorant Moabitess?

The reader will think perhaps that the passages we have just cited as examples of rhythmic or balanced *prose* are aside from the point either because they are *not* really poetry or because they *are*. We have cited them for just this reason, because they show how vague is the dividing-line between prose and poetry in Hebrew and how easy it is at times to find balance in thought and phrase in passages which are plainly prose. We have pointed out that Kittel makes Nathan's rebuke of David poetic. If mere balance and rhythm constitutes poetry then verse 15 of the same chapter begins with an excellent couplet.

And Nathan went to his house  
 And Jehovah smote the lad.

Yet it is part of a simple prose narrative. The metricist is constantly tempted to regard a prose passage as metrical, or to force a strict metre upon a passage of rhythmic prose. There is no serious objection to a metrical arrangement as such, if only it does not obscure the meaning

of a passage.<sup>11</sup> In fact it may be a very effective means of increasing the clearness and beauty of the rendering. But to venture upon textual emendation and to do this even against the testimony of the versions is as dangerous as it is arbitrary.

There is one further matter which must be mentioned before we close this discussion of the text. In considering Professor Smith's metrical versions of viii.14ff we have seen that he takes exception to the word which he renders "panic" and substitutes another word on the basis, as he tells us, of the Greek. The arbitrariness and ruthlessness of our author shows itself most clearly perhaps in such a verse as xxxi.22 f—

For the Lord hath created a new thing on earth,  
A female shall compass a man.

This couplet he encloses in brackets, as suspicious. In the margin we read: "*Compass* or *change to* (?). This couplet has been the despair of commentators. Its exilic terms, *created* and *female*, relieve us of it." In this wise the critic brushes aside difficulties which generations of reverent scholars have patiently sought to solve. But the method of the critic is as unsound as it is arbitrary. It is not true even from the standpoint of the critics that "create" is an "exilic term." It is found in Deuteronomy (iv.32 D) and in Amos (iv.13), which should be pre-exilic. It is also found frequently in Isaiah xl ff. and in P (not to mention other passages) which are exilic or post-exilic only because the critics are determined to have it so. "Female" is also not obviously an "exilic term." It is found of course in P, but it also occurs Genesis vii.3, 9, in J (or J<sup>2</sup>) and only preserves its standing as an exilic word (Aramaism?) by being treated as a gloss. In verse 16 of the same chapter it is only saved for P by mutilating the verse. Yet Professor Smith calmly assumes that these words are exilic and in this way avoids the necessity of attempting a serious explanation of a much discussed verse.<sup>12</sup>

Now it would be different if Professor Smith were never guilty of the violation of critical canons himself. But in reality he is a grievous sinner in the matter of diction. In his translations of Jeremiah's verse he uses such words as the following: sans care, remede, fere, falsing, bruit, eke, keening, healless, condolement, staith, wight, rede, no one of which is in common use in the English of today, and most of which

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<sup>11</sup> In 1848 James Nourse published his *Paragraph Bible* in which large sections of the prophets were printed as blank verses. He used the *Authorized Version* and made no changes in it. The book is of interest as a proof that many of the changes introduced by the critics are unnecessary even from the standpoint of the metricist, unless he is prepared to insist in imposing certain definite and stereotyped metres upon this or that portion of the text, regardless of the difficulties it may involve.

<sup>12</sup> Similarly he insists that "Jacob" as the name of the nation is indicative of "the end of the Exile" (p. 300); and describes "holy mount" as a "late term" (p. 306).



are listed in *Murray's Dictionary* as *archaic* or *obsolete*. The use of sans in such hybrid combinations as "sans care" is described as "Shakespearean." "Keening" is derived from "keen" the name of the "Irish lament for the dead." "Wight" as used of a hero (the etymological meaning of נַחַשׁ) is Chaucerian; the word is now generally used with the opposite connotation of weak, unfortunate, hapless. But the best example is "rede." The expression "saith the Lord" (נֹאמַר יְהוָה) is a common one with the prophets. We find it most frequently in Jeremiah and Ezekiel, but also in Isaiah, Hosea, Amos, Micah, etc., i.e. in all the *great* prophets as the critics regard them. Now in his *Isaiah* (1889-90) and in *The Book of the Twelve* (1896) Professor Smith renders this phrase by "oracle of Jehovah," or by "saith the Lord." But here in the *Jeremiah* it is translated "rede of the Lord." This seems to be the uniform rendering here and it occurs some 50 times. Of the word "rede" Murray says: "The word is very frequent in O E. and early M E., and remained in literary use till the beginning of the 17th century. After that date it is rarely found until revived in archaic and poetic diction in the 19th century." If we were to apply to Professor Smith's lectures on Jeremiah the same canons which he insists on applying to the Book of Jeremiah, it would be easy to argue that the *Jeremiah* cannot be by the author of the *Isaiah*. Surely a Biblical exegete who in 1889 rendered אָמַר by "oracle" would not change to "rede" in 1922. Consequently if the *Isaiah* is by Rev. G. A. Smith, the *Jeremiah* must be by pseudo-Smith. The use of archaic and obsolete words points to an early date; and the use of the word "keening" points, if Murray's standard work can be relied upon, to an Irishman rather than a Scotchman as the author, to Belfast rather than Glasgow-Aberdeen as the provenance.

Absurd! the reader will say, perfectly absurd to speak of "pseudo-Smith." Nothing is more certain than that the book was written by the Very Reverend Sir George Adam Smith, D.D., LL.D., Principal of Aberdeen University. Of course it would be absurd. But it would be no more absurd than to argue as the critics do, as Dr. Smith does, for or against the genuineness of a verse or passage in the Book of Jeremiah on the basis of a single word or phrase the history of which they know if at all only very imperfectly. Professor Smith as a translator permits himself the use of rare and obsolete words, of peculiar almost ungrammatical phrases, such as "thy follow of Me," "the wherefore," in order to keep close to the thought and metre of the original. But he holds Jeremiah very strictly to account for his use of language and with an assurance which is simply amazing professes to tell us exactly what Jeremiah could have said and what he could not have said. The situation would be amusing were it not so tragically serious. Professor Smith has an unusual mastery of English. His vocabulary is very copious. He can take liberties which one less skilful would hesitate to venture upon. We would think then that he might allow to Jeremiah in the use of his native Hebrew something of the liberty which he claims for himself in the use of his native English. But he does not.

O. T. A.

## NOTES AND NOTICES

### THE WORDS FOR "KINGDOM" IN THE OLD TESTAMENT

In Dr. Driver's *Literature of the Old Testament*, it is said<sup>1</sup> that "In order properly to estimate the *Hebrew* of Daniel, it must be borne in mind that the great turning point in Hebrew style falls in the age of *Nehemiah*." The Hebrew of Daniel resembles that of Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther and Ecclesiastes; and Dr. Driver cites a number of words and phrases which are found in two or more of these books with the intention of showing that they prove all of these works (except parts of Ezra and Nehemiah) to have been written subsequent to Nehemiah, and hence that Daniel cannot have been written in the sixth century B.C.<sup>2</sup> In this note I shall treat of the first of these words and phrases, endeavoring to show that the use of them by Daniel does not prove that Daniel was written subsequent to Nehemiah.

The evidence is stated in *The Literature of the Old Testament* (p. 506) as follows: "מַלְכוּת i. 1, 20; ii. 1; viii. 1, 22, 23; ix, 1; x. 13; xi. 2, 4, 9, 17, 21, as regularly in Ezra, Chronicles, Esther.<sup>3</sup> The phrase in i. 1; ii. 1; viii. 1 . . . בִּשְׁנַת מַלְכוּת שְׁלוֹשׁ, as 1 Ch. xxvi. 31; 2 Ch. xv. 10, 19; xvi. 1; xxxv. 19; the earlier language, in similar sentences (Kings, *passim*), dispenses with מַלְכוּת."

The question is, Can this word<sup>4</sup> and this phrase<sup>5</sup> have been used by an author living at Babylon in the latter part of the sixth century B.C.?

I. Before entering upon the discussion of the words for "kingdom" *mamlākhā*, *mal'ekhûth*, *m'elûkha* (abbreviated M<sup>1</sup>, M<sup>2</sup>, M<sup>3</sup>) we shall give a table showing the number of times that they occur in the books of the Old Testament and in Ecclesiasticus:

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 504 f.

<sup>2</sup> As only three of these words or phrases are found in Ecclesiastes, we shall omit this book from the present discussion.

<sup>3</sup> A footnote in LOT at this point refers to p. 536, No. 9 of that volume.

<sup>4</sup> I.e., *malekhuth* instead of *mamlakha*, which is the common word in the literature before 550 B.C.

<sup>5</sup> I.e., "in the year three to the reign of." The earlier literature dispenses with *reign of*.

	M <sup>1</sup>	M <sup>2</sup>	M <sup>3</sup>		M <sup>1</sup>	M <sup>2</sup>	M <sup>3</sup>
Gen.	2	—	—	Lam.	1	—	—
Exod.	1	—	—	Ezek.	4	—	2
Num.	2	1	—	Amos	3	—	—
Deut.	7	—	—	Obad	—	—	1
Jos.	2	—	—	Micah	1	—	—
J	1	—	—	Nahum	1	—	—
E	2	—	—	Zeph.	1	—	—
JE	1	1	—	Hag.	2	—	—
D	7	—	—	1 Chron.	3	11	1
D <sup>2</sup>	1	—	—	2 Chron.	19	17	—
P	2	—	—	Ezra	1	6	—
Hexateuch	14	1	—	Neh.	1	2	—
Sam.	12	1	7	Esther	—	26	—
Kings	17	1	8	Dan.	—	16	1
Isa. 1st Part	11	—	1	Eccles.	—	1	—
Isa. 2nd Part	2	—	1	Pss.	6	6	1
Jer.	17	3	1	Ecclus.	2	2	—

Besides these three words, a fourth *maml<sup>e</sup>khûth* occurs in Joshua xiii. 12, 21, 27, 30, 31, 1 Sam. xv. 28, 2 Sam. xvi. 3, Jer. xxvi. 1 and Hos. i. 4. It will be seen that the books written before 550 B.C. have *mamlākhā* 84 times, *mal<sup>e</sup>khûth* 6 times, and *m<sup>e</sup>lûkhā* 21 times; as against 24, 78 and 2 times, respectively, for the books written after 550 B.C.; that the books of disputed date have the three words respectively 8 times, 7 times and once; and that the fourth word is found only in the earlier literature. There is no doubt, then, that the earlier writers preferred to use the concrete terms denoting "the place ruled over" and "the place where one rules" to the abstract word for rule or government; nor, that the later writers except in the second book of Chronicles had a decided preference for the abstract term. In fact the writers of Esther and Daniel never use the common concrete term at all and it is found but once each in Ezra and Nehemiah.

To what ideas, or circumstances, are we to attribute this marked change in nomenclature? It does not explain anything to say that it occurred after the time of Nehemiah, nor is this in harmony with the facts. For Ben Sira, who wrote about 180 B.C., employs *mamlākhā* as often as *mal<sup>e</sup>khûth*, the former as concrete and the latter as abstract; and the second book of Chronicles has the concrete word 19 times and the abstract 17 times and in the so-called Maccabean Psalms lxxix, cii and cxxxv the concrete term is used but not the abstract.<sup>6</sup> In all of

<sup>6</sup> The Hebrew version of the Aramaic of Daniel, found in Kennicott MS 240, renders the plural of the Aramaic word by the plural of מַמְלָכָה. The MS in which this Hebrew version occurs appears to be dated as from the year A.D. 1327.

these works the distinction between the senses of the two words is for the most part clearly discernible.

It is noteworthy, also, that the Chronicles, in describing events that transpired before the captivity, even in the parts that are not parallel to anything in the books of Samuel and Kings, uses the concrete term 17 times. It follows, therefore, that the common employment of the abstract instead of the concrete term in the late documents was due to radical changes which had taken place, not in the Hebrew language itself, but in the ideas which lay back of the language in which the ideas were expressed. The matter under discussion, then, is at what time did the change in ideas take place. And it seems to me, that the most probable time for the change was in the sixth century B.C. For it was then that the Egyptians, Babylonians, and Persians, were contending for the hegemony of Western Asia, and no one of these great dominating nations had in its language a concrete word for kingdom.<sup>7</sup> They all spoke of a king as exercising lordship, or kingship, over a city, or land, or the lands. This will appear clearly to anyone who will read Breasted's *Egypt* or the Tel-el-Amarna Letters, or the inscriptions of the Assyrian, Babylonian, and Persian kings, in any of the excellent translations now before us.

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<sup>7</sup> The ancient Egyptian word for *rule* was *sutenit*, an abstract formed from *suten* "king" by adding the feminine ending (Erman, *Aegyptische Grammatik*, p. 95; Budge, *Egyptian Reading Book*, p. 40); and in Coptic we find the abstract word *metouro*. In Assyrian and Babylonian we find a number of words ending in *utu* to denote lordship and kingship such as *enûtu*, *belûtu*, *malûtu*, and *sharrûtu*. This last word, which corresponds to the Hebrew *malekhûth* is found in the inscriptions hundreds of times in the abstract sense of rule, kingship, etc., and only seldom in the concrete sense, as possibly in Tel-el-Amarna letter xxxvii. 6, 8. In ancient Persian, also, no word for kingdom has been found though the abstract word for rule *Kšathra* derived from the word for king occurs in Behistun § 4. In Phenician the word מַמְלָכָה is used in the sense of *royal person* (Lidzbarski, *Nordsemitische Epigraphik*, p. 310). In Ethiopic, we find *neges* "regimen," and *mangeset* "regnum" or "*potestas regia*." In the Sabean and Minean inscriptions, no word for kingdom has been found; but the more modern Arabic, from the seventh century A.D. on, has *mulk* "royal dignity," *malakat* "royalty," *mamlakat* "royaume" and "royauté" and *malakut* "royaume" and "royauté" (the last derived from the Aramaic). In the Aramaic, one word only is found and this an abstract just as in Egyptian, Babylonian, and Persian: to wit,



It follows from all this that a writer like Daniel, who was educated at Babylon in all the languages and literatures of that city of wise men, in that city over which the great kings Nebuchadnezzar and Cyrus exercised their kingship, would naturally express himself after the way of thinking (the *Denkungsart*) of that eminent centre of learning and statecraft. It follows, also, that Ezra and the writer of Esther would naturally pursue the same manner of expression. It is not necessary to suppose that the use of the abstract for the concrete word for kingdom was a mere matter of chance. It was a result of a change in circumstances and conditions that arose during the political cataclysms of the sixth century. There is, therefore, absolutely no evidence in the use of the abstract word *mal'ekhûth* in Daniel, Ezra, and Nehemiah, that they were written after the time of Nehemiah. This proof (*sic!*) of the lateness of the book of Daniel should be erased from the *Literature of the Old Testament*, page 506; for, like all other *alleged* proofs brought forward by the assailants of the historicity of the Scriptures, it is found in the light of wider knowledge to be a vain figment of the critics' imagination.

II. Nor has *Literature of the Old Testament* a better proof of the late date of Daniel in the phrase "in the year X to (ב) the rule of Y." As far as the use of "to" (ב) in dates is concerned, it occurs already in Num. xxxiii. 38; 1 Kings xv. 25, 28, 33; xvi. 8, 10, 15, 23, 29; xxii. 41, 52; 2 Kings i. 17; iii. 1; viii. 16, 25; ix. 29; xii. 2, 7; xiii. 1, 10; xiv. 1, 23; xv. 1, 8, 13, 17, 23, 27, 30, 32; xvi. 1; xvii. 1, 6; xviii. 1, 10; xxiv. 12; xxv. 1, 27; Jer. xxviii. 2; xxxii. 1, xlvi. 2; li. 59; lii. 28, 29, 30, 31. So that its use in the early literature before the time of Cyrus is fully established, and in exactly the same way we find it used in later literature as in Dan. i. 21; vii. 1; ix. 2; x. 1; xi. 1; and in Ezra i. 1; vi. 3; vii. 7; Neh. ii. 1; xiii. 6; 2 Ch. xvi. 13; xvii. 7; xxix. 3; xxxiv. 3, 8; xxxvi. 22; Hag. i. 1, 15; ii. 10, and Zech. i. 1, 7; vii. 1; Es. i. 3.

The only question, then, is whether the date of a document

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the word *mal'ekhûth*. Hebrew, as we have seen above, has four words *melûkha*, and *mamlākhā* "royaume," *mal'ekhûth* "royauté" or "royaume" and an abstract form *maml'ekhûth* formed from the concrete *mamlākhā*. It will thus be evident that in pre-Christian documents it is in Hebrew alone that a concrete word for kingdom is found.



can be determined by the use of the whole phrase "in the year X to the reign of Y." But since the whole phrase is found in the Scriptures outside of Daniel only in Chronicles and Esther, whose date also is disputed, we are driven to seek in documents outside the Scripture for any evidence of its use, which might help us to fix approximately its date. Where, then, is the extra-biblical evidence to be found? It will do us no good to look in the Aramaic Targums for they were not written till A.D. 200 at the earliest. Besides, the versions were influenced by the original and not the original by the versions. Nor will the Syriac version help us. For it is not earlier probably than A.D. 200 and besides it frequently renders the "to" (ל) by "of" (ד). Nor will the Hebrew of Ecclesiasticus or of the Zadokite Fragments help us; for they have no such phrase and the latter never use any work for kingdom.

As to the inscriptions and papyri, the Babylonian inscriptions use always the phrase "the year X (of) Y." The Phenicians wrote "the year X to Y" except in that of Eshmunazar (c. 300 B.C.), where we have "in the year 14 to the reigning (מלכי) of King Eshmunazar" and in the Idalium inscription from 391 B.C., where we have "in the year 2 of my reigning (למלכי)." The Palmyrenes always date from the era of the Greeks, using simply "year (of) X."<sup>9</sup> The Nabateans always say "the year X to Y." The Egyptian papyri commonly have "the year (of) Y," though the oldest of all, from the year 495 B.C., has "the 27th year of (ל) Darius the king."<sup>11</sup>

We thus see that there is absolutely no evidence either in or out of the Biblical text for the statement on page 506 of *The Literature of the Old Testament* that the employment of the phrase "in the year of the reign of X" is a proof of the post-Nehemian date of Daniel, or indeed of any other document of the Holy Scriptures.

Princeton.

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<sup>8</sup> As in 2 Kings i. 17, viii. 16, xii. 2, xv. 22, xxiv. 2, xxv. 1.

<sup>9</sup> Lidzbarski, *Nordsemitische Epigraphik*, pp. 417, 421.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. p. 457 ff.

<sup>11</sup> It might be stated, also, that the Arabic version in Walton renders the ל by *min* and not by ל.

# REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

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## PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE

*The Psychology of Religion.* By W. B. SELBIE, M.A., D.D., Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford. Wilde Lecturer in Natural and Comparative Religion. New York: Oxford University Press, American Branch. 1924. Pp. xii + 310. Price \$4.20.

The Bishop of Gloucester informs us in the introduction that this volume is the first of a series to be published by the Clarendon Press for the use of "Theological Students and of others who are anxious for wise and sober instruction on questions of Religion and Theology." He then further informs us that "psychology and especially psychology in relation to religion, like most new subjects, makes somewhat extravagant claims, and professes to do a good deal which it does not succeed in accomplishing." This may be granted, but the next few sentences of the good Bishop are disquieting: "It [*i.e.*, psychology in relation to religion] is obviously destitute of any sound scientific principles. It exhibits remarkable variations and innovations which can hardly claim the name of progress, and it causes considerable perplexity and misgivings amongst those who are intimidated by the latest novelty." Now Dr. Selbie in his part of the preface thanks the Bishop "for his kindness in reading the MSS., and for some valuable suggestions"; and the query at once arises, Did the Bishop write his opinion of psychology of religion before or after his perusal of this volume?

For this is a disappointing book although to be sure it is very well written and exceedingly interesting. The author gives us a surprising amount of information on the following topics: the Religious Consciousness; the Unconscious; Cult and Worship; Belief in God; Religion in the Individual, in Society, in Childhood and in Adolescence; Conversion; Prayer; Sin and Repentance; Mysticism; Immortality; and as introduction and conclusion, the Psychological Approach to Religion, and the "New" [*i.e.*, the Freudian] Psychology and Religion. Any student who reads attentively and follows out the unusually well selected reference lists printed at the close of each chapter cannot fail to gain an accurate and ample knowledge of contemporary opinion upon the psychology of religion. These excellencies—and they are great—may be granted, and yet the book fails in the following respects:

First, it does not advance beyond the previous works on the subject. We are all familiar with that mixture of anthropology, comparative religion, sociology, philology, and philosophy of religion, which has been served up to us by such writers as Culten, Ames, Leuba, and Coe, and called "psychology" of religion. But surely psychology [the Bishop of Gloucester to the contrary notwithstanding] has by this time defined its field clearly enough to prevent any new writer from repeating the

work of "the times of this ignorance" at which perforce we had to wink. Yet Dr. Selbie has continued the same uncritical mixing.

Second, there is no explanation of the meaning we are to attach to the word psychology. The "New" psychology of the psychoanalysts is decisively rejected, but the author does not tell us what he thinks of the structural, the functional, the behavioristic, and the other psychological tendencies of the day. He does not clearly define his psychological terms, and for this reason he is unable to carry out the task he sets for himself "to investigate the workings of the human mind under the influence of religious ideas and impulses, and to describe and coordinate religious phenomena and practices in all their vast variety" (p. 14).

Third, the concept of evolution Dr. Selbie employs is more and more proving inadequate for the scientific determination of the phenomena he wishes to describe. He himself confesses that "Our knowledge of primitive man, so called, is no doubt very imperfect and contains a large speculative element. We have no right to argue about Congo pygmies or Australian bushmen as though they represented the earliest childhood of the race" (p. 30), and that "it is quite true that we know but little of the mentality of primitive races" (p. 152); but, nevertheless, everywhere in his book he cannot complete his description of any religious complex without recourse to this speculative "primitive." Belief in God is the evolution of the reaction of "primitive man" to the dimly understood powers of the environment; prayer is the development of spell and magic (p. 217); conversion is "beyond all question a phenomenon of adolescence" (p. 192), and "a normal feature of religious experience" (p. 205), incomprehensible unless we parallel it with the degenerate initiation rites of naked savages, who (in spite of the author's disclaimers already quoted) are replicas of our ancestors from whom we derive the capacities that are the outcome of the "age-long working of faculties and instincts which we share with the animal creation" (p. 232). We could multiply illustrations, but let these suffice to demonstrate the inadequacy of an uncritical transfer of biological concepts to fields where, because they are beyond scientific testing, they merely introduce confusion.

The volume is also filled with statements for which no proof is given; and manifest contradictions. Examples of the former are: that those whose emotional nature is strongly developed are therefore presumably more subject to influences from the subliminal (p. 86); that the down-and-outs converted in the Water Street Mission in New York are always those who had been under religious influences in their childhood (p. 87); that "it is quite possible to be soundly converted according to all the accepted standards and yet to remain censorious, uncharitable, and mean to a degree that is quite incompatible with any really Christian interpretation of conduct" (p. 198); that "among some more extreme Protestant sects, a high degree of religious fervour and devotion is found to be quite compatible with a most un-Christian callousness to suffering and a very low standard of commercial morality" (p. 243). Examples of contradictions are: we are advised (pp. 41, 95, and 168), "that man's earliest experiences of the universe convinced him that things are not what

they seem," yet assured elsewhere (p. 114), "At first men believe easily and upon any kind of evidence. Things are held to be what they seem . . ."; pragmatism is criticised as not "the sole criterion of truth" (p. 118) and we are told that even when used the whole process of applying it is an intellectual process; but (p. 301) we are assured that the ultimate test of the trustworthiness of the religious consciousness is "the pragmatic one of the workableness of the result arrived at. Our interpretation of the universe must work or we abandon it;" we are told (pp. 166 and 171) that "the young child is simply a young animal," but surely no one who really knew and loved the "bairns" could say so. We are glad, therefore, to note that Dr. Selbie says elsewhere (p. 225) that "there is a profound truth in the words, 'Except ye become as little children ye cannot see the Kingdom of God.'" But we feel sure that this "profound truth" was not that we were to become "young animals."

In conclusion it is a regret that a book written for theological students should make so little of historical Christianity and its psychological processes. Surely this would have been as worth while presenting as the practices of pagans and the opinion of professed atheists like Leuba, Freud, Tansley, and Jung. But when the concept of the miraculous and the supernatural disappears in that of a God immanent in natural law (p. 196); when belief in the Bible as "the very word of God" is due to distrust of one's reasoning processes (p. 123); when the Pauline ideas of "predestination and election are now repudiated by the general moral sense of mankind" (p. 240); when it is only *probable* "that Christ's teaching originated a view of human personality very different from that held by pagan thinkers generally" (p. 133); when the "stimulus" of religion is "that which will secure the conservation of socially recognized values" (p. 294); when "the phenomena of Pentecost are but one example of (a) form of spiritual excitation, (that) has many parallels in the religious and initiation practices of primitive and savage peoples" (p. 204); is it any wonder that the glory and uniqueness of Christianity disappear submerged in the analogy with the secular?

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GEORGE JOHNSON.

*Conservatism, Radicalism, and Scientific Method: An Essay on Social Attitudes.* By A. B. WOLFE, Professor of Economics, Ohio State University. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1923. Pp. 333, Preface, Bibliography, and Index.

This volume contains a study in the field of social psychology and social ethics by one whose specialty is the field of economics. Such bearing as it has for religion and theology is indirect, not direct; and yet, if the position advocated in this book is tenable, it would be difficult to exaggerate the significance of its import for religious thought and life. To be more explicit, as the title indicates, Professor Wolfe has presented us with a study of the sources, characteristics, and socio-ethical bearing of the social attitudes indicated by the words, conservative, radical, scientific.

An attitude is defined as "the *type* of sentiment which the individual



manifests upon the recurrence of a given situation," as "behaviour-patterns with reference especially to the 'feeling' side of response" (p. 9). Their social importance arises from the fact that "an individual characterized by a given attitude will meet and evaluate a given situation in a way typical to the attitude and predictable from it" (p. 201). The attitude of men in general is either that of the conservative or that of the radical. This does not mean that it is possible to draw sharp lines of distinction in this connection. The scale of attitudes which different men take is compared to the solar spectrum. "At the opposite ends stand extreme radicalism and uncompromising reaction. Between these extremes are conservatism and liberalism, or progressivism, each with its various degrees of intensity and its shading into the adjacent attitudes. Thus the attitudinal spectrum reads, from left to right, radicalism, liberalism or progressivism, conservatism, reactionism" (p. 11). By conservatism Professor Wolfe means that attitude which causes the individual to approve of things-as-they-are and to oppose with vigor any proposal for radical transformation: by radicalism he means that attitude which causes the individual to be dissatisfied with the existing *status quo* and to advocate a speedy, thorough-going and more or less extensive innovative reform or revolution of the social order. Nearly two-thirds of the book is devoted to the study of the origin, characteristics, motivation, and methods of conservatism and radicalism.

Professor Wolfe's discussion of conservatism and radicalism is both informing and thought-provoking. While he makes many ill-guarded, even foolish statements, yet he also says much that needs to be said and that should be taken into consideration by thoughtful men everywhere. He is much more in sympathy with radicalism than conservatism. His main purpose in criticising both conservatism and radicalism, however, is to prepare the way for commending what he calls the scientific attitude and the scientific method as the only hopeful solution of the social issues—central to which it is constantly maintained is the conflict of economic interests. A considerable part of his discussion of "scientific method and scientific attitude" deals with the problem of fundamental ethical norms, both of ends and means, especially the psychological basis for an objective ethical norm. In this connection our author commends what he calls "the broader selfishness"—a selfishness that implies an individualism of ends but a coöperation or sociality of means and that involves a democracy of opportunity.

Professor Wolfe's interests are primarily social and his objective the bringing about of a "Great Society" that will be safe and productive of a life worth while for all its members. The two main prerequisites to the realization of this objective, according to him, are (1) adequate knowledge and (2) the general adoption of the scientific attitude and the employment of the scientific method. We have no quarrel with his demand for more adequate knowledge. Still further we are in verbal agreement with him in his plea for the adoption of the scientific attitude and the use of the scientific method. But here our agreement stops, be-



cause, according to Professor Wolfe, we must adopt a deterministic philosophy and a behavioristic psychology before we can attain to a scientific attitude and employ a scientific method. He thus writes:

"The application of scientific *method* to the investigation of social problems, and to the solution of social issues and conflicts, is conditioned on the acquirement of the scientific *attitude*. It must be firmly borne in upon us that the scientific attitude rests upon one, and only one, fundamental article of faith—faith in the universality of cause and effect. Without this faith, a steady, undaunted pursuit of scientific knowledge as a guide to action may be incontinently flouted whenever it interferes with special interest or prejudices. . . . Science, in other words, is deterministic—must be so. No one who does not become a thoroughgoing determinist can ever completely acquire the scientific attitude. One who is able to take a scientific point of view sees the universe as a mechanism. A mechanism is an inter-relation of causes and effects. It is something we can analyze. We can understand its processes, and in a measure control them to our own purposes. Of nothing else, were anything else scientifically conceivable, is this true. . . . The mechanistic conception of the universe, including human activity and social relations, leaves no room for 'explanation' of phenomena by reference to mystical or metaphysical entities, nor for the time-honored idea of the freedom of the will. Psychologists have practically ceased to have any interest in the old dispute over free will and determinism, partly, no doubt, because the phrase free will can be made to mean anything or nothing, but mainly because psychology, becoming scientific, necessarily becomes thoroughly deterministic. . . . A very essential prerequisite to the scientific study of social relations and processes is a well developed objective, scientific psychology. . . . Such a psychology—the mechanistic psychology of behaviour—is now in process of rapid development. Its methods and postulates aim to be scientific in the fundamental sense. It regards the human individual as a mechanism, and the key to its understanding an objective analysis of the mechanism of stimulus and response, from the simplest to the most complex aspects of that process. . . . We may be permitted to point out again that the more thoroughly we see the truth of this mechanistic theory of life, and the more we know about the causation of human conduct, the less room we have for personalistic praise-and-blame attitudes. The thoroughly scientific position leaves no room for praise, blame, or punishment, if by punishment we mean any element of revenge and not simply the sort of stimuli which act as deterrents on socially undesirable conduct. Praise and blame may be used as methods of influencing behaviour, but for any other purpose or in any other sense science has no place for 'moral responsibility' or 'moral desert' " (pp. 215-219).

This passage not only indicates Professor Wolfe's point of view but supplies a sufficient refutation, it seems to us, of the solution of the social issue that he offers. In a word, the scientific attitude and the scientific method that our author commends is rooted in science falsely so-called. His criticism and appraisal of conservatism and radicalism is interesting and suggestive, but it is vitiated throughout by his false and inadequate conception of science and philosophy. Further and as a consequent, it cannot be supposed that any permanent significance attaches to the conclusions he draws as to the method by which better social conditions may be attained.

While the point of view from which this book approaches social and ethical questions is sufficiently novel, and presented with sufficient learning and ability, as to give it a significance beyond its intrinsic value, yet its main significance, perhaps, lies in the revelation it contains of the kind of instruction that is being given in some of our colleges and universities. This book, the author himself tells us, was the outcome of an attempt to meet the needs of the juniors and seniors of an American college. It is boys and girls of this age who are being taught that "the true social scientist will reach a point where he can regard a human enemy of society, a secret diplomat, a monopolistic profiteer, a corrupt labor leader, or a sadistic criminal imbecile, for instance, with the same scientific curiosity and objectivity with which an entomologist regards a boll weevil or gypsy moth, or a bacteriologist a congregation of staphylococci or colon bacilli" (p. 316). It is such boys and girls who are being told not only that there is no valid place for praise and blame—except as stimuli to prevent the recurrence of unethical attitudes and conduct—but that appeal to any transcendental religious motive to influence conduct is "but an emotional appeal to the interests of the larger self." It matters nothing that the appeal to some super-sanction is not wholly condemned since its legitimacy is allowed only when it "works better" than a direct and frankly rational appeal to scientific insight and as a temporary make-shift until mankind acquires to a larger degree the objective, scientific attitude. Professor Wolfe repudiates the ethical ideals and sanctions of Christianity as decisively as he does its doctrines.

Professor Wolfe makes frequent reference to the maudlin sentiment, clap-trap, chicane, and such like, of which both conservatives and radicals are guilty in their endeavors to further their economic interests. But even if we should grant that all he says in this connection is true, it would still be stating the matter weakly to say that in this respect they have not sinned more grievously than has Professor Wolfe himself. Though he advocates a mechanistic philosophy and behavioristic psychology; though he seeks to explain all conduct "not in personalistic praise and blame terms, and not in terms of 'final causes' which explain nothing, but in terms of impersonal, phenomenal correlation and sequence," and holds that an "individual's behaviour, however complex and 'purposive,' is in the last analysis the mechanistic response to the stimuli of its environment"; though he holds that the individual is the only possible end and that in the last analysis there is no such thing as altruism and no

such thing as self-sacrifice—notwithstanding all this and more he tells us that his ethical and social ideals are in essential harmony with those of Jesus and that “the world needs to be converted to Christianity almost as much as it does to science.” Surely we will search long before we find a purer exhibition of clap-trap and chicane than this, a more manifest instance of “drawing red herrings across the trail of inquiry.” We would have had a larger measure of respect for Professor Wolfe if he had omitted such a “solemn assertion of things which every intelligent person knows to be untrue” (p. 100). We may believe that Christianity is true or false, but surely no one—not even Professor Wolfe—believes that it is, even as regards its ethical and social point of view, in even approximate harmony with the teachings of this book.

Princeton.

S. G. CRAIG.

## APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY

*Modern Religious Liberalism, The Destructiveness and Irrationality of Modernist Theology.* By JOHN HORSCH, Author of “A Short History of Christianity,” “Menno Simons, His Life, Labors, and Teachings,” etc. With an Introduction by James M. Gray, D.D., President of the Moody Bible Institute, Chicago. Second Edition. Chicago: The Bible Institute Colportage Association. 8vo; pp. 320.

The reviewer would refer his readers to The Princeton Theological Review, Vol. XX, No. 1, p. 135, for his opinion with regard to Mr. Horsch's admirable book. All that he said there he would like to repeat here, but with added emphasis. A comparison of the two editions reveals only a few and unessential changes. More than ever does the one that has just come disclose “an adequate knowledge of orthodoxy and a most exceptional knowledge of ‘Modern Religious Liberalism’ as set forth in the more popular magazines and newspapers of today.” A more timely volume there could not be. If its first edition was urgently demanded, specially is this true of the one before us.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

*Man's First Disobedience, An Interpretation and Defense of the Biblical Narrative of the Fall of Man.* By LEANDER S. KEYSER, A.M., D.D., Professor of Systematic Theology in Hamma Divinity School, Wittenberg College, Springfield, Ohio. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1924. 8vo; pp. 84.

“Is the Biblical teaching on the origin of sin and suffering adequate and reasonable?” This is Dr. Keyser's theme.

“He proceeds to show that the explanations of the Fall of Man as Myth, Legend, Tradition, Folklore, Inspired Allegory or Primitive Animalism are patently inferior compared to the acceptance of the third chapter of Genesis as historical in character and superhuman in source.” “After dealing with some ethical objections, he presents the affirmative grounds for believing in its historical character and concludes with an

exposition of striking ways that the third chapter of Genesis fits in as a factual and necessary link in the divine plan of creation and redemption."

As might have been expected from his previous work, Dr. Keyser's treatment of his profound subject is simple, clear, strong, and, consequently, very helpful. He proves his point. He does not explain man's "First Disobedience." But then he does not profess to. What he proposes to do he does. He proves beyond a peradventure that the third chapter of Genesis is so superior to all other explanations as to be in a class by itself.

Of course, the book is not perfect. What book is? By no possibility can Calvinist and Lutheran agree on all even fundamental points. But this is no reason why they should not see eye to eye in the matter of the Fall, its reality and nature and consequences, and above all its need for a supernatural and vicarious Saviour. We welcome Dr. Keyser's little, yet in some ways great book. The church and the world need discussions like this, though they may not want them always or even often.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

*The Necessary Existence of God.* By WILLIAM HONEYMAN GILLESPIE of Torbanehill, F.R.G.S., F.Z.S., F.G.S.L., etc., Author of "The Argument a Priori for the Being and the Attributes of the Lord God, the Absolute One and First Cause"; etc., etc. Prepared on behalf of the Trustees of Mr. Honeyman Gillespie of Torbanehill. By JAMES URQUHART, F.S.D. (Scot.) With a Supplementary Chapter giving the Views of Modern Philosophers regarding Space, contributed by REV. H. R. MACKINTOSH, D.D., Professor of Systematic Theology, New College, Edinburgh. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1923. Pp. 716.

The purpose and content of this ponderous and elaborate volume are best and sufficiently indicated by the title page.

Mr. Gillespie "argued that space and time must be related to some necessarily existing being, and so advanced from space and time to Deity in conclusion." His basic proof is that space and time are necessarily existing and must, therefore, be under a necessarily existing being.

To most persons argumentation of this kind will seem little better than "idle talk." The whole tendency of our age is away from *a priori* reasoning. Such an argument as the famous one between Mr. Gillespie and his anonymous opponent Antitheos could not be repeated now; but eighty-five years ago it commanded the attention, at least in Scotland, of thousands even of working men.

Perhaps, the best estimate of the *a priori* proof of God is that by Professor Flint (*Theism*, p. 285): "Probably not one of these arguments has completely satisfied more than a few speculative minds. They certainly are not fitted to carry conviction to the ordinary practical understanding. Yet it is not easy to detect flaws in some of them, and the more carefully they are studied, the more, I am inclined to think, will it be recognized that they are pervaded by a substantial view of truth. They attempted logically to evolve what was implied in certain primary intentions or fundamental conditions of the mind; and although they may



not have accomplished all that they aimed at, they have at least succeeded in showing that unless there exists an eternal, infinite and unconditioned Being, the human mind is, at least in its ultimate principles, self-contradictory and delusive."

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

*The Influence of the Bible on History, Literature, and Oratory.* By THOMAS TIPLADY, Author of "The Cross at the Front." New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1924. 8vo; pp. 128.

The well known and much appreciated author of "The Cross at the Front" has given us another admirable volume in the one before us. That is, it is this in the light of its purpose, but only in the light of this. For example, it has little to say—and that little is not specially illuminating—on the nature of inspiration, the errorlessness of Scripture, etc.; but as an exhibit and appreciation of what the Bible has done, at least in certain spheres, it is almost unique. In spite of considerable repetition, its chapters on "The Best of Books," "The Bible as a Means of Culture," "The Creative Power of the Bible," "The Inspiring Effect of the Bible on English Literature," "On Bunyan," "On Lincoln," and on "The Bible as the Master Light of our Knowledge of Human Nature" are among the best on this subject in the language.

On us at least the reading of this little book makes a double impression:

1. It stresses the importance and power of knowledge of the Bible itself as distinguished from knowledge about the Bible; and this is always a timely lesson.

2. It emphasizes the utter inadequacy of any, even the best, explanation of the influence of the Bible which, unless it be by remote implication, has nothing to say of the Bible as alone "able to make us wise unto salvation"; for this is both the truth, and the truth of supreme importance, with regard to it.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

## EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY

*An Introduction to the Study of the Bible.* By JOHN ROBERT VAN PELT, Ph. D. Professor in Gammon Theological Seminary, New York: George H. Doran Co., 1923. pp. 394. Price \$2.00.

Within the last few years a number of books have made their appearance in a field which is virtually one with that which the present volume occupies, yet few of these, we reckon, are likely to appeal more effectively to the popular ear than will this *Introduction* by Dr. Van Pelt.

With the arrangement of his matter, we are thoroughly satisfied. We shall, in outline, indicate the plan that informs our author's book:

The Bible is, at the outset, taken up as a finished product, and, turning it round, as it were, before our eyes the author, in quite an instructive manner, remarks on certain facts concerning the Bible, facts



which ought to be obvious enough, but which not everyone, if uninstructed, at once recognises in their real significance, as that, for example, in the Bible we have the sacred book of all Christians; that the Bible, while, in one sense, a unit, is, in another sense, a library; that this library, whose main divisions are the Old and the New Testaments, is made up of 66 distinct books, of which 39 constitute the former and 27 the latter of these two main divisions; that this sacred book of Christians, when it enters into competition with the sacred books of other religions, proves itself, when tested by those principles which must be regarded as fundamental to true religion, to be immensely superior to all other aspirants to recognition in this particular province.

We are, in the second main section of the book, reminded that this Bible, which may be regarded as having been, for the last fully 1800 years, a finished product, had, anterior to the date at which it became a finished product, an interesting history, that it is a growth, and that, in the process of growing, some 1300 other years were occupied. Yea, we are told that, for a good understanding of our subject, it will be necessary for us to reckon with such facts as that, back of the Book, with its gradual growth, there are a People among whom the Book grew, and that back of the People, there is a Land of unique interest, in which that People dwelt.

Thus from a survey of the Land we are led to form some acquaintance with the People, and from the People we are led on to an examination of the Book—a Book the beginnings of which, so it is suggested, we may possibly find in a remote past, in what is known as *The Song of the Sword* (Gen. iv. 23f), and of which, if we omit a few fragments in the interval, the remaining principal *stadia* in the course and process are, The Book of Amos (c. 760 B.C.); The Canon of The Law (established c. 444 B.C.); The Canon of the Law and The Prophets (settled c. 200 B.C.); The Canon of The Old Testament (fixed c. 75 B.C.); the New Testament (which, with the exception of 2 Peter, is supposed to belong to The First Christian Century).

The Bible became the finished product we now know it to be, at c. 100 A.D. or shortly afterwards, and we are living at an interval of more than 1800 years from that date. The question arises, How have these writings been transmitted to us across those nearly two milleniums of time? The answer to that question forms the third main part of the volume under review. The author's exposition of his theme occupies, under this head, some 75 pages, and much valuable information bearing upon the Bible in manuscript form, or as printed matter, both as it concerns the original tongues, and several of the most important translations in which the Bible has come down to us, is for the reader's instruction here submitted in lucid style.

The next main section is occupied with the intrinsic significance of the Bible. It is recognised that, in the Christian Church, the Bible has always held an authoritative place, and the rationale of the place thus assigned it is discussed in three chapters—by no means the most satis-

factory chapters in the volume—but chapters that respectively bear on the ideas of Revelation, Inspiration, and the word as preached.

A valuable section is devoted to the giving an account of the process by which a Book, which to begin with formed the religious literature *par excellence* of one of the smallest nations on earth, appears destined to become the sacred book of mankind. Under this caption figures of exceptional interest are tabulated.

The final section, strictly speaking, of our volume is of a practical character. It is concerned with an answer to the question, How should a book of such incomparable vitality, and one that makes such an incomparable appeal to the hearts of men, as the Bible admittedly is, be studied? The author, in this connection, emphasises the importance of bearing in mind certain principles of interpretation that, among Protestants, are universally accepted, as, that the meaning of the book is one, and that in order to our arriving at the full meaning of a book we should learn to interpret it historically.

A Bibliography forms an Appendix to the book.

The arrangement of the material making up the book thus appears to us admirable. With much also of the contents of the book we are in hearty agreement. The several chapters bearing upon, A Comparison of the Bible with other sacred books; The transmission of the Biblical text; The influence of the Bible upon universal literature, are exceptionally well done. And, if the style is the man, the author reveals a personality from which one would not, without strong reasons, be disposed to disagree.

And yet disagree in large measure, as where the author describes the growth of the Bible, or where he gives the rationale of the authority assigned the Bible in the Church, we must.

It is quite true that, in comparison with writers like Wellhausen and Kuenen, the author concedes not a little, and particularly in what appertain to the historical background, or to the history of the people with whose literature we are here concerned, to the evangelical tradition. Nevertheless, in the main, Dr. Van Pelt, in the matter of literary analysis accepts and defends the views of the radical school. The immediate sources of the Pentateuch are to him J, E, D, P; "Isaiah" is not all due to the son of Amoz, in it we may discern the hand of, at the fewest, a Jerusalem—a Deutero—and a Trito-Isaiah. A few Psalms are attributed to David; a larger number are pre-exilic; but a goodly number appear to be of a date not earlier than the second century B. C.

In the New Testament field, the author is more conservative, but even here there is room for improvement. The Synoptic problem is solved in terms of Q, Mark, anonymous writers, "Matthew," Luke. It is thought conceivable that all the writing customarily spoken of as Johannine are due to the Apostle John, or, failing him, a disciple and interpreter of his. Acts, like our third Gospel, is by Luke the Physician. Nine Epistles of Paul are genuine: 2 Thessalonians may be genuine. The "Pastorals" are an alloy of Pauline and material extraneous to Paul. The date of *Hebrews* is given as c. 80 A.D. First

Peter is genuine, but 2 Peter is spurious. "James" and "Jude," are, according to our author, probably not by brothers of our Lord.

I offer a few criticisms:

The "Song of the Sword" is doubtless very ancient, but, on *a priori* grounds, and that is about all that our author can have for his own view, it is hard to think of it as the spring out of which such a Bible as is ours issued. Much sooner would one think of "The Protevangelium" (Gen. iii.15) as such a source.

The author does not seem to recognize nor to do justice to the remarkable way in which within the last few decades archaeological science has spoken in confirmation of the Old Testament narrative. It is not only that it has been shown that Israel's environment, in the O. T. period, was what the Bible implies, but in several specific instances, in which the correctness of the Biblical narrative was questioned, confirmation to the very letter has been forthcoming. Is it not sheer dogmatism for Dr. Van Pelt to say, as he does on p. 106, "in the pre-Mosaic period there were no writings"? If the sheikhs of Taanach in Moses' time could correspond with one another on cuneiform tablets, could not Abraham, coming from a home of culture like Ur, be in possession of similar tablets? They would not be burdensome.

The reasons which our author assigns for denying the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch are the usual ones. They are, to begin with, the familiar difficulties about Canaanites for Amorites, Dan for Laish, Sinai for Horeb, duplicate narratives. Evangelical scholars have offered satisfactory explanations, consistent with Mosaic authorship, of these difficulties: and besides, these difficulties are trifles in comparison with the difficulties to faith which we are up against if we accept the critical view of how the Pentateuch was written. We must, on the critical hypothesis, believe that the Main or Priestly Code flatly contradicts what the important Jahvist Code taught in answer to the fundamental question: Was Jehovah, by name, the God of Abraham? We must regard Deuteronomy as essentially forgery. Nor does it help matters to suggest, as our author does, that the book may be as early as the days of Hezekiah, and that many of its ideas are of a still earlier date. These concessions are the critics' safety valves when they are up against a moral difficulty of this kind before an evangelical audience.

That is, of course, not the whole of Dr. Van Pelt's case for a post-Mosaic Pentateuchal authorship. There is, to be sure, the diverse terms for the Supreme Being. But one really wonders how the critics, realising, as they must do, that *Elohim*, or its equivalent, is a name common to Israel with every body that recognises a supernatural power, while *Jehovah* is special to the people of God, can fail to be so struck with the delicacy of touch with which, not only in the Pentateuch, but in the whole Old Testament, the terms for the Divine Being are appropriately put in the mouth of the several collocutors, as that they should not join the chorus of evangelical scholars in appreciation of the beauty and consistency of God's word on this very account.

Our author seems to rely upon the skill with which the critics have

learned to weave together, like a spider's cobweb, the several threads, J, E, J E, D, J E D, J E D P, Ezra, out of which the Pentateuch is supposed to be formed, as evidence of the trustworthiness of his theory, but evidently it would require another volume to traverse these contentions successfully. Our author does not fairly face the contention of Evangelicals in this form: that as the laws of Leviticus concerning sacrifices could have been, to begin with, audible only to Moses, they must, if genuine, be either immediately or mediately of Mosaic authorship.

The author, it is true, makes the centrality of Jesus fundamental to a right conception of the value of the Bible, and that is so far well. But we desiderate a statement analagous to that made in *Hebrews*, in the sense that this Jesus, all the time, held up all things by the word of His power. It is because He was, and is, man, that His work meant so much for us men—but it is because He was, and is, divine, that that work of His has for us, as for God Himself, infinite value. In like manner, evangelical men have judged that it was because of the perfection of His humanity that He drew men, as with the cords of a man, even in His capacity as teacher: but that it is because He was, and is, divine, that there can be no possibility of His putting us upon wrong lines under any aspect whatsoever of His activities as a prophet. Now anyone can see, and it is being more and more conceded by scholars of every school, that our Lord not only highly valued the Old Testament for religious purposes, but confirmed its historical trustworthiness to the last detail. If, as our author says, He taught the incompleteness of the Old Testament revelation of God, He did so, not on the score of the Old Testament being, in any of its part, historically untrustworthy. Evangelical men simply carry on that conception of the Old Testament which our Lord and His Apostles laid as an obligation on the New Testament Church. This our author fails to do.

It is not satisfactory to be told that, with the Bible not as the word of God, but as *containing* His word, nothing in the religious sense is lost. For, although, as disciples of the Bible, our business is mainly religious, yet religion, if soundly Christian, must take up our whole rational nature, intellectual, moral, and religious, and an instrument that is two third, more or less, imperfect cannot, in the nature of things, be perfect as an instrument in the remaining third.

Our author, in his effort to save the religious value of the Bible, while jettisoning a considerable portion of its contents falls back upon the well known principle of the *consensus Spiritus Sancti*. But his understanding of that principle is not that with which the historic Reformed Church has familiarised us. His sense of the term can scarcely be much more ancient than the controversial period in the life of the late Professor W. Robertson Smith.

Our author does well to emphasize the gradual nature of revelation, and to distinguish between Revelation and the record thereof. But when the outcome is a record that is not strictly divine, one feels how far removed is our author's standpoint from that of Paul. To Paul the



record was as truly divine as the Revelation itself (cf. Gen. xv.5 and Rom. iv.23; Num. xxi.5 and I Cor. x.11; the Old Testament *passim* and Rom. xv.4).

Dr. Van Pelt proves himself well informed over a wide field. Perhaps his step is less firm when he touches upon matters Egyptological. One would like that some proof were submitted of a statement made on p. 31 in the sense that alphabetical writing made its appearance as early as the 17th century B. C. It is scarcely correct to say that the Egyptian hieratic was semi-alphabetic. The hieratic was simply the hieroglyphic, in a cursive style. It is scarcely in order to speak of the Coptic version of the Scriptures, although there are Coptic versions.

The proof reading has been carefully attended to. On p. 26, 7:12, should read 7:12-26; on p. 170, *Schechem*, should read *Shechem*; on p. 276, *James v.* should read, *James vi.*

Edinburgh, Scotland.

JOHN R. MACKAY.

*A Translation of Luke's Gospel.* By A. T. ROBERTSON, M.A., D.D. New York: Geo. H. Doran Company.

Current theological controversies seem to be responsible for the appearance of certain recent studies in the Gospel of Luke. The first to be noticed here is Professor A. T. Robertson's "A Translation of Luke's Gospel." The author, one of the first authorities in the field of New Testament Greek, says that his purpose has been to preserve as far as practicable the delicate nuances of the Greek idiom. Grammatical notes on each chapter compose the second part of the book. The reader's first impression—that this is merely another attempt to render a portion of the New Testament into modernized vernacular—will be quickly dispelled. Any departures—and they are many—from the smoothness of even the American Revision, are justified by the clear bringing out of the exact sense of the Evangelist, to which the conventional rendering of an aorist or imperfect may not always quite do justice. However, in numerous instances, the shading is rather too heavy, as 5:27: "Follow Me forever"; or 14:17: "Begin to come, for all things are now ready." In 22:31, Dr. Robertson correctly renders: "Satan has begged to sift you all as wheat." The American Revision has not even in a footnote called attention to the fact that all the disciples were included in the malicious attempt of the Adversary. We were also interested to note that 13:32 is translated: "Go, tell that fox"; which is the same as saying that in the judgment of a premier scholar (as against Professor Plummer and others) *οὗτος* does not invariably demand the rendering "this"—a conclusion confirmed by Luke 17:34, where "this night" cannot possibly be the meaning intended. Vss. 15, 18 and 19 of chapter 11 are rendered "by Beelzebub," which seems inevitable enough, but may serve as a reminder that the locative understanding of *ἐν*—however technically justifiable—has at times been a little overstressed.

The Grammatical Notes are of high interest and value, and have been prepared in the light of our enlarging knowledge of the Koine. They con-



stitute, indeed, the principal value of an admirable little work. In a single instance, we find ourselves constrained to differ from the judgment of the distinguished author, perhaps unduly influenced by denominational prepossessions. The passage is Luke 18:16, where Dr. Robertson endeavors to break the force of the strong argument based on the use of the word *βρέφη*, by pointing out that Christ refers to the little ones as *παιδιά*, "here partly grown children." With an eye to the use of this word, and of the word *ἔρχεσθαι*, and perhaps not recalling that a direct vocal summons is not always included in *προσκαλεῖσθαι* (as Acts 5:40 and James 5:14 should establish with sufficient clearness), he adds that the *βρέφη* "apparently walked toward Christ." Granting that children "old enough and large enough to come to Christ" may be included in the word *παιδιά*, no such meaning ordinarily (if ever, for II Tim. 3:15 is manifestly proverbial) attaches in the New Testament to *βρέφος*, used by Luke himself of a new-born infant (2:12), and even of an unborn babe (1:41). And as to *παιδίον*, the Evangelist certainly applies this term to the Baptist when presented for circumcision, and therefore when only eight days old. No doubt the real reliance of Dr. Robertson is the word *ἔρχεσθαι*; but that this, in the usage of Luke, does not necessarily denote walking may be seen in Acts 8:36, where it is said that Philip and the eunuch came (*ἦλθον*) to a certain water, though riding in a chariot.

Lincoln University, Pa.

EDWIN J. REINKE.

*Israel Before Christ.* An account of Social and Religious Development in the Old Testament. By A. W. F. BLUNT, B.D. New York: Oxford University Press. 1924. Pp. 143.

This is one of The World's Manuals of History. The author presents in non-technical terms the history of Israel from the period of the Patriarchs to the advent of Christ following the chronology suggested by the "Documentary Hypothesis." No effort is made to argue for the author's position, in fact, little mention is made of the possibility of a contrary view. The "assured results of modern scholarship" are offered to the reader in a well written presentation of social and religious practices, either as they exist today or are made known to us in literature and excavation, which goes far toward awakening an appreciation of the social background of Scripture.

The following quotations indicate the author's attitude toward the canonical Scriptures: "Our records scarcely allow us to say precisely what cultus Moses taught or allowed; some Hebrew practices may be part of their Semitic inheritance, while others may have been borrowed from the Canaanites before and after the Hebrew invasion.—The description of the Tabernacle in Exodus 25-27 is of course a pure anachronism, which transfers the arrangements of the second Temple back into the wilderness times.—It is unlikely that Moses made any special provisions as to annual festivals" (pp. 32-33).

Glenolden, Pa.

CHARLES F. DEININGER.

## HISTORICAL THEOLOGY

*La Faculté de Théologie et Le Séminaire Protestant de Strasbourg* (1803-1872). Une page de l'Histoire de l'Alsace. Par CH. TH. GEROLD, Docteur en Théologie, Pasteur de l'Eglise St. Nicholas. Librairie Istra. Strasbourg 1923, Études d'Histoire et de Philosophie religieuses publiée par la Faculté de Théologie Protestante de l'Université de Strasbourg, Fascicule 7. Prix: 15fr. vii., 366.

As pastor of the Church of St. Nicholas in Strassburg, and, as he notes in his preface, a former student of the Seminary and Faculty of which he writes, having, from 1855-1860, studied under Professors Matter, Hasselmann, Stahl, Kreiss, Bartholmess, Waddington, Baum, and Cunitz; also Dean Bruch and Professors Fritz, Jung, Reuss, and Schmidt; and having personally known Colani, Lichtenberger, Weber, and Sabatier, the author of this very illuminating piece of Alsatian historical research is more than fitted for his worthy task. The treatment is in three periods: 1803-1820, 1821-1864, and 1864-1872. At the end (pp. 297-366) are documentary selections, notes, and letters, with a table of contents. In passing, the birthdate of Professor Emmerich should be 1786 instead of 1876 (p.59).

It is not possible to detail here the many excellencies of this book. A great deal of valuable historical matter is gathered together and presented in such a way as to be of superior reference value. Attention may well be called to some things that are of importance to our modern views of theological schools and of the training of young men for the Christian ministry. Considerable discussion was ever provoked over the method of nomination of a new professor in the filling of vacancies or a newly-established chair. Salaries were very small. In 1854 a full professor received \$620. a year with the free use of a house, while the assistants and fellows received as much as \$40. per annum (p. 38)! Another problem was that of a mixed faculty, Lutheran and Reformed. To this there was, of course, much opposition. The Protestant Academy of Strassburg had been created for the instruction of ministers of the Augsburg Confession, while the Reformed theology was provided for at Geneva. A Reformed professor was appointed in 1819, and this mixed idea prevailed, though as late as 1837 there was opposition to the mixed faculty from some 119 clergymen (pp. 189-190).

Still another source of trial was the radical tendency which gradually spread in the Faculty. Up to 1821 the professors, most learned and especially in classical culture, were little disposed to the newer spirit and methods which were then spreading abroad in Germany under the influence of Schleiermacher and DeWette. Younger and more progressive men were needed (pp. 128, 141). Henceforth the door was opened to rationalizing currents. Mathias Richard, the new Reformed professor, was a pronounced rationalist. So was J. F. Bruch. Whenever a new chair was to be filled this question arose, and the liberals always won. The teaching of the Seminary was thus frequently under suspicion (cf. p. 239). The controversy especially gathered around Prof. Timothy Colani, who was both brilliant and popular. He was seated as professor of

oratory, then defeated his opponent, A. F. Lichtenberger, for the chair of homiletics, and was finally named for the chair of philosophy (pp. 240-265).

Strassburg has had some remarkable professors. Indeed, all of them were noted for colossal industry and devotion to their chosen subjects. Here is Theodore Fritz, rising daily at 4 A. M., working fourteen and fifteen hours, giving three hours to Arabic, three to Hebrew, five to Sanscrit, and three and four to French (p. 134). Most of these professors had secured part of their education in German universities, especially at Jena, Leipzig, and Göttingen, where the influence of the orientalist Eichhorn shaped their critical methods. Such names as DeWette, Charles Schmidt, and Sabatier, and many others are well known this side the Atlantic. Many a college student has used Professor Weber's *History of Philosophy*. Professor Sabatier's last work, *Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit*, has found numerous followers in America. And the prodigious labors of Baum, Cunitz, and Reuss on the works of Calvin are a lasting memorial to the painstaking scholarship of this great institution.

The pages dealing with the student life are singularly interesting. The rules were rigid, but generally wholesome, fair, and opportune. Hebrew was required throughout the course. The courses were obviously fundamental. They covered three years in exegesis, dogmatics, ethics, ecclesiastical history, homiletics, catechetics, practical exercises, O. T. and N. T. introduction, Hebrew antiquities, apologetics, and ecclesiastical law. Assiduous attention to the current work was an indispensable condition of admission to the examination. Each year a dissertation on some theological question was required, and the candidate preached at least once annually before his ecclesiastical inspector. At twenty-five he took his final examinations for ordination. Regular attendance at public worship was compulsory, and spiritual directors were chosen from among the local pastors (p. 185). Even a certain garb was prescribed for the students; not, however, a special or uniform costume, which the Commission felt might nourish in the young students the sacerdotal spirit, but the black frock coat, white or black neckties, and high hat (pp. 235, 237). Students were forbidden to frequent public houses in the city or boisterous assemblies anywhere, or take any part in any improper scene (p. 79). Notwithstanding this, the student excesses were disgraceful, and led to rigid punishments (pp. 80-86). The number of students varied. In 1860 the Seminary and Faculty had, exclusive of foreigners, 75 students; and in 1869-1870 it had risen to 103 (pp. 271-272).

Both Faculty and Seminary passed through severe trials. The controversy over a mixed faculty proved a menace. The year 1848 was signalized by student uprisings. Certain demands were made of the faculty with regard to various courses, elective and required, and the substitution of French for German. Of long standing were the Ultramontane attacks against the Seminary in regard to property rights, a controversy which the Protestants finally won (pp. 187-209). Severe criticism was

directed against the general character of the teaching of the Seminary. How very modern sounds the accusation, made in 1851, that the instruction which the Strassburg theological students were receiving was "too theoretic and too dry; it tends to be too exclusively scientific. Elements indispensable to a pastor, such as catechization and preaching, are too much neglected; professional apprenticeship, in a word, is not the object of sufficient solicitude. Practice is too much sacrificed to theory; application, to pure science" (p. 232). The criticism was courteously evaluated, but it was justly replied that it was necessary to conserve scientific education. It is the old criticism of a pragmatic philosophy and utilitarian age. But it loses considerable force when one reflects that many a young minister must get his philosophic bearings, his scientific grounding during his Seminary course or he will never get it at all. The modern pastor is all too often a man of affairs rather than a preacher of the Gospel. He easily dabbles in everything at the expense of the one thing needful, and faces constantly the peril of proclaiming publicly values which he is incapable of expounding or defending. The Seminary that does its duty by its students will not be misled by this common cry, nor will it betray its high purpose by encouraging in its students the facile arts of superficiality; they can learn these arts easily enough elsewhere. It will strike deep and lay foundations that will not sway and tremble in the face of inevitable attack.

On June 29, 1860, the old Dominican cloister was destroyed by fire. The Seminary was thus compelled to erect a new building, which was occupied exactly three years later (pp. 100, 103). Then came the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, in which lectures were temporarily suspended. But the effects were disastrous, and in 1872 the Faculty of theology ceased to exist, and the next year the Protestant Seminary closed its doors. The author disposes of the surviving professors in a series of valuable footnotes (pp. 288-290), somewhat as a novelist is forced to lay off the characters for which, having reached the end of his story, he has no further use. But here is a story with a sequel. In November, 1919, the French University of Strassburg was inaugurated, and the new Faculty of Protestant Theology was instituted. The hope, in which we join, is expressed that the high traditions of former professors will be continued in the school.

Lancaster, Ohio.

BENJAMIN F. PAIST.

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## SYSTEMATICAL THEOLOGY

*A Century of Anglican Theology, and Other Lectures.* By CLEMENT C. J. WEBB, M.A., LL.D., Late Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford; Oriel Professor of The Philosophy of the Christian Religion in the University of Oxford. New York: D. Appleton and Co. 1924. Pp. 190.

The first chapter of this book deals with the theology of the Church of England during the last hundred years. The author does not go into any details, but sketches broadly the Anglican theology in its relation to European thought. He points to the isolation of this theology as its



first main characteristic, and this he ascribes mainly to its mediating position between the theology of the Church of Rome, and the Protestant thought of Europe in Lutheranism and Calvinism. Being an Anglican, Professor Webb would not admit that the theology of the English Church was only partly reformed, but he writes very objectively as a historian, and so makes no criticism of Protestant thought on the continent of Europe.

The second main characteristic of Anglican theology, he says, is its Platonism. Here he criticises the Ritschlian attitude toward Greek thought and regards this Platonic influence as favorable to the true expression of Christian truth. He is right in his criticism of the Ritschlian banishment of metaphysics from theology, because the New Testament teaching contains metaphysics. But he has not proven, nor attempted to prove, that New Testament Christianity is Platonic. In fact he adopts a free attitude toward Scriptural authority, rejecting certain elements in the teaching of Jesus where they conflict with what he regards as moral. His line of reasoning is specious. It is true that we cannot accept on authority that which contradicts our rational and moral nature. It is true that this way lies ultimate scepticism. But it is quite another thing to say that this or that specific doctrine is contrary to our moral intuitions. For example, the doctrine of eternal punishment was taught by Jesus. The mind and heart of the natural man finds it distasteful. Nevertheless we cannot reject it as immoral with no adequate treatment of the nature of God and the problem of evil and sin. Difficulties there are, but the erection of difficulties into contradictions with our rational and moral nature is too summary a method of dealing with the problems involved.

The European influence the author finds chiefly in the rationalism of Voltaire, the sentimentalism of Rousseau, and the philosophy of Kant. The three movements of Anglican theology briefly outlined are the evangelical, the high Church, and the liberal. Of course these intermingle, and Professor Webb's position seems to be a combination of the last two.

The second chapter deals with the relation of Morality and Religion. It consists of three lectures. The first shows that the two are distinct. The idea that religion is merely an appendix to morality is well criticised, both as the view is represented by Matthew Arnold and by Kant in different ways. The author uses Westermarck's *Origin of Moral Ideas* to show that the development of moral ideas in primitive peoples goes on independently of their religious beliefs, and that even when Religion is moralized in higher types of its manifestation, Morality and Religion are still two distinct spheres of human life.

The second lecture shows how Religion advances under the criticism of Morality, and the third lecture points out how Religion inspires, grounds, and corrects Morality. We cannot agree with Professor Webb's ideas concerning the evolution of both Morality and Religion. Neither do we find evidence cited in their support. But one illustration of the corrective influence of Religion on Morality which he cites, we believe



to be true. He traces the idea of a finite God to a too exclusive consideration of the distinction between good and evil, without due regard to other matters such as the demands of our religious nature for an omnipotent and infinite God, and the results of an adequate treatment of the theistic problem, to say nothing of the Biblical conception of God. If a man loses sight of God in His glory, the existence of evil will loom so large to him that he will fall into dualism, or pluralism, or some philosophy like that of Bergson. But while the existence of evil might drive one to atheism, Professor Webb is right in saying that a finite God is just no God at all. If there be a God, He is the Infinite God of the Bible. In other words the Biblical conception of God is in the last analysis the most rational. The problem of theodicy will always present difficulties, but once we begin to lower our ideas of God's wisdom, power, and goodness, we cannot stop short of dualism or atheism. It may also be noted in passing that, though this idea of a finite God is usually described as most modern, there has been a notable reaction against it in recent years in German theological thought. In fact one can no longer claim to be up-to-date by following Wells, Bergson, and the Pluralists.

The third and last lecture deals with theology as the science of religious experience. On reading this one cannot escape the impression that the author is himself somewhat isolated from recent discussion. Possibly he intends simply to set forth his own view as briefly as he can. But he takes no account of Dr. MacIntosh's printed criticisms of the view he advocates. Dr. MacIntosh's book *Some Aspects of Christian Belief* contains pertinent discussion and criticism of the above definition of theology. Nor do we find any allusions to O. Hoffmann's *Der Begriff der religiösen Erfahrung* (1921); nor to Wobbermin's important work or Faber's criticism of Wobbermin. However, an author is at liberty to state his own view briefly and constructively. Dr. Webb's view is that theology is the science which interprets religious experience. He contrasts this view with that which would regard it as dependent on revelation and authority. This shows great confusion of thought. Obviously Dr. Webb has confused the question of the source of knowledge in theology with that of the object of theological knowledge. There is a science of religious experience, but it is not theology. It is a branch of psychology. Theology is the science of God, and Dr. Webb insists that religious experience must give us a knowledge of God. Nevertheless it remains true that we could have a science of religious experience if there were no God. But even if it could be shown that all theological knowledge could be drawn from religious experience, then theology would still be the science of God, and religious experience the alleged source of knowledge or means by which we know God. But if religious experience is the object of theological knowledge, then theology is only a branch of psychology, and cannot settle the epistemological question as to the reality of its objects.

Furthermore even if it be granted that the human mind has an immediate experience of God, what can experience tell us of God's plan, His method of redemption, to say nothing of the great truths of escha-

toLOGY? The whole point of view we believe to be mistaken. Religious and Christian experience depend on faith, and the object of faith is known only through revelation, general and special. We are dependent on the idea of authority in theological knowledge, and we cannot escape it.

In concluding we would remark that we regard the historical sketch of Anglican theology as the best part of this little volume.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

## PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

*A Layman's Confession of Faith.* By P. WHITWELL WILSON. New York:

Fleming H. Revell Co. 8vo; pp. 208. \$1.50.

The author introduces himself as "a plain man who has only one life to live and wants that life to be worth living." Nevertheless, this plain man is known to most of us as a journalist who has won distinction as the author of a number of thoughtful books which are reckoned among the "best sellers" of our time.

It is an unusual thing and most enheartening to find a newspaper man with anything like a reasonable grasp of spiritual truth. As a rule writers of this sort have a notion that to be religious is all that is required of us; but "P.W.W." has evidently discovered the important fact that a man may be intensely religious without being a Christian at all. This fact is the radiating center of this charming book.

For what is Religion but seeking God? And what is Christianity but finding Him? All men are, at one time or another, more or less earnestly religious, wanderers from God, expatriates, "homesick" as Augustine said "until they return to him." Paul spoke of the Athenians as "exceedingly religious" though there was probably not one Christian among them; and he suggested an end of their futile quest when he said, "Him whom ye ignorantly worship declare I unto you."

Here is the fact that differentiates our religion above all others: Christianity is no longer seeking God, having found Him in Christ. The author of this fine Christian book has evidently, like doubting Thomas, come into such personal contact with Jesus of Nazareth that his "Confession of Faith" finds its conclusive expression in the cry "My Lord and my God." And the successive chapters of the book give abundant reason for the faith that is in him.

New York City.

DAVID JAMES BURRELL.

*Seven Questions in Dispute.* By WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN. New York:

Fleming H. Revell Co. Pp. 158.

*Orthodox Christianity versus Modernism.* By WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN.

New York: Fleming H. Revell Co. Pp. 48.

Of these two volumes far and away the more impressive is the smaller one. It is divided into two parts; the first of which is devoted to a consideration of the Five Points of Presbyterian Doctrine as formulated in the General Assembly of 1910 and re-emphasized in the Assemblies of 1916 and 1923. The argument is so conclusive that it is difficult to see how any reasonable man can escape it.

The second part of the little book deals with Evolution—and if anyone entertains the least lingering doubt as to where Mr. Bryan stands on this question this booklet will satisfy him. There are some things that he makes clear. *First*, Evolution is an unsubstantiated guess. *Second*, the futility of the multitudinous and long-continued attempts to prove the truth (in any sense whatever of the word proof), of the evolution hypothesis furnishes an ample demonstration of its utter worthlessness as “a working theory of the universe.” If a man were to endeavor ten thousand times to leap a stream and fail, every time he might reasonably conclude that it couldn’t be done, or at least that he couldn’t do it. *Third*, Evolution and Creation are irreconcilable. It is related that when Laplace submitted his *Mécanique Céleste* to Napoleon for inspection and criticism, the latter remarked, “I find no mention of God in your philosophy,” whereupon Laplace answered, “Sire, that is the glory of my philosophy, it has no need of Him.” There are theistic evolutionists; but why need or how can there be? *Fourth*, the theory yokes man up with the lower orders of life. But what difference does it make whether I am descended, as I had supposed, from self-respecting ancestors or, as Darwin says “from a pair of hairy quadrupeds arboreal in their habits”? None whatever. It is a mere matter of family pride. Noblesse oblige. *Fifth*, Of course Darwinism rules the Scriptures out of court, substituting, as it does, the “inner consciousness” for divine authority. Here is what Darwin says: “As far as I am concerned, I do not believe any revelation has ever been made.” But obviously, when a man becomes “a law unto himself,” that is, an infallible Ego, his character loses all its moorings and drifts without compass on a boundless and uncharted sea. *Sixth*, it invalidates faith as evidence. “By faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the Word of God.” Without faith we must remain in perpetual doubt as to everything that lies beyond the circumscription of our finger tips. *Seventh*, accordingly this theory, when followed to its logical and inevitable conclusion, must deny all miracles. When “In the beginning God created” goes, every other supernatural fact goes with it. *Eighth*, exit Christ! The life principle of Evolution is the uninterrupted operation of natural law. The moment there is an intrusion upon this principle from any quarter the whole theory explodes. One miracle breaks the charm. But Christ himself is the miracle of all miracles; His ministry was a bundle of miracles and His pathway through the centuries is lined with them. A consistent evolutionist must therefore reject Christ altogether or else reduce Him to the dimensions of a common man, a product of the chemical reactions which have been going on since the remote period of the primordial germ.

Such are the conclusions at which the author arrives by a process of argumentation which seems irrefutable. The issue between the evolution theory and Christian belief is sharply drawn. If the former prevails the latter goes by the board. And what compensation is offered for this immeasurable loss? Nothing! Nothing for everything! All anchors lost and a south wind blowing where the ship went down!

New York City.

DAVID JAMES BURRELL.

*His Salvation as Set forth in the Book of Romans.* By NORMAN B. HARRISON. Chicago: The Bible Institute Colportage Association. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 160. Price \$1.00 net.

This is an admirable brief study of Paul's supreme epistle. It is of a popular character, clear, concise and well arranged. It presents a logical outline and traces the development of thought, explaining the significance of the more important texts and emphasizing in a practical way the force of the principal teachings of the Epistle.

*Princeton.*

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*One Thousand Best Bible Verses.* Compiled and edited by J. B. SMITH, D.D. Chicago Bible Institute Colportage Association.

This booklet contains not merely a list of specially precious passages of Scripture, but it so arranges and presents these passages as to make them easy to be memorized. They are placed in their scriptural order and so printed as to make an immediate impression on the mind. This compilation cannot fail to awaken a new interest in the invaluable practice of committing to memory extended portions of Scripture.

*Princeton.*

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*The Significance of the Cross.* By the REV. GEORGE H. MORRISON, D.D. New York: George H. Doran Co. 12mo; pp. 72. Price 85 cents.

The author of this small volume has been known by the publication of his sermons and by his pulpit service as among the leading English preachers of today. This volume consists of outlines which were subsequently expanded by the author into three addresses relative to the atoning work of Christ. They contain a brief but comprehensive review of the real meaning of the death of our Lord and of the significance of the cross for Jesus, for God and for man. The concise paragraphs include the essence of the old sweet matchless story of the redeeming love of God in Christ Jesus.

*Princeton.*

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*The Person of Christ.* By PHILIP SCHAFF, D.D., LL.D. New York: George H. Doran Co. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 148. Price \$1.25 net.

A whole generation of Christians which has been familiar with this classic from the pen of Dr. Schaff, together with a host of new readers will rejoice in the republication of a volume which so long has been regarded as among the most forceful and complete characterizations of Christ. One of the main contentions of the book is that the perfect humanity of our Lord is a proof of his divinity. As to this perfection of his humanity there is presented a large number of striking testimonials from men of widely differing religious beliefs. This treatise was written by Dr. Schaff in 1865. By its reproduction in this present attractive form, the American Tract Society has rendered an invaluable and timely service to the Church. The division of the book into numbered sections and the introduction of the tables of contents at the heads of the chapters



make the argument even more clear and forceful. This contribution to popular apologetic literature should be widely circulated by all who appreciate how far the fact of the divine person of Christ is central in all discussions of Christian doctrine and in all experiences of Christian life.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*Springs in the Desert.* By the REV. J. H. JOWETT, D.D. New York: George H. Doran Co. 16mo; pp. 300. Price \$1.50 net.

The whole Christian world has become familiar with the spiritual insight, the vivid imagery and the melodious English which have characterized all the writings and the public utterances of the late Dr. Jowett. This volume of devotional studies on the Psalms is an admirable example of these qualities. The studies are based on separate phrases or texts taken from nearly one hundred different psalms. They are most brief and occupy only three or four pages each. However, each one of them presents a message calculated to inspire in the mind of the reader a new faith in God and a greater desire for holiness.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*Tarbell's Teachers' Guide to the International Sunday School Lessons Improved Uniform Course for 1925.* By MARTHA TARBELL, PH.D. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 416.

Miss Tarbell is rendering an invaluable service to the Sunday School teachers of the world by the volumes she is issuing to aid them in the study of the International Lessons. This volume which forms a guide to the lessons for 1925 is the twentieth of the series. Like all the others, it shows careful study and wide and patient research. The plan of the author is not to attempt original expositions of Scripture but to give extracts and quotations from the writings of other Bible students. The writers quoted represent various schools of religious thought and belief, but the evident endeavor is to present evangelical truth with a view to giving spiritual and practical help to the student.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*The Preacher's Old Testament.* By EDWARD MACK, Professor, Department of Hebrew and Old Testament Interpretation, Union Theological Seminary, Richmond, Va. F. H. Revell Co. 1923. pp. 158. \$1.25.

These lectures were delivered at Princeton Theological Seminary, 1923, on the Levi P. Stone Foundation, and the Introduction, by President J. Ross Stevenson, attests the interest and appreciation with which they were received by those to whom they were first addressed.

The purpose of the book is to indicate how the Old Testament may be used by the preacher. It does not deal with critical questions, like the disappointing book of George Adam Smith on *Modern Criticism and the Preaching of the Old Testament*, but wisely confines itself to its chosen theme. The positions taken regarding the authorship, integrity and authority of the Old Testament writings are drawn from the Scripture itself; and they are assumed as the basis of the argument of the book.



How the theme is developed is indicated by the titles of the several Chapters: I. Introductory: General Values, II. Literary Values and Influence, III. Historical Values, IV. Dramatic and Imaginative Elements, V. The Moral Message, VI. A Sound Philosophy, VII. The Messianic Heart. The purpose is clearly stated: "We decided that we would not occupy these hours with scientific and technical criticism. My purpose is to speak from some experience, and out of love, of the teaching and preaching values of the Old Testament" (p. 31). "Many true and interesting things must be taken for granted, while we limit ourselves to the one query: 'How may the Old Testament in all its phases and features serve the purpose of the Preacher of the Word?'" (p. 35). The purpose thus expressed is answered by the exposition in a manner which is stimulating and instructive, and should turn the thoughts of many preachers to the riches of grace and truth which the Old Scripture contains.

While the conservative point of view is upheld throughout, just recognition is given to the service rendered by the learning and ability of modern critics to the understanding of the Scripture. "Without controversy these many decades of relentless and exhausting study—and I stress the *latter* adjective—have been of invaluable aid to Bible study and interpretation. . . . Historical and literary criticism with attendant archaeological research, have done much to humanise the Old Testament" (p. 27).

On p. 48 the author tells us of an unusual form of service which he occasionally introduced when he was a pastor, inviting a talented reader of the Scripture to present to the congregation some of the great chapters of the Word in place of the sermon.

The style is clear and animated, and that the author does not live altogether in the world of the past but is familiar with the events of the day is shown by his reference to Matthewson, "mightiest of baseball pitchers" (p. 44), and his treatment of that type of modern womanhood known as "the flapper" (p. 113).

Here and there the book like every other is open to criticism. It is going too far to say that "there can be little real expository, Biblical preaching without some knowledge of the Hebrew and Greek" (p. 33). That the knowledge of the original tongues of Scripture is of the highest value to the preacher is obvious; but to be of material value in expository preaching his knowledge must be of that thorough character which lies beyond reach of the ordinary minister. And if exposition requires a thorough knowledge of the Hebrew and the Greek, the great majority of our pulpits are barred against the expositor. The history of the Church attests that men may be interesting and instructive in this kind of preaching who are familiar with no tongue but their own. The results of the ripest scholarship are brought within the reach of every minister, and while the original languages will be of great service they are not indispensable to expository preaching.

It is said on p. 41 that twenty-four of the twenty-seven books of the New Testament are in letter form.

In treating of the Bible account of the origin of sin (p. 65) it is singular to find that no mention is made of the fact so clearly presented in Genesis that sin did not originate with man, but was introduced into the world from without in the person of the tempter.

In a book so sound and sensible it is surprising to read that the author's conception of a sermon cannot be better expressed than by this definition: "Every great sermon must contain three things; a smile, a tear, and a vision of beauty" (p. 14). This surely will make the judicious grieve, for the definition omits everything that distinguishes the sermon from other forms of public speech, and is far more appropriate to the moving-picture show.

*Princeton.*

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

*Economics and Ethics*, A Treatise on Wealth and Life. By J. A. R. MARRIOTT, Honorary Fellow, Formerly Fellow and Lecturer on Modern History and Economics, of Worcester College, Oxford, Late M.P. for Oxford. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co. 8vo; pp. x, 293.

"The argument of this book is addressed to those who desire to order their daily lives, in the home, in the shop, in the factory or on the farm, in conformity with the highest ethical standards, or, in more familiar words, to live according to the will of God; and to them only." "Many of these are sorely perplexed in mind and gravely disturbed in conscience, by the apparent contradiction between the precepts of Ethics and the laws of Economics." To help such is the author's earnest desire. "Others, not thus troubled, will," he hopes, "find in his book, an exposition, as simple as he can make it, of the leading principles of Economic Theory, as understood and expounded by the classical Economists." But the book is distinguished from any other text-book known to him "by the abundance of concrete illustrations, and by occasional excursions into the domain of Economic history."

The former of these two classes the volume under review will reach at least to a considerable degree. Whatever it may not be, it is an admirable "exposition of the leading principles of Economic theory as understood and expounded by the classical Economists." It is the best presentation of these principles known to the reviewer.

Here he is compelled to pause. The second class of readers referred to our author will not reach. He would seem to have given so much time and thought to the first group as to have none for the second. He comes to the sound conclusion, that "between the laws of wealth and the precepts of morality there is, in the last analysis, no contradiction. But ethical practice is conditioned by the operation of economic law, and in the one case as in the other, the wages of disobedience is death." This is what he had engaged to show and it is what we all need to have shown; but with the exception of a very few almost casual remarks, it is what he would appear to have ignored entirely. May we not express the hope that a second edition will supply the deficiency?

*Princeton.*

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

*Baron Paul Nicolay: a Biography.* By GRETA LANGENSKJOLD. Translated by Ruth Evelyn Wilder. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1924. Pp. 251. \$1.60 net.

This is a most helpful biography. We learn something of the life of a man who was truly a great Christian and whose influence blessed multitudes. Paul Nicolay was a member of the Russian and Finnish nobility. His family was conservative, loyal to the throne and in very close touch with the Russian court. Nicolay gave up all that rank and wealth offered and devoted his life to the service of men.

We see the controlling motive of his life. It was Christ in him. His communion with Christ was most real. "We must not be locomotives, but electric tram-cars." The day before his confirmation, he wrote in his diary, "What a joy, what a privilege, to feel Jesus within oneself." "Jesus within himself" became for him not only the source of joy and peace for his whole life but also an absolutely binding call to a life of holiness and a pledge of coming victory."

His great work was with the students of Russia. The work known as the Russian Student Christian Movement was begun by him in 1899. In Russia it was difficult to do any real Christian work. We learn of the almost inconceivable difficulties which he encountered. Official opposition, ignorance and prejudice were met. Yet he pressed on. The aim of the movement was "to wage war against the worst enemy of the Russian student,—loneliness and moral uncertainty." To do this, he sought to bring the student to Christ.

The impression he made on men was always pronounced. It was one of faithfulness, faithfulness to men and faithfulness to his call. Russians, Swedes, Finlanders, Norwegians, English and Americans have said, "I shall never forget what Baron Nicolay said."—"I shall never lose the impression Baron Nicolay made on me." "There was something about the expression on his face which told of a determined fight for the spiritual world." He was called a "young Daniel in a worldly society." He inspired confidence as few men do. At a certain conference, a student was asked which of the speakers he liked best. Immediately he answered, "Baron Nicolay. One can't but believe what he says."

His life was wholly given to serving others. We see his humility, his perseverance and his genuineness. We learn of his personal work with individual students, of his work in the over-crowded prisons of Russia and Siberia. His prayer life and his humility are revealed. Full surrender to God he always emphasized. Only so can one serve. "Amateurs do not advance His kingdom." He longed to be "a tool in the hand of the Lord." His whole aim and purpose was to be used of God for God's own glory and for the bringing of men to Christ.

Those who cannot read Swedish are under a lasting debt to Miss Wilder for her work of translating. The cause of Christ is distinctly advanced by having the life of this good man published in English.

Norristown, Pa.

J. M. CORUM, JR.

*God's Open.* By JAMES I. VANCE, D.D. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co. 1924. 12 mo. Pp. 204.

In this volume of short sermons the Rev. J. I. Vance of Nashville brings forward those scenes in the Bible dealing with Nature. His aim is to give the freshness of an open air setting to scriptural teaching, and, so to speak, take an outing in God's Word. The aim is certainly commendable, and the writer has succeeded admirably in introducing an atmosphere of field and wood, sky and stream into his book. He has written in a popular style. His sentences are short and Anglo-Saxon, while a suitable poem of a few stanzas adorns the opening and closing of each excursus. There is no attempt to deal with any of the theological controversies of the day, or to enter very deeply into doctrinal matters. While this very feature might commend the book to the average reader, there is a sense in which it is a defect. When a man with the evident virility of the author, whose real function, or profession, is that of a preacher, exercises his gifts, it seems a pity that there is no great emphasis placed on the *one* gospel that the minister of Jesus Christ has anything to do with—that of redemption through the cross. The world, today, is not perishing for lack of knowledge of Nature. There never was a time in history when more attention and study were being directed to what Doctor Vance calls "God's Open." The newspapers, the magazines, the movies, the nature studies in the schools, from the lowest primary grades up to the University, all take the world week-ending into God's great out-of-doors. If the minister of the gospel fails to preach, not the gospel of the open air, or the gospel of hard work, or the gospel of social service, or the gospel of world-brotherhood, or the gospel of no more war, but the gospel of Christ and Him crucified, who will preach it? How can people ever hear it unless it be preached? If the world ever needed that gospel, it needs it now. Let every one who is ordained to preach it, put the trumpet to his lips, and blow it with no uncertain sound, whether men will hear or whether they will forbear. By all means put into the tone all the beauty, all the freshness and all the romance of Robin Hood's bugle in Nottingham Forest, but let it be blown with the same urgency and authority commanding immediate response.

*New York.*

ALBERT DALE GANTZ.

*L'Union des Chrétiens Évangéliques.* Son but.—Ses moyens d'action.

Par E. DE. VEDRINES. 2<sup>e</sup> Edition. Editions de l' Union des Chrétiens Évangéliques. 1924. Serie B. No. 4. Prix. 0 fr. 30.

This is a Union of evangelical clergymen and laymen representing all branches of the protestant church in France. It had its birth October 10, 1920, at Lézan, in Gard. Its purpose as declared is: "(1) To draw the attention of evangelical Christians to the mortal peril that a growing abandonment of the fundamentals of faith is bringing upon our churches and the cause of Christianity; and (2) To group Christians of all denominations who wish, in meeting this grave danger, to bring back into life the fundamental verities of the evangelical faith; and this in the spirit of humility and love."



Its basis is thus stated: "The Union is open to Christians who, recognizing the sovereign authority of the Holy Scriptures in the matter of faith, and worshipping Jesus Christ, the Only Begotten Son of God, made man for our offenses, raised from the dead for our justification, ever present by the Holy Spirit in the Church of which He is the Head, wish to unite, the better to labor together for the confirmation of the evangelical faith, the development of Christian life, and the general advance of the Kingdom of God."

Prominent among the members, who number at present about fifteen hundred, are MM. Pasteur Cruvellier, Professeur Devaux, Fernand Faivre, Pasteur W. H. Guiton, Samuel Lortsch, Pasteur Paul Pic, Pasteur Saillens, E. de Vedrines, and Professeur E. Doumergue.

It is significant that a careful study of the roster of the Union reveals that there is a conspicuous absence from the list of many outstanding pastors and professors. It would be indeed lamentable if this indicated a departure from the historic faith of the French Church on the part of those who today are most active and potent in determining its doctrinal position. In the case of not a few this would cause no surprise. As is well known, the Reformed Church of France has been long divided into two sections, known respectively as The National Union of Reformed Evangelical Churches, and The National Union of the Reformed Churches. The cleavage between these two bodies is chiefly doctrinal. That theological conservatism still dominates the French Church is indicated in the fact that the first named of these two bodies, the one distinctively evangelical, has the attachment of nearly twice as many ministers and churches as has that of the liberal wing.

While exact information is not obtainable, it would be safe to say that fifty per cent of the ministers of the evangelical body have united with the *Union des Chrétiens Évangéliques*. Naturally, a much smaller percentage of ministers in the branch of the Church known as liberal is enrolled. The question arises, Why have not all truly evangelical pastors and professors identified themselves with the Union? Surely its influence and impact would be greatly augmented did the Union include in its membership all who stoutly maintain the evangelical faith and share in the alarm now prevalent from the growing menace of rationalism in the Church.

The answer to this question readily suggests itself. There is abstention from, and even reprobation of, the Union by many who approve most cordially the declaration of principles of the Union and who would sincerely rejoice if its purpose were attained. They ask, What is more important than to restore to its rightful place the fundamental faith of the Church; what is more legitimate and urgent? But they question the means employed. These they distrust, and raise the cry, "Let us not make trouble where peace reigns." These seem to forget that peace at such price ceases to be the chief good. It is therefore hoped by the Union that when men of true evangelical convictions once become convinced that the peace they would pursue can be maintained only at the price of virtual capitulation on the part of those who would defend the



historic doctrines of the Church, they will recognize that an attitude of active resistance by all those who would fearlessly maintain the truth is both reasonable and necessary. They must sooner or later realize that it is a vicious peace, and a peace which carries the worst possible implications, that can be had on such terms.

Moreover, it should be remembered that at the base of the Union stands the declaration that "in maintaining the fundamentals of faith, the purpose is to follow none but constitutional methods." The propaganda is not by revolutionary devices but rather designed to educate public opinion in legitimate ways, such as holding conferences, publishing literature and using other peaceful lines of influence. To all who are sympathetic as to the purpose, but doubtful as to the method, the Union is now addressing periodical pamphlets (monthly or quarterly) which set forth and emphasize the positive, historic doctrines revealed in the Word of God and maintained with the courage of martyrs by the founders of the Church in France. In the same spirit, it is setting forth how the ingenious and subtle devices of "modern doctrinaires" are calculated to hoodwink and deceive the very elect, and how certain it is that unless the virus is detected and eradicated the death of the Church will inevitably follow.

If "the pacifist" does not realize this, the members of the Union do, or at least they believe that they do, and they are making the fact of the Union a means of informing the lovers of peace that to defend the faith of the Apostles, Reformers and Huguenots is a duty to which all who love French Protestantism should rally without delay. The appeal is well-stated in these words: "Rather than shut our eyes to the evidence and seek by plausible excuses to evade the responsibility which is involved in our membership in the Church and our vows as ministers of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, let us make humble confession of our sin and take, every one of us, the resolution which the crisis makes reasonable and necessary, and enter the ranks, of those who are enlisted under the banner of Christ Jesus, the Captain of our Salvation."

Princeton.

SYLVESTER WOODBRIDGE BEACH.

*Pour la défense de la foi.* Editions de l'Union des Chrétiens Évangéliques. 32, Boulevard de Vincennes. Fontenay-sous-Bois. 1924. Série A.—No. 8. Prix: 5 francs.

This is one of the many publications proceeding from the Union of Evangelical Christians of France.

It consists of a series of brochures, six in number, as follows: *L'Enseignement Théologique* (E. de Vedrines), *La Sanctification* (Pasteur W. H. Guiton), *Qui dit-on que je suis?* (Pasteur E. Larroche), *N'est-ce pas le Suicide?* (S. Lortsch), *La Lumière* (Professeur H. Devaux), and *L'Espérance Chrétienne* (Pasteur A. Cruvellier). These brochures consist of scholarly and succinct statements of certain fundamental doctrines of supernatural religion, especially such as lie at the basis of the Reformed faith. They are designed and well calculated to stem the tide of rising rationalism that threatens to sweep the French Church from its historic moorings.

One quotation from the admirable paper, *N'est-ce pas le Suicide?*, by Dr. Samuel Lortsch is typical in setting forth the doctrinal position maintained throughout the entire volume:

"For them (the Modernists) the Bible is not the witness which is the basis of the faith of the Church; it is only the product of that faith. They see in the New Testament particular conceptions of the primitive Church respecting Christ; not the thought of Jesus, but the thought of the first Christians about Jesus. The apostles, the evangelists, the writers of our New Testament have interpreted the thought of Jesus through the prism of their Jewish mentality, by their own thought which has deformed the teaching of Jesus. Therefore, the service which modern theologians wish to render is to release the true thought of Christ (of which they have the intuition and sense) from all early superstitions and all symbols which oriental mysticism, deceived hopes of the disciples, or blind tradition, have attributed to Jesus.

"Now we are in the presence of two conceptions diametrically opposed (mutually exclusive).

"One rests all authority in Christ; and accepts the Bible for what it claims to be: The Word of God, and as such the rule, objective and absolute, of our faith.

"The other conception makes the authority of the Bible only relative, and subordinates it to the value judgment of man. Man is, in the last analysis, the source of authority, not the Word of God. In short the alternative is between the authoritative Word of God, and an absolute, arbitrary subjectivism.

"And if it be the question of authority which separates Catholics and Protestants, it is still a question of authority which separates evangelicals and non-evangelicals.

"Each one is free to choose his own rule of faith, but let us learn to renounce the chimerical hope, which is only a delusion and snare, that these two conceptions can be reconciled. There is no common standing ground. Attempting a task so impossible must eventuate in misunderstandings the most deadly" (p. 42f).

Princeton.

SYLVESTER WOODBRIDGE BEACH.

*The Hymn as Literature.* By JEREMIAH BASCOM REEVES, PH.D., Professor of English Literature in Westminster College, Fulton, Mo. The Century Co. Cloth, 8vo., pp. 369. Price \$2.00.

This is a wholly new study of the Hymn. Its history has been written, various collections of hymns have been made, but its place in literature, simply as "literature," has never before to the reviewer's knowledge been investigated in any adequate fashion. It is matter for congratulation that this effort has been made by one so eminently fitted for a sympathetic and scholarly handling of this important theme as Dr. Reeves.

The opening chapter, "The Hymn," shows its singular power and importance in the world by an array of facts which almost startle one. That more "hymn-books" are sold than any other form of "book"; that more hymns are read than any other form of poetry, almost any

other form of literature; that the hymn has been sung as an essential act in nearly every important, critical time of history; that it has played a powerful part in forming history,—are facts whose meaning is not realized by many. Succeeding chapters on, The Hymn, Ancient and Mediaeval, The Native English Hymn, English Psalmody, Watts, The Period of the Wesleys, Heber and the Romantic Revival, The Nineteenth Century, give the study the historical back-ground which is always essential to any complete and adequate literary appreciation.

Dr. Reeves' literary taste is precisely what is required for successful handling of such a topic. If anything, a little too severe in his standards of what is "good hymnody," he is eminently sane and sensible, while also refined, scholarly and critical. In marked contrast with the patronizing tone adopted by some so-called students of literature, he ably defends the Hymn and vindicates its right to a place in literature side by side with the greatest types. Its field is peculiarly its own, but that field is shown to be as great and worthy as that of any other form. The Drama, Lyric Poetry in general, the Essay,—none has a better claim than the Hymn, though hitherto its merits have been all too lightly regarded. The Hymn has been historically a great exponent of orthodox Christianity, a most appropriate channel for the expression of Christian devotion. And the lack of interest in hymnody on the part of many a literary critic is perhaps in not a few instances indicative of a lack of interest in vital Christianity. Dr. Reeves is a finely equipped scholar and critic, but he is also a Christian, who has an understanding of the great doctrines of the Faith which is fully adequate to his task, and he is an earnest believer in them. This adds to his purely intellectual and aesthetic equipment, adequate and fine as it is, that sympathetic understanding of the Hymn which no one can possess in a degree sufficient for its true appreciation and estimation, who is not a Christian believer. This is especially apparent in the last chapter, "The Import of the Hymn-Book" in which Dr. Reeves discusses that feature which finally justifies the claim of the Hymn to rank as great "literature." For no literature is great which is not the expression of great thoughts. The mighty and eternal truths and aspirations which are the subject matter of the Hymn are here beautifully and forcefully presented, and the power of the Hymn adequately to express them—its lyric beauty, charm, perfection of form, finish of style, emotional power, elevation of manner,—are finely presented.

The book is one that every minister of the Gospel should read, and it should also appeal to a much wider circle of readers.

Fulton, Mo.

DANIEL S. GAGE

*Heaven and Hell in Comparative Religion; with Special Reference to Dante's Divine Comedy.* By DR. KAUFMANN KOHLER, President Emeritus, Hebrew Union College, Cincinnati. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1923. pp. 158.

In his latest book, Dr. Kohler has succeeded in compressing into very short compass more misinformation regarding religion in general and

Christianity in particular, more radical criticism, and less understanding of Dante, than one could have believed possible, were not the book in evidence. With no insight into the mysticism of Dante, no sympathy with or understanding of the Catholic tradition, and no point of contact with the mediæval mind, Dr. Kohler embarked upon a hopeless task when he started out to show the *Divine Comedy* as a link, and the last link, in the evolution of the human myth of heaven and hell.

"The middle ages are called ages of faith, but it would be more correct to call them ages of credulity, or of blind belief, unenlightened by reason and knowledge, and lacking altogether originality of thought" (p. 134). "As we trace life today through its various stages, from the lowest to the highest form, we see man's life to be a constant ascent and not a fall from grace . . ." (p. 151.) "We are passing amidst severe tests and trials from the former religion of servility and blind authority-worship, to one of independent thinking and free manhood. . . . We are in the birth-throes of a new era of humanity. . . . We need a new inspiration . . . a powerful vision which points not to a realm beyond the grave, but beckons us . . . forward to a life of duty and service, and makes us all, be it through the Church or the Mosque, the Pagoda or the Synagogue, partakers of the kingdom of God" (pp. 157-158). These passages sufficiently illustrate the viewpoint of the author and his fitness to be an interpreter of the *Divine Comedy*. But if Dr. Kohler is really in earnest in his search for a new religion that will welcome mosque, pagoda, synagogue and church, we wonder that he does not join the forces of the Bâb, unless indeed there is too much supernaturalism in Mirza Ali's philosophy.

Delaware City, Del.

ROBERT CLAIBORNE PITZER.

*The Teaching Work of the Church.* By the Committee on the War and the Religious Outlook (Appointed by The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America). New York: Association Press. 1923. Pp. ix, 309. Price \$2.00.

This is the final volume of a series of five reports issued by the Committee on the War and the Religious Outlook. This committee, it may be recalled, was an interdenominational group appointed in 1918 by united action of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America and the General War Time Commission of the Churches. The committee was requested "to consider the state of religion as revealed or affected by the war, with special reference to the duty and opportunity of the Church." Including the volume under review the Committee has issued five reports: Religion among American Men; The Missionary Outlook in the Light of the War; The Church and Industrial Reconstruction; and, Christian Unity.

Of these reports *The Teaching Work of the Church* is in every way the most valuable and the one most likely to be permanent. It easily takes a foremost place as in general a sane, suggestive, and comprehensive presentation of what is at present the most necessary function of the Church.

Chapters I. and II, by Professor Luther A. Weigle of the Yale Divin-



ity School, point out as an obvious consequence of the secularization of the public schools that the Church must *teach*, not merely preach, the Christian religion. Under the American system of government the Church alone can educate religiously. Hence the extreme importance of controlling for Christianity the popular agencies that mould public opinion. It does not follow, however, as Dr. Weigle would have us conclude, that if religious education begins with the experience of fellowship in Christian purposes and activities (p. 52), Christian doctrine is therefore an interpretation of Christian experience. Chapters III and IV., by Benjamin S. Winchester of The International S. S. Lesson Committee, explain how best to teach the Christian religion to the child and the youth. The importance of a Christian education for infancy and childhood is strikingly emphasized. The fundamental relationships that should be explained to the child of the kindergarten age are carefully stated (p. 68). But why should the most important relationship of all, that of Christ as Savior to the child, be omitted? Our own teaching experience with young children convinces us that this relation can be as readily grasped as that of the Father in heaven. Chapter VI., by Dr. William Adams Brown, considers the method of teaching Christianity to modern men. It is a fresh restatement of the familiar argument that the problems of modern life are to be solved rightly only by the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Chapter VI., by the Rev. Samuel McCrea Cavert of the Federal Council of the Churches, discusses Christianizing Public Opinion. A great many of us have perhaps never thought of this at all. Public opinion, we might agree, is perhaps the most powerful educator in the modern world, but can it be Christianized? Dr. Cavert thinks it can and shows how. Few will refuse to follow the facts and reasons here presented in proof of the assertion that in public opinion we have a means of moulding the beliefs of thousands popularly regarded as beyond the reach of the Church. Chapter VII, The Teaching Agencies of the Local Church, and Chapter IX, Securing a Unified Educational Program for the Church, are again by Dr. Winchester. The following is worth quoting:

"Altogether too much of the preaching of today, however—and of the services of worship also—leaves the impression that their teaching value is very imperfectly understood. The sermon fails to make contact with the life and thinking of the hearer, or it deals too exclusively in vague generalities, or it lacks suggestiveness, or its structure is diffuse and scattering, or it leaves the hearer in doubt as to just what he is expected to do. In other words, the preacher is not educational in method" (p. 146).

Chapter VIII., by Erwin L. Shaver of The Congregational Education Society, describes interestingly and in detail, The New Movement of Week Day Religious Education.

The last section of the book considers The Church as it Trains for Christian Leadership. Chapter X., Religious Education in the College, and Chapter XI, Religious Education in the Tax-supported Institutions, are by Dr. Robert L. Kelly, of the Council of Church Boards of Education. His findings are much more moderate than his reports on theological education would lead us to expect. Contrary to many loudly



expressed opinions of the day, Dr. Kelly thinks that the colleges form favorable soil for the growth of religion. Chapter XII, by Dr. William Adams Brown, deals with Education for the Christian Ministry. We might conceivably agree with the following (p. 291):

"We must, in a word, regard the seminary as first of all a *training* school. It is not primarily a place for making technical experts in Biblical languages and literature, history or philosophy, though the seminary that is worthy of its task will do this also, but for fitting men to go out into the midst of modern social life as pastors, preachers, teachers, organizers, for the sake of building the Kingdom of God on the earth." But this is no necessary reason for excluding from the seminary course as much of the traditional content and method as is recommended in the pages following. The minister must be primarily "mighty in the Scriptures" and, whatever else modern learning may add, this demands the fundamentals of the traditional curriculum.

The book contains a classified bibliography of all the matters discussed.

*Lincoln University, Pa.*

GEORGE JOHNSON.

## PERIODICAL LITERATURE

*American Church Monthly*, New York, October: WILLIAM C. WOODS, Present Status of Evolution; J. G. H. BARRY, Modernism once more; ARTHUR C. CLARKE, Problems of Prayer. *The Same*, November: THOMAS J. HARDY, Towards Discipleship; J. G. H. BARRY, Lives of the Saints; F. J. FOAKES JACKSON, The Lausiac History; RUPERT D. TURNBULL, Church in Canada; ELIZABETH E. BARKER, What Has Modernism to Do with Religion? *The Same*, December: F. J. FOAKES JACKSON, Cassian's Institutes and Conferences; FREDERICK S. ARNOLD, Psychology of Holiness; F. C. H. WENDEL, Was Jesus the Son of Joseph?; GEORGE W. HODGE, The Rationale of Prayer.

*Biblical Review*, New York, October: JOHN MACNICOL, Essential Reality in Christianity; A. G. HOGG, Comradeship and Forgiveness; ANDREW GILLIES, Religion and Morals; J. E. HABLSTON, Loose Leaves from an Expositor's Notebook.

*Bibliotheca Sacra*, St. Louis, October: A. TROELSTRA, Deuteronomy; PARKE P. FLOURNEY, Evolution of the Mind of Man; JAMES BUSWELL, Alleged Genetic Relationship between Christianity and Ancient Contemporaneous Religions; C. B. HURLBURT, Birth-Origin of the Christian Ecclesia.

*Catholic Historical Review*, Washington, October: J. F. LEIBELL, The Church and Humanism; MAURICE WILKINSON, Erasmus, the Sorbonne and the Index; MAX G. RUPP, Hugo Grotius and his Place in the History of International Peace; RICHARD C. WILTON, Early Eighteenth Century Catholics in England; ALFRED KAUFMANN, Renan—the Man; ALFRED H. SWEET, Some Papal Privileges of the English Benedictines.

*Church Quarterly Review*, London, October: J. ARMITAGE ROBINSON, Bishop Gore on the Holy Spirit and the Church; W. LOCKTON, Unction of

the Sick; H. F. B. COMPSTON, Jewish Humanism; H. BRYANT SALMON, Judean Narratives in the Third Gospel; CLAUDE JENKINS, Some Thirteenth Century Registers; KENNETH T. HENDERSON, Ethics and the Control of History; C. E. WAGER, Neo-Tübingenism and the Acts of the Apostles.

*Congregational Quarterly*, London, October: F. R. TENNANT, Divine Personality; WILFRED GRENFELL, How the Gospel Is Preached in Labrador Today; H. A. MESS, The Elements of a Christian Sociology; ALEXANDER BAXTER, The Chinese Mind and the Christian Message; JOHN B. MURPHY, Psychology of Gambling; HUGH MARTIN, The Student Christian Movement; HAROLD F. SANDERS, Christianity and the Changing Moral Sanctions.

*East & West*, London, October: HARRY WALLER, Christian Education and the Missionary Societies of India; F. H. MOSSE, Unity in the Crucible; W. H. G. ASPLAND, Opium in China; SETON CHURCHILL, Abolition of Slavery; D. A. STEVENS, African Christianity and the Sacraments; J. I. MACNAIR, Problems raised by the Indian Mass Movement; A. S. CRIPPS, Daybreak for Darkness.

*Expositor*, London, October: W. D. NIVEN, Ten Best Books on the Philosophy of Religion; H. H. ROWLEY, The Belshazzar of History and of Daniel; S. TONKIN, The Preacher and the Transfiguration; F. R. M. HITCHCOCK, Latin Expressions in the Prison Epistles. *The Same*, November: H. J. FLOWERS, The Second Commandment; H. T. ANDREWS, Ten Best Books on the Life of Jesus; R. DUNKERLEY, Early Christian Reminiscences of Jesus; H. ERSKINE HILL, Relation of Pentecost to the First Coming of Christ. *The Same*, December: H. R. MACKINTOSH, Ten Best Books on Miracle; H. J. FLOWERS, The Second Commandment; H. J. CADBURY, The Ancient Physiological Notions underlying John 1:13 and Hebrews 11:11; HUGH MICHAEL, "Work out Your Own Salvation"; W. S. WOOD, Simplicity toward Christ; J. RENDEL HARRIS, The Diatessaron and the Testimony Book.

*Expository Times*, Edinburgh, November: J. F. MCFADYEN, A St. Andrew's Day Sermon; J. HUGH MICHAEL, Paul and Job: a neglected Analogy; JAMES JEFFREY, The Massoretic Text and the Septuagint compared; H. R. MACKINTOSH, Recent Foreign Theology: The Swiss Group; A. D. BELDEN, Doctrine of the Trinity. *The Same*, December: J. E. MCFADYEN, Telescoped History; JOHN A. HUTTON, 'When ye pray, say Our Father'; J. S. MACARTHUR, The Words of the 'Hymn of Jesus.'

*Homiletic Review*, New York, September: Theological Seminaries under Fire; Alexander Whyte of Free St. George's; LYNN H. HOUGH, The Mind of the Preacher; WM. H. LEACH, Working with Men who Toil; LYNN H. HOUGH, The Gentle Art of Illustration. *The Same*, November: JOHN E. MCFADYEN, The Preacher's Use of Jeremiah; Why Psychoanalysis?; E. H. BYINGTON, Pulpit Mirrors; ELIZABETH ROSE, Seven Day Churches in Mission Lands. *The Same*, December: A. G. MACKINNON, The World into which Christ Came; ARTHUR CHAMBERLAIN, The Preacher and the Procession; J. F. MCFADYEN, Religious Education in Theory and in Practice.

*Jewish Quarterly Review*, Philadelphia, October: A. W. GREENUP, Fragment of the Yalkut of R. Machir bar Abba Mari on Hosea; L. D. BARNETT, Two Documents of the Inquisition; B. HALPER, Recent Orientalia and Judaica.

*Journal of Negro History*, Washington, October: A. A. TAYLOR, The Negro in South Carolina during Reconstruction (concluded).

*Journal of Religion*, Chicago, September: WILLIAM K. WRIGHT, On Certain Aspects of the Religious Sentiment; W. D. SCHERMERHORN, Syncretism in the Early Christian Period and in Present-Day India; MARIO PUGLISI, Fascismo and Religious Teaching in the Italian Schools; JAMES T. ADDISON, The Modern Chinese Cult of Ancestors; BRUCE W. BROTH-ERSTON, Religion and Instinct. *The Same*, November: ERNEST D. BURTON, Religion and Education; SHIRLEY J. CASE, Religious Meaning of the Past; LEWIS HODOUS, A Chinese Premillenarian; GEORGE CROSS, Christianity and Christology; ROBERT A. ASHWORTH, The Fundamentalism among the Baptists; T. L. HARRIS, The Problem of Worship in American Protestantism.

*Journal of Theological Studies*, London, October: G. H. DIX, The Heavenly Wisdom and the Divine Logos in Jewish Apocalyptic; C. H. TURNER, Marcan Usage: Notes on the Second Gospel; J. H. BAXTER, Martyrs of Madura: N. H. BAYNES, Optatus; P. BATIFFOL, La Prima Cathedra episcopatus du Concile d'Elvire: réponse à M. Jülicher; R. P. BLAKE, Georgian Theological Literature; E. C. E. OWEN, St. Gregory of Nyssa: Grammar, Vocabulary and Style; C. H. DODD, Notes from the Papyri; F. C. BURKITT, Isaac of Nineveh.

*London Quarterly Review*, London, October: W. T. DAVISON, An Epistle of Eternal Realities; ST. NIHAL SINGH, The Social Upheaval in India; H. REINHEIMER, Spiritual Law in Nature; LESLIE D. WEATHERHEAD, Idea of Immortality in Wordsworth; ARCHIBALD W. HARRISON, Vorstius and James I: a Theological Interlude in Diplomacy; J. MARWOOD SANDERSON, The 'Supernatural' in Religion: is it Necessary?; HENRY BETT, Theology and Progress.

*Lutheran Quarterly*, Gettysburg, October: J. A. SINGMASTER, The Virgin Birth; J. F. SPRINGER, Why Lose the Apostle Matthew as a Witness?; PAUL H. HEISY, The Lutheran Graded Series of Sunday School Material.

*Monist*, Chicago, October: HENRY LANTZ, The New Phenomenology; LOUIS A. REID, Reason and Freedom; A. J. SNOW, Newton's Objections to Descartes' Astronomy; J. G. MCKERROW, A New Natural Theology; O. STAPLEDON, Problem of Universals; H. WILDON CARR, Crucial Problem in Monadology; ALAN D. CAMPBELL, The Role of Sequences in our Search for the Truth.

*Moslem World*, New York City, October: D. S. MARGOLIOUTH, Latest Developments of the Caliphate Question; "ALUN YALE," The Caliphate; LOUIS F. DAME, Four Months in Nejd; MUMAMMED DIN, Islam the Religion of Peace; SAMUEL M. ZWEMER, The Law of Apostasy; ABRAHAM MOORHATCH, A New Day in Persia; HENRY A. BILKERT, The New Mesopotamia.

*New Church Life*, Lancaster, October: W. F. PENDLETON, Use of Books; K. R. ALDEN, The Costly Sacrifice; G. A. McQUEEN, What is the Academy Spirit?; F. R. COOPER, Establishing the Church.

*Open Court*, Chicago, September: JONATHAN WRIGHT, Legend of Socrates; R. PETSCH, Problem of Personal Immortality; J. V. NASH, Ethics of John Dewey; VICTOR S. YARROS, The Idea of God Today: Neo-Agnostic View; HENRI VANDERBYLL, Sidelights on History; HARDIN T. McCLELLAND, Aspiration as an Artificial Attitude. *The Same*, October: J. V. NASH, An Undamaged Soul: Thomas Paine, i; JOHN J. BIRCH, Origin and Development of Instincts; ELBRIDGE COLBY, Lowbrows, Highbrows, and the National Defense; T. B. STORK, Religion; VICTOR S. YARROS, Inconsistencies and Incongruities in Jesus' Reported Teachings. *The Same*, November: J. GRAHAM EDWARDS, Interpretations Interpreted; J. V. NASH, An Undamaged Soul: Thomas Paine (conclusion); HENRI VANDERBYLL, Individual Development; HARDIN T. McCLELLAND, Art and Scientific Education; JULIUS J. PRICE, Arabic Parallels to Rabbinic Literature.

*Reformed Church Review*, Lancaster, October: HENRY H. RANCK, The Huguenots and American Life; LEE M. ERDMAN, Place of the Church in Our Modern Life; A. S. ZERBE, Evolution and Pseudo-Evolutionism; FREDERICK K. STAMM, Is Jesus Still the World's Saviour?

*Review and Expositor*, Louisville, October: CHARLES H. NASH, Salvation of the Triune God as it is Interpreted by Jesus; A. B. RUDD, Mexican Men of Letters; J. D. BAILEY, Philip Mulkey and the Story of the First Baptist Church in Upper South Carolina; E. Y. MULLINS, God and the War.

*Yale Review*, New Haven, January: ROBERT GRANT, Marriage and Divorce; THOMAS MOULT, Life and Work of Joseph Conrad; ALBERT FEUILLERAT, Scholarship and Literary Criticism; W. C. HANDY, Marquesan Sketches.

*Bilychnis*, Rome, Agosto-Sett.: S. MINOCCHI, Verità e illusioni della scienza: la statistica delle religioni; F. DAL MONTE, L'intimità del divino in Bonaventura da Bagnorea; B. BRUNELLI, L'elemento religioso nel teatro di Paul Claudel. *The Same*, Ottobre: U. BRAUZZI, In nome dell'amore; G. SEMPRINI, Le idee religiose di Leon Battista Alberti; M. A. ALMEDINGEN, La religione russa di oggi.

*Ciencia Tomista*, Madrid Septiembre-octubre: P. BARBADO, La contemplación sensitiva, según Santo Tomás; SABINO M. LOZANO, Naturaleza de la Sagrada Teología; ALEXANDER ZYCHLINSKY, Sinccra doctrina de conceptu transsubstantiationis inuxta principia S. Thomae Aquinatis. *The Same*, Noviembre-diciembre: ANTONIO G. PELÁEZ, Doctrina tomista sobre la tiranía política; JUAN G. ARINTERO, Incoherencias y fantasías peligrosas en la contemplación adquirida; VICENTE BELTRÁN DE HEREDIA, Crónica del movimiento tomista.

*Gereformeerd Theologisch Tijdschrift*, Aalten, September: J. RIDDERBOS, De bescherming van Jeruzalem en Juda in Jesaja's profetie; J. G. KUNST, Verslag der Dertiende Algemeene Vergadering van de Vereeniging van Predikanten van Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland. *The*



*Same*, October: F. W. OROSHEIDE, Gustav Dalman; G. CH. AALDERS, Gereformeerd kerkelijk leven in Schotland; T. HOEKSTRA, Van Preeken. *The Same*, November: G. CH. AALDERS, Gereformeerd Kerkelijk leven in Schotland, ii; J. G. KUNST, Verslag der Dertiende Algemeene Vergadering van de Vereeniging van Predikanten van Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland; T. HOEKSTRA, Steiner's Anthroposophie; N. D. VAN LEEUWEN, De Zoogenaamde Monotheistische Reformatie.

*Logos*, Napoli, Luglio-Settembre: M. DE FRANCHIS, L'estetica delle matematiche; A. BANFI, Il naturalismo romantico del Guyau e le correnti del pensiero contemporaneo; L. VALLI, Per la Croce e l'Aquila di Dante; N. ABBAGNANO, Il problema dell'arte.

*Revue d'Ascétique et de Mystique*, Toulouse, Octobre: STEPHANE HARRETT, La doctrine du pur Amour dans le *Traité de l'Amour de Dieu* du P. Surin; W. HÜMPFNER, Coup d'oeil sur les publications relatives a Anne Catherine Emmerick; J. VAN MIERLO, Hadewijch, une mystique flamande au treizième siècle.

*Revue d'Histoire Ecclesiastique*, Louvain, Juillet-October: J. LEBON, La position de saint Cyrille de Jérusalem dans les luttes provoquées par l'arianisme (suite et fin); AUGUSTIN FLICHE, Le pontificat de Victor iii (1086-1087); P. RICHARD, La monarchie pontificale jusqu'au de Trente.

*Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie religieuses*, Strasbourg, Juillet-Août: EDOUARD NAVILLE, La révolution religieuse à la fin de la xviii<sup>e</sup> dynastie égyptienne; A. N. BERTRAND, L'héritage du modernisme; W. A. BROWN, La Religion démocratique; L. AUBERT, Le Code hittite et l'Ancien Testament; PAUL LOEBSTEIN, Trois problèmes d'Apologétique chrétienne contemporaine.

*Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie*, Lausanne, Août-October: GUILLAUME BALDENSPERGER, Un demi-siècle de recherches sur l'historicité de Jésus; WILFRID MONOD, Gaston Frommel, pasteur de campagne; ROLIN WAVRE, Une nouvelle histoire des sciences antiques; HENRI REVERDIN, La pensée d'Ernest Mach.

*Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*, Paris, Octobre: L. CHOPPIN, La Trinité dans l'Épître de S. Clément 95-98; R. HOORNAERT, Les Sources térsiennes et "L'Amour divin" de Echegoyen (à suivre); E. B. ALLO, *Encore Rom.* viii. 28-30.

*Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie*, xlviii: 4: EMIL DORSCH, Der ursprüngliche Gottesbegriffe in der Menschheit, ii; FRANZ PELSTER, Literatur-historische Probleme im Anschluss an die Bonaventuraausgabe von Quaracchi; URBAN HOLZMEISTER, Das Kontrastbild in der Bibel.



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By J. GRESHAM MACHEN, D.D. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923. Price \$1.75.

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By ROBERT DICK WILSON, PH.D., D.D., Professor of Semitic Philology and Old Testament Criticism in Princeton Theological Seminary. With a Foreword by PHILIP E. HOWARD. Philadelphia: The Sunday School Times, 1922. Price 25 cents. London: Marshall Bros., 1923. Price 1 sh.

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